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Abstract 
 
Examining Outcomes of Marketing Actions from Customer, Investor, and Operational 
Perspectives 
 
Lim Leon Gim 
 
 
This dissertation examines the impact of three distinct marketing actions from three different 
perspectives, i.e., customer, investor, and operational. Specifically, the first essay examines 
investors’ evaluation of firms’ price-increase preannouncements, thereby responding to 
recent calls for exploring investors’ evaluation of a firm’s pricing actions which have been 
predominantly examined from consumers’ perspective. The second essay adopts an 
operations lens to present the first empirical examination about the impact of customer 
satisfaction on the future costs of selling and producing for a firm. The essay, therefore, is of 
direct importance to CEOs as they consider costs as their top priority. In addition, it is 
responsive to recent calls for more research on the cost implications of marketing actions. 
Finally, the third essay integrates the customer, investor and operational perspectives, to 
explore the consequences of mergers and acquisitions using a stakeholder-specific approach. 
Specifically, using a longitudinal dataset, this essay examines how mergers and acquisitions 
in the airline industry have an impact on key stakeholders – consumers, employees, senior 
managers, and investors. Taken together, this dissertation seeks to contribute to existing 
literature by exploring, for different stakeholders, the outcomes of marketing actions that 
have high managerial relevance, but have received little attention in current literature. 
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Chapter 1 
General Introduction 
 
Marketing actions can potentially have differential or even conflicting consequences for 
different stakeholders, e.g., consumers, investors, employees, and senior managers. For 
example, while price wars are welcomed by consumers, investors are wary of them as they 
are likely to erode a firm’s profit margins (van Heerde, Gijsbrechts, and Pauwels 2015). 
Similarly, whereas investors have favourable evaluations of new product announcements 
(Warren and Sorescu 2017), the launch of new products is likely to increase the costs of 
selling for the firm (Kim and McAlister 2011). Accordingly, this dissertation comprises of 
three essays that examine the consequences of three distinct marketing actions from three 
different perspectives, i.e., customer, investor, and operational.  
1.1 Outline of the Dissertation 
Chapter 2 features the first essay of this dissertation, “Investors’ Evaluation of Price-Increase 
Preannouncements”. This essay examines the impact of firms’ price-increase 
preannouncements from an investor perspective. Several firms preannounce their price 
increases with the expectation that such announcements will be evaluated favorably by 
investors. However, little is known about the actual effect they have on shareholder value. 
Accordingly, the authors present the first systematic empirical examination of investors’ 
evaluations of 265 price-increase preannouncements (PIP). Results show that whereas the 
average increase in abnormal returns following a PIP is 0.41%, almost 42% of the PIPs result 
in negative abnormal returns. To explore this heterogeneity, the authors propose a conceptual 
framework that focuses on three key pieces of information that investors can use when 
evaluating a PIP: information on the nature (size and timing) of the upcoming price increase, 
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information on the underlying motivation for the price increase (cost and/or demand based), 
and information on prior PIP occurrences by the firm and its competitors. Consistent with the 
proposed hypotheses, results indicate that PIPs with greater timing, higher own precedence 
and greater competitive precedence result in lower abnormal returns, while PIPs with higher 
magnitude and PIPs with an explicit demand attribution result in greater abnormal returns.  
Chapter 3 features the second essay of this dissertation, “Customer Satisfaction and 
its Impact on the Cost of Selling and Producing”. This essay adopts an operations lens to 
present the first empirical examination about the impact of customer satisfaction on the future 
costs of selling and producing for a firm. Whereas most empirical research on customer 
satisfaction explores its impact on either investor sentiment or operational performance, few 
studies directly examine its impact on the costs incurred by the firm. Accordingly, this essay 
draws on the Motivation-Opportunity-Ability framework to outline hypotheses about the 
effects of customer satisfaction on the cost of selling (COS) and the cost of producing (COP). 
Using almost two decades of data comprising 1022 observations from 115 firms, the results 
suggest that on average higher customer satisfaction significantly lowers COS. This effect is 
stronger for firms that have lower stock returns or stock returns volatility, or higher inventory 
slack. In addition, the impact of customer satisfaction on COS is stronger if the firm is in an 
industry with higher growth or lower turbulence. Interestingly, customer satisfaction 
significantly lowers COP only for firms that have lower stock returns or stock returns 
volatility, or higher inventory slack. This essay concludes by calculating the cost elasticities 
of customer satisfaction and discussing the dollar impact of increases in customer satisfaction 
on COS and COP. 
Chapter 4 features the third essay of this dissertation, “A Stakeholder-Specific 
Approach to Examining the Impact of Mergers and Acquisitions: Policy Implications from an 
Empirical Examination”. This essay integrates the consumer, employee, senior manager, and 
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investor perspectives, to explore the consequences of mergers and acquisitions in the airlines 
industry by adopting a stakeholder-specific approach. Using a unique longitudinal dataset 
assembled from multiple secondary data sources, results from the stacked generalized 
difference-in-difference analysis show that following a M&A, acquiring airlines offer higher 
prices, lower service quality and fewer choices for consumers. In addition, whereas the 
employees of these airlines face reduction in headcounts, lower salaries and lower benefits 
after the M&A, senior managers of these airlines enjoy higher salaries post-merger. Finally, 
from an investor perspective, M&As result in higher operating margins and lower operating 
costs. However, the revenue passenger miles (RPM), an indicator of an airline’s growth 
potential, decreases after a M&A. Interestingly, further analyses show that higher prior 
service emphasis of an acquiring airline softens the negative impact of M&As for consumers 
and employees. In addition, acquiring airlines with higher prior service emphasis also provide 
smaller increases in senior managers’ salaries after a M&A. From an investor perspective, 
these airlines also accrue smaller gains in operating margins, and smaller reduction in 
operating costs following a M&A. Importantly, acquiring airlines with higher prior service 
emphasis experience a smaller reduction in RPM following a M&A. Taken together, results 
of this essay provide policy makers with empirical evidence to reconsider the future 
approvals of M&As in the airline industry. 
1.2 Contribution of Dissertation 
This dissertation contributes to the academic literature by examining, for different 
stakeholders, the outcomes of marketing actions that have high managerial relevance, but 
have received little attention in current literature. Specifically, the first essay responds to 
recent calls for exploring the shareholder-value effect of firms’ pricing actions (Edeling and 
Fischer 2016, p. 533), a key concern for investors (e.g., Subhedar and Rees 2017). By 
presenting a systematic examination of how investors evaluate price-increase 
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preannouncements, this essay also augments existing research on price increases that 
predominantly focuses on consumer reactions (e.g., Homburg, Hoyer, and Koschate 2005; 
Homburg, Koschate, and Totzek 2010).  
The second essay is responsive to recent calls for more research on the impact of 
marketing actions on firms’ costs (Katsikeas et al. 2016, p. 16), a top priority for CEOs (e.g., 
PwC 2017). Even though firms often engage in initiatives to improve customer satisfaction 
(e.g., Keiningham et al. 2014), the views of the cost implications of such marketing efforts 
are often inconclusive (e.g., Krasnikov, Jayachandran, and Kumar 2009; Mizik and Nissim 
2011). As such, recognizing the importance of customer satisfaction and costs, this essay 
seeks to contribute to the paucity of research examining the relationship between the two.  
Finally, the third essay is responsive to recent calls for more research in marketing 
that accounts for the key stakeholders of the firm (Mishra and Modi 2016, p. 43) and assesses 
the societal outcomes of marketing actions (Moorman and Day 2016, p.29). Through the 
examination of multiple performance outcomes, this essay provides a holistic investigation of 
the costs and benefits of M&As for key stakeholders and complements extant research that 
predominantly examines the impact of M&As on prices (e.g., Borenstein 1990; Peters 2006).  
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Chapter 2 
Investors’ Evaluation of Price-Increase 
Preannouncements 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Price increases are widely viewed as one of the most effective marketing instruments to 
increase profits (Meehan, Davenport, and Kahlon 2012). Consulting reports, the popular 
press, and industry experts frequently underscore the importance of price increases. For 
example, Deloitte Consulting reports that the effect of a price increase on profits is 4 times 
that of other initiatives (Hayes and Singh 2013). McKinsey & Company reports that a 1% 
increase in product price can boost the operating profits of a typical Global 1200 firm by 
8.70% (Baker, Marn, and Zawada 2010). The investment community also endorses the 
importance of price increases. Warren Buffet, for example, suggests that the ability to raise 
prices is investors’ “single most important decision in evaluating a business” (see Frye and 
Campbell 2011, p. 1 for the full statement). Similarly, Reuters identifies a firm’s ability to 
raise prices as the key concern for investors in 2017 (Subhedar and Rees 2017).  
Against this background, it is not surprising that several firms publicly announce their 
price increases ahead of their actual implementation to signal to investors their ability and 
willingness to do so (Calantone and Schatzel 2000). For example, during 2010 – 2014, 
Starbucks made 10 price-increase preannouncements (PIPs), J.M. Smucker made 7 PIPs, 
while Peet’s Coffee made just one such pre-announcement. Analysts tend to view a PIP as a 
valuable signal as it communicates potential future earnings to investors, and allows 
customers to make budgetary adjustments (Marn, Roegner, and Zawada 2004; Smith 2011). 
A PIP can also be a valuable competitive market signal, as it indicates a firm’s pricing intent 
to its competitors (Heil and Robertson 1991; Prabhu and Stewart 2001). 
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Anecdotal evidence, however, shows that investors do not always share a unanimous 
positive view about PIPs. For example, when J.M. Smucker preannounced a price increase 9 
days before its implementation in February 2011 (J.M. Smucker Company 2011), it resulted 
in an abnormal increase of 0.76% in its stock price.1 However, when it preannounced another  
price increase almost 2 months before its implementation in September 2011 (Ziobro 2011), 
its stock price had an abnormal decrease of 0.40%. Similarly, when Starbucks made a 
preannouncement of a 1% increase in its prices in June 2013 (Kavilanz 2013), it resulted in 
an abnormal decrease of 0.72% in its stock price. However, when in June 2014 it made a 
preannouncement of a 4.5% increase in its prices (Ausick 2014), its stock price had an 
abnormal increase of 1.85%.  
Given the oft-mentioned importance, combined with the contradictory anecdotal 
evidence, it is surprising that there has not yet been a systematic examination of investors’ 
evaluations of a PIP. Accordingly, we draw on multiple secondary data sources to present the 
first large-scale empirical study of investors’ evaluations of PIPs. Using an event-study 
approach, we measure investors’ evaluations by calculating the abnormal returns following 
265 PIPs between 2010 and 2014. Thus, we respond to recent calls for research to examine 
investors’ evaluations of a firm’s pricing decisions (Edeling and Fischer 2016, p. 533), and 
complement existing studies on price increases that almost exclusively examined customer 
reactions (Homburg, Hoyer, and Koschate 2005; Homburg, Koschate, and Totzek 2010).  
We find that, on average, a PIP results in abnormal returns of 0.41%. There is, 
however, significant underlying heterogeneity, as almost 42% of the PIPs result in negative 
abnormal returns. Therefore, we develop a conceptual framework to identify conditions under 
which investors will react more or less positively (negatively) to a PIP. Integrating prior 
                                                          
1 An abnormal increase in stock price is an increase in the stock price that is not predicted by taking into consideration 
fundamental financial factors. 
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literature from a customer, economic, and competitive perspectives, we postulate that 
investors are likely to take three essential pieces of information into account when evaluating 
a PIP. First, we posit that investors will take information on the implementation of the 
upcoming price change into account, i.e. the extent of the increase (i.e., magnitude) and when 
it will become effective (i.e., timing). Second, investors may consider whether an explicit 
reason for the increase is offered in the announcement (i.e., attribution), and if so, whether the 
price change is attributed to an increase in demand and/or to an increase in the underlying 
costs. Finally, investors’ evaluations of a PIP are likely to also be affected by prior PIP 
occurrences by the firm and/or its competitors (i.e., precedence).  
Results provide strong support for the conceptual framework, as we find that timing 
has a significant negative impact on abnormal returns. In contrast, magnitude has a 
significant positive impact on abnormal returns. Therefore, results underscore the importance 
of both implementation features of the upcoming price increase. Underscoring the moderating 
role of attribution, we find that a PIP is likely to result in a significant positive effect on 
abnormal returns if a firm provides a demand attribution in the PIP. In addition, results 
support arguments for the moderating effects of precedence. Specifically, we find a 
significant negative effect on abnormal returns following the PIP if the firm’s own 
precedence of prior PIPs is higher. We also find a significant negative effect on abnormal 
returns following the PIP if competitive precedence is higher. Taken together, the results 
present a nuanced picture that enables senior managers to identify conditions under which 
PIPs are more likely to be evaluated (un)favourably by investors.   
2.2 Conceptual Framework 
A PIP takes place when a firm makes a public announcement of a future price increase. The 
fundamental concern for investors is the expected effect of a PIP on the future cash flows of 
the firm (Srinivasan and Bharadwaj 2004). If investors consider a PIP to result in an increase 
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(decrease) in future cash flows, they are likely to adjust the stock price of the firm upwards 
(downwards), resulting in positive (negative) abnormal returns.  
Drawing on prior literature on preannouncements, we propose that investors’ 
evaluations of a PIP are likely to be a function of three sets of drivers: (1) the information 
contained in the PIP that characterizes the planned price increase (Implementation 
Information), (2) the underlying rationale for the preannounced price increase (Attribution), 
and (3) the prior PIP behaviour of the firm and its competitors (Precedence). Figure 2.1 
outlines the proposed conceptual framework. 
[Insert Figure 2.1 about here] 
While a PIP can serve as a “necessary means” for a firm to communicate its future 
price level to customers (Smith 2011, p. 283), it can also signal to investors the potential 
future earnings of the firm (Marn, Roegner, and Zawada 2004). In addition, like other forms 
of preannouncements, a PIP can also be conceived as a competitive market signal (Heil and 
Langvardt 1994), where the firm makes a PIP with the purpose of influencing the behaviours 
of its competitors (Prabhu and Stewart 2001). Thus, when developing our hypotheses, we 
assess the impact of each of the proposed drivers on abnormal returns by considering three 
perspectives: a customer, an economic and a competitive perspective. In doing so, we draw 
upon the shareholder value framework of Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey (1998), and 
consider how future cash flows could be affected in terms of their level, their stability, and 
their timing.2 Then, following prior research (e.g., Geyskens, Gielens, and Dekimpe 2002), 
we derive the expected net effect on shareholder value by combining the arguments across 
the three perspectives.  
                                                          
2 Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey (1998) also identify the residual value as a fourth dimension of shareholder value. 
However, given that investors evaluate the net impact of a PIP on all expected future cash flows, the residual value of the 
firm’s business is automatically incorporated into the valuation as an outcome of the level, stability and timing of expected 
future cash flows (see Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey 1999, p. 173). Therefore, consistent with existing research in 
marketing (e.g., Luo and Homburg 2008), we do not explicitly consider the effect of a PIP on the residual value of the firm’s 
business in our conceptual framework. 
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From a customer’s point of view, a PIP’s impact on shareholder value is likely to 
depend on their perceptions of fairness. If customers view the announced price increase as 
unfair, they may well  reduce (or even terminate) their relationships with the firm (Xia, 
Monroe, and Cox 2004). This, in turn, will result in lower future sales. Customers may even 
vent their negative emotions by spreading unfavourable word-of-mouth about the firm or 
brand, which is likely to have an adverse effect on the purchase decisions of both current and 
potential customers (Luo 2007). If customers view a PIP as unfair, it can lower the levels and 
stability of expected future cash flows. It can also have an adverse effect on the timing of 
expected future cash flows, as negative word-of-mouth can make it more difficult (and time 
consuming) to convince prospective new customers (Luo and Homburg 2007). In contrast, if 
customers perceive the price increase as fair, both current and potential new customers are 
likely to proceed with their usual (planned) transactions, but now at a higher price.  
From an economic perspective, investors take into account the PIP’s implications in 
terms of revenues and costs (Geyskens, Gielens, and Dekimpe 2002), given that both affect 
the levels of the expected future cash flows of the firm (Srinivasan et al. 2009). Also, the time 
at which the firm experiences the changes in revenues and costs, i.e., sooner or later, will 
accelerate or delay the firm’s receipt of these expected future cash flows (Srivastava, 
Shervani, and Fahey 1998). 
Finally, a PIP’s impact on shareholder value is also likely to be a function of the 
degree to which a firm is vulnerable to competition. Following a PIP, competitors can try to 
attract the firm’s customers by keeping their own prices unchanged, by cutting their prices, or 
by increasing their prices to a lesser extent (Thomadsen 2012). The higher the expected loss 
of current and potential customers to competitors, the lower investors’ expectations will be 
about the level and stability of future cash flows, while the expected speed of reaction will 
affect the timing of these cash flows.  
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It is important to note that our objective is to develop hypotheses about investors’ 
expectations about the impact of a PIP on shareholder value at the time when the PIP is 
made. Therefore, we develop arguments for the effect of a PIP on the three aforementioned 
dimensions of expected future cash flows to arrive at a testable expectation about the 
combined (or net) effect on shareholder value. Consistent with prior event studies (see, for 
example, Geyskens, Gielens, and Dekimpe 2002 or Kalaignanam et al. 2013), we do not 
empirically test the effects of the independent variables on each separate underlying 
dimension. This is because the data for these are typically not available to investors at the 
time when a PIP is made (see also Steenkamp and Fang 2011, p. 631 for a similar reasoning).  
Table 2.1 outlines the three perspectives, along with the net expected effects of 
implementation information, attribution and precedence on the resulting abnormal returns. 
 [Insert Table 2.1 about here] 
2.2.1 Implementation Information 
In assessing the impact of a PIP, investors are likely to focus on two fundamental attributes of 
the upcoming price increase, its Magnitude and Timing. Timing is a fundamental attribute 
because it provides concrete information about the time at which investors can expect the 
changes in future cash flows to accrue to the firm (for a similar logic in case of product 
recalls, see Eilert et al. 2017).  It also signals the firm’s commitment to really implement the 
price increase (cf. Sorescu, Shankar, and Kushwaha 2007), as well as the concreteness of its 
intentions. A second fundamental attribute is the magnitude of the preannounced price 
increase, which communicates the per-unit impact of the upcoming price increase, and 
thereby helps investors to form expectations about its likely cash-flow impact (Marn, 
Roegner, and Zawada 2004).  
Timing. The duration between the date of the announcement and the date the 
preannounced price increase will become effective refers to the timing of a preannounced 
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price increase. Greater timing implies that customers have more time to prepare for the 
preannounced price increase by changing their consumption patterns or by reallocating their 
budgets. Since such a situation is in customers’ favour, it is less likely to trigger perceptions 
of price unfairness (Xia, Monroe, and Cox 2004). Therefore, from a customer perspective, a 
PIP with greater timing is likely to result in more favourable expected future cash flows.  
However, from an economic perspective, the timing of the preannounced price 
increase is likely to have a negative impact on the level and timing of expected future cash 
flows. This is because if the preannounced price increase corresponds to a better (more 
profitable) price for the firm, then purchases made between the day of the PIP and the 
effective date of the preannounced price increase are less profitable for the firm. Similarly, 
when a firm preannounces a price increase far ahead in time, it provides competitors with 
more time to fine tune their strategies to attract the firm’s customers (Kohli 1999). Thus, 
from a competitive perspective, greater timing increases a firm’s vulnerability to competitors’ 
actions. This is likely to result in lower expectations about the level and stability of expected 
future cash flows.  
Taken together, we expect that concerns from an economic and competitive 
perspective will outweigh the more positive customer considerations, and result in investors 
having an overall negative evaluation of PIPs with greater (as compared to lower) timing of 
the preannounced price increase. As such, we propose: 
H1: The greater the timing, the lower the associated abnormal returns 
following a PIP. 
  
Magnitude.  Magnitude refers to the level of the price increase that is preannounced. 
A PIP with higher magnitude is more likely to trigger customers’ perceptions of price 
unfairness as larger price increases have a greater likelihood of exceeding customers’ price 
threshold (Kalyanaram and Little 1994). A PIP with higher magnitude is more likely to 
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trigger customers’ perceptions of price unfairness, and results in a higher likelihood that 
customers’ price threshold will be exceeded (Pauwels, Srinivasan, and Franses 2007). As 
such, from a customer perspective, we expect a negative impact on the level, timing and 
stability of expected future cash flows for the firm.  
From an economic perspective, PIPs of higher magnitude can have a positive effect 
on the level and timing of expected future cash flows. This is because such PIPs not only 
correspond to higher revenues per unit sold, they also provide customers with a greater 
incentive to move their purchases forward to take advantage of the current (lower) price 
(Bijmolt, van Heerde, and Pieters 2005). Still, higher magnitude of a PIP suggests that unless 
competitors follow this increase, a firm’s relative price position will deteriorate more. This, in 
turn, increases the firm’s vulnerability to competition, and hence is likely to reduce investors’ 
expectations on the level and stability of its future cash flows. However, prior research shows 
that price increases of higher magnitude also signal the presence of a “core loyal customer 
base with a strong need or desire” for the firm’s offerings such that they will continue to 
purchase from the firm “even at very high prices” (Pauwels, Srinivasan, and Franses 2007, p. 
85). Such loyal customers, in turn, suggest that PIPs with higher magnitude are likely to 
result in a higher level and stability of expected future cash flows. Therefore, from a 
competitive perspective, it is not clear whether magnitude of a PIP will have a positive or a 
negative impact. 
Given that the customer (negative), economic (positive), and competitive (positive or 
negative) perspectives provide good arguments for both a positive and a negative effect of 
PIPs with higher magnitude, we offer alternative hypotheses for the relationship between 
magnitude and abnormal returns (we refer to Geyskens, Gielens, and Dekimpe 2002 for a 
similar approach). 
H2a: The greater the magnitude, the higher the associated abnormal returns 
following a PIP.  
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H2b: The greater the magnitude, the lower the associated abnormal returns 
following a PIP. 
  
2.2.2 Attribution 
The reason(s) provided by a firm for making an increase in the price charged to customers is 
referred to as the PIP’s attribution.  Since a price increase can only result in an overall 
increase in future cash flows if it is not offset by a proportionate decrease in the quantity sold, 
the cash flows implications of a preannounced price increase due to rising demand are likely 
to be different from those of rising costs (Prabhu and Stewart 2001). As such, investors are 
likely to evaluate a preannounced price increase differently depending on whether the firm 
attributes the price increase to rising demand, i.e., a Demand Attribution, or to rising costs, 
i.e., a Cost Attribution. 
Demand Attribution. A firm provides a demand attribution in its PIP if it states that 
the reason for its preannounced price increase is an increase in the demand for its offerings. 
Existing studies on price fairness suggest that a preannounced price increase is likely to be 
perceived as unfair if it is attributed to a rising demand (Kwak, Puzakova, and Rocereto 
2015). This is because customers are likely to infer that the firm will enjoy additional profits 
while making them bear the burden of higher prices (Campbell 1999). Therefore, from a 
customer’s perspective, a PIP citing demand attribution is likely to result in investors 
expecting a reduction in the level, stability and timing of future cash flows. 
However, from an economic perspective, demand attribution in a PIP is likely to have 
a positive impact on the level and timing of expected future cash flows. This is because 
higher demand indicates that the per-unit impact of the preannounced price increase will be 
applied to a high(er) number of units sold. A demand attribution is also likely to signal an 
acceleration in the receipt of the expected future cash flows, as the growing demand indicates 
that more customers are likely to buy a firm’s offerings sooner rather than later. 
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A demand attribution also suggests to investors that the firm is offering high-quality 
products that provide unique benefits to customers (Hellofs and Jacobson 1999). In this way, 
investors are likely to be more confident about the firm’s value proposition, and hence less 
likely to be concerned about competitors’ ability to attract the firm’s customers (e.g., Prabhu 
and Stewart 2001). Importantly, customers of firms with rising demand are also likely to be 
more loyal as they tend to have more positive attitudes towards the firm’s offerings 
(Koschate-Fischer, Cramer, and Hoyer 2014). As such, from a competitive perspective, PIPs 
with a demand attribution are likely to have a positive impact on the level and stability of the 
expected future cash flows of the firm.  
In summary, a joint consideration of the customer, economic, and competitive 
perspectives suggests that investors have more reasons to expect a PIP with a demand 
attribution to result in an enhancement of shareholder value. Therefore, we propose: 
H3: Providing a demand attribution in a PIP results in higher associated 
abnormal returns following the PIP. 
 
Cost Attribution. A firm provides a cost attribution in a PIP if it states that the reason 
for the preannounced price increase is an increase in its cost of doing business. Customers are 
less likely to perceive a preannounced price increase as unfair if it is due to an increase in 
firm costs (Bolton, Warlop, and Alba 2003). This is because customers view such price 
increases as an attempt by the firm to maintain (rather than increase) its existing level of 
profit (Campbell 1999). As such, from a customer perspective, a cost attribution in a PIP is 
likely to have a positive impact on the expected future cash flows. 
From an economic perspective, however, a cost attribution in a PIP indicates that 
rising costs are likely to (partially or fully) offset any benefits of higher revenues due to the 
price increase. In fact, a firm is likely to enjoy an increase in cash flows, if any, only some 
time later, i.e., after overcoming the higher costs. Therefore, from an economic perspective, 
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the presence of a cost attribution in a PIP is likely to reduce investors’ expectations about the 
level and timing of the firm’s future cash flows. Rising costs also indicate that the firm is 
likely to be more resource constrained, and thus more vulnerable to competition (Lee and 
Grewal 2004). This is because a firm facing rising costs is likely to be handicapped by the 
resulting budget constraints when facing competitors. Thus, from a competitive perspective, 
PIPs citing cost attribution are likely to result in a negative impact on the level and stability 
of expected future cash flows. 
In summary, even though it is less probable for customers to perceive a PIP with a 
cost attribution to be unfair, economic and competitive considerations strongly suggest that a 
PIP with a cost attribution is likely to lower investors’ expectations about the levels and 
stability of future cash flows. Therefore, we expect: 
H4: Providing a cost attribution in a PIP results in lower associated abnormal 
returns following the PIP. 
 
2.2.3 Precedence 
Precedence refers to the prior preannouncement behaviours of the firm and its competitors. 
Since investors cannot directly observe the pricing strategies of a firm, they rely on the 
historical preannouncement behaviour of the firm and its competitors to form an 
understanding of the firm’s unobservable pricing strategies (Warren and Sorescu 2017). We 
examine two dimensions of precedence: the firm’s Own Precedence, which reflects the firm’s 
past price preannouncement behaviour, and the prior occurrence of PIPs by its competitors, 
i.e., Competitive Precedence. 
Own Precedence. A firm’s own precedence of prior PIPs refers to the number of PIPs 
made by the firm before the current PIP. Frequent PIPs increase the probability that 
customers perceive the preannounced price increase as unfair. This is because customers’ 
perception of price unfairness is based on their comparisons between the price they currently 
pay and a range of past prices that they have paid (Bolton, Warlop, and Alba 2003; 
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Kalyanaram and Winer 1995). The more frequent the PIPs by a firm, the more salient the 
price attribute becomes (Nijs et al. 2001), and the more likely customers will note that the 
preannounced new price exceeds previously-paid prices (Rajendran and Tellis 1994). The 
increased salience is also likely to influence the future price expectations for the firm’s 
current and future customers, resulting in a higher price sensitivity and lower willingness to 
pay (DelVecchio, Krishnan, and Smith 2007). Thus, from a customer’s perspective, higher 
own precedence is likely to result in a negative impact on the level, stability and timing of 
expected future cash flows. 
A firm also incurs a menu cost, i.e., the cost of revising prices, when it implements a 
change in its prices (Anderson, Jaimovich, and Simester 2015). Frequent PIPs are likely to 
result in higher menu costs and therefore lower per-unit profits for the firm. Therefore, from 
an economic perspective, higher own precedence is likely to have a negative impact on the 
expected future cash flows of the firm. 
Frequent PIPs also provide competitors with more opportunities to learn about the 
firm, as each additional PIP offers some information about the firm’s underlying pricing 
strategy (Eliashberg and Robertson 1988). This, in turn, is likely to increase competitors’ 
likelihood of identifying the best response to a firm’s PIP (Montgomery, Moore, and Urbany 
2005), hence increasing the firm’s vulnerability to competition. As such, from a competitive 
perspective, making frequent PIPs is likely to reduce investors’ expectations on the level and 
stability of the firm’s future cash flows. 
In summary, higher own precedence of prior PIPs is likely to lower investors’ 
expectations about the level, stability and timing of future cash flows. More formally: 
H5: The higher the firm’s own precedence of prior PIPs, the lower the 
associated abnormal returns following a PIP. 
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Competitive Precedence. We refer to the number of PIPs made by a firm’s 
competitors before its current PIP as the PIP’s competitive precedence. Customers evaluate 
the fairness of a firm’s preannounced price increase by comparing it with competitors’ prices 
and pricing practices (Bolton, Warlop, and Alba 2003). If a firm makes a PIP after a number 
of its competitors have already done so, it is less likely for customers to perceive the 
preannounced price increase as unfair. This is because the new price is comparable to the 
other prices being offered in the market (Xia, Monroe, and Cox 2004). Thus, from a customer 
perspective, competitive precedence is likely to result in a positive impact on the expected 
future cash flows. 
Higher competitive precedence, however, is likely to result in a negative effect on the 
timing of the firm’s expected future cash flows from an economic perspective. This is 
because when a firm makes a PIP after a number of its competitors have already done so, 
investors may perceive its delay in raising prices as “leaving money on the table” (Prushan 
1997). That is, by waiting for its competitors to make PIPs, the firm foregoes an opportunity 
to accrue higher cash flows (Marn, Roegner, and Zawada 2004).  
Furthermore, higher competitive precedence also signals to investors that the firm is 
not confident about its ability to increase prices without losing customers (Keil, Reibstein, 
and Wittink 2001). That is, the firm appears to lack a loyal customer base since it can only 
make a PIP after the industry has become accustomed to the notion of price increases. In this 
way, the lack of confidence is likely to signal the firm’s vulnerability to competitors’ actions 
(Prabhu and Stewart 2001). As such, from a competitive perspective, competitive precedence 
is likely to have a negative impact on the level and stability of expected future cash flows.  
Taken together, even though customers are unlikely to view PIP with higher 
competitive precedence as unfair, both economic and competitive considerations suggest that 
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higher competitive precedence in a PIP is likely to have an adverse effect on shareholder 
value. Therefore, we expect:  
H6: The higher the competitive precedence of prior PIPs, the lower the 
associated abnormal returns following a PIP. 
2.3 Method 
To identify PIPs, we use the electronic search engine FACTIVA that allows us to search all 
major US-based newspapers and trade publications.3 We consider all PIPs that were made 
between 2010 and 2014 by publicly-listed firms in the United States.4 Following precedence, 
we do not consider observations from utility, finance and insurance industries, as prices in 
these industries are typically heavily regulated (Morgan and Rego 2009; Rego, Billett, and 
Morgan 2009). We also exclude observations from firms operating in industries with less 
than 2 unique firms in each year, as we are not interested in studying the effects of a PIP in 
monopolistic markets. This resulted in 684 observations from 120 firms. 
To avoid potential confounds, we do not consider announcements that are in close 
proximity (+/- 2 days) to other major events, such as earnings announcements (e.g., 
Robinson, Tuli, and Kohli 2015; for details, see Appendix 2.A). In addition, we eliminate 
PIPs if we cannot determine their release date, and if their accounting and stock-returns data 
are not available in COMPUSTAT and the University of Chicago Centre for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP). In case of multiple release dates, we use the earliest date as the 
release date of the PIP. These criteria produced a preliminary sample of 608 PIPs from 111 
firms. Since we focus on the timing and magnitude of a PIP, we use the PIPs that provided 
information about these variables. Our final sample consists of 265 PIPs between 2010 and 
                                                          
3 We only consider non-commodity PIPs because commodities such as oil and natural gas are heavily traded in commodity 
exchanges. We identify a product as a commodity if it is listed on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) (see Bruno, Che, 
and Dutta 2012 for a similar practice). Using FACTIVA’s “Intelligent Indexing”, we restrict our search to only US 
publications by selecting a source grouping (i.e., Publications – By Region) and a regional indexing term (i.e., United States) 
in FACTIVA (see DeKinder and Kohli 2008 for an example of the use of FACTIVA’s “Intelligent Indexing”). The 
keywords used in the search are combinations of “price” and “increase”, “jump”, hike”, “raise”, “rise”, “increment”, etc. 
4 We do not consider PIPs from foreign companies listed in the US, as prior research in finance suggests that investors may 
possess different preferences for domestic versus foreign equities (Coval and Moskowitz 1999).  
19 
 
 
 
2014 from 78 firms (for details, see Appendix 2.B).5 The reduction in the final sample size 
(i.e., 265) from the total number of public preannouncements of price increases (i.e., 684) is 
consistent with prior event studies in marketing. For example, Wang, Saboo, and Grewal 
(2015) begin with an initial sample of 926 public announcements of CMO succession and 
analyze a final sample of 303 announcements. More recently, Hsu and Lawrence (2016) start 
with 2,124 announcements of public recalls and use a final sample of 185 announcements.  
We estimate abnormal returns following a PIP as a function of the information 
available to investors on the day when the PIP is made. As such, all variables are measured as 
of the day of the PIP. For the variables that reflect periodically released firm financial 
information, we use the annual report released in the closest financial year preceding the PIP. 
Following prior work (e.g., Rust and Huang 2012), we identify the firm’s industry using its 
six-digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code.  
2.3.1 Dependent Variable 
We adopt the event-study method to estimate the abnormal returns following a PIP. 
According to the efficient-market hypothesis, stock prices reflect the impact of all publicly-
available information about a firm on its future cash flows (MacKinlay 1997). When a firm 
makes a PIP, investors update their expectations of the firm’s future cash flows and adjust the 
price of the firm’s stock accordingly. If investors expect the PIP to result in an increase 
(decrease) in future cash flows, the stock price will increase (decrease). The benefit of an 
event-study is that it allows an inference of cause (PIPs) and effect (abnormal returns) in a 
quasi-experimental setting, thus identifying factors that explain changes in abnormal returns 
(Srinivasan and Hanssens 2009). The approach is widely used to assess investors’ evaluations 
                                                          
5 For all subsequent mentions of PIPs, we are referring to PIPs that provide information on timing and magnitude. However, 
we will also consider the larger sample of 608 PIPs (i.e., thereby also taking into account the PIPs that do not disclose 
information on timing and/or magnitude of a PIP) in our sensitivity analyses. 
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of marketing actions, such as CMO successions (e.g., Wang, Saboo, and Grewal 2015) and 
product recalls (e.g., Hsu and Lawrence 2016). 
 We assess the effect of a PIP (the “event”) on the stock price of a firm by estimating 
the change in its stock price after accounting for firm and market factors (i.e., the risk-
adjusted abnormal stock return of the firm) during a specified time window around the event 
date. The risk-adjusted abnormal stock return of the focal firm is measured as the difference 
between the firm’s expected and actual stock returns (Equation 1): 
   
                ARijt = Rijt − (aij + βijRmt + sijSMBt + hijHMLt + uijUMDt),                (1),            
 
where ARijt is the abnormal return of firm i of industry j on day t (i.e., the day of the PIP), 
Rijt is the firms’ actual stock return, Rmt the return on a value-weighted portfolio of the total 
stock market, SMBt the Fama and French (1993) size portfolio return, HMLt the Fama and 
French (1993) book-to-market-ratio portfolio return, and UMDt the Carhart (1997) 
momentum portfolio return, all on day 𝑡. 𝑎𝑖𝑗 ,  𝛽𝑖𝑗,  𝑠𝑖𝑗,  ℎ𝑖𝑗  and  𝑢𝑖𝑗 are parameters estimated 
over a 250 day period ending 30 days before the event date (see Geyskens, Gielens, and 
Dekimpe 2002 for a similar practice). We use the CRSP database to obtain daily stock returns 
from a value-weighted market index comprising all stocks on NASDAQ and NYSE. 
2.3.2 Independent Variables 
Timing. Timing is measured as the number of days between the date of the PIP and 
the date the preannounced price increase becomes effective (for examples, see Appendix 2.C, 
Table 2.C1). PIPs in our sample were made as early as 131 days (W.R. Grace and Company 
in August 2010) or as late as one day (Carpenter Technology in April 2011) before 
implementation.  
Magnitude. We measure the magnitude of the preannounced price increase as the 
percentage change in the price of the firm’s product and/or service before and after the PIP 
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(for examples, see Appendix 2.C, Table 2.C1). In our sample, firms make PIPs with 
magnitudes ranging from as low as 1% (Starbucks in June 2013) to as high as 63% (DISH 
Network Corporation in December 2013).  
Demand and Cost Attribution. We measure attribution through the reasons given in 
the PIP to justify the increase in price. To identify the reasons for the preannounced price 
increase, the PIPs were first content-analyzed to identify phrases and combinations of words 
that are commonly used to justify the need for a price increase.  
To identify PIPs with a demand attribution, the keywords include combinations of 
words such as, “demand”, “profit(s)”, “revenue(s)”, “growth”, and “increase”, “change”, 
“strong”. In addition, we used specific phrases such as “facilitate organic growth”, “rebalance 
the marketplace”, “support continued growth and investment”.  In coding PIPs with a cost 
attribution, the set of keywords includes combinations of words such as “cost” or “costs” and 
“increase”, “input”, “operating”, “transportation”, “logistic”, “raw materials” (for examples, 
see Appendix 2.C, Table 2.C2).  
Second, two judges independently examined the PIPs to identify the attributions, and 
then compared notes to arrive at an agreement. This approach is consistent with prior studies 
(e.g., Lee and Grewal 2004; Robinson, Tuli, and Kohli 2015). We find that 73 out of 265 
(i.e., 28%) of the PIPs in our sample cite demand attributions while 127 out of 265 (i.e., 48%) 
of the PIPs in our sample cite cost attributions.6  
Own and Competitive Precedence. Following Warren and Sorescu (2017), we 
measure own (competitive) precedence as the natural logarithm of the number of PIPs by the 
firm (competitors) in the year preceding the focal PIP, where we define competitors as firms 
                                                          
6 This frequency of disclosure is in line with previous event studies. For example, Sorescu, Shankar, and Kushwaha (2007) 
find that less than half of the new product preannouncements provide information on the price and introduction date of the 
new product. 
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within the same six-digit NAICS code as the focal firm.7 We compute these variables using 
PIPs from the most recent year because prior research suggests that investors weight recent 
information more heavily (Sorescu, Shankar, and Kushwaha 2007). Using a one-year time 
window not only allows sufficient variation to examine the PIP history of the firm and its 
competitors, it also more accurately captures the investors’ state of mind when they are 
evaluating the firm’s PIP (e.g., Warren and Sorescu 2017). We find that some firms made as 
many as 29 PIPs in the preceding year, while others did not make any PIPs during that 
period. For competitive precedence, we find that while some PIPs are preceded by 48 
competitive PIPs, others are the first PIP to be made in the industry within a year.  
To account for potential diminishing returns to scale effects of our continuous drivers, 
we take the natural logarithm of Timing, Magnitude, Own and Competitive Precedence (cf. 
Hanssens, Parsons, and Schultz 2001).8  
2.3.3 Control Variables 
We control for several factors that are likely to have an impact on abnormal returns. First, we 
control for firm-related non-financial variables that may result in systematic differences in 
investors’ evaluations of a PIP. Research in consumer behavior and psychology suggests that 
the source of price information “can influence evaluations and perceptions of outcomes” 
(Campbell 2007, p. 262). Since PIP made by the top management team or the chief executive 
officer can be perceived differently from PIPs made by other members of the firm (Sorescu, 
Shankar, and Kushwaha 2007), we account for the Spokesperson of the PIP as a control 
variable in our model.  
                                                          
7 The computation of Own Precedence and Competitive Precedence also includes price-increase announcements that 1) were 
post-announcements, 2) were made on the day the announced price increase becomes effective, 3) do not provide sufficient 
information about the magnitude of the change in prices and the effective date of the announced price increase, and 4) were 
in close proximity (i.e., +/- 2 days) to other events such as earnings announcements. In addition, the computation of 
Competitive Precedence also includes PIPs that were from foreign companies listed in the US. We collected price-increase 
announcements that were made in the year of 2009 using the same data-collection procedure in order to compute Own 
Precedence and Competitive Precedence for PIPs made in 2010. 
8 Since Timing, Magnitude, Own Precedence and Competitive Precedence can have very small values, we use the 
transformation of, for example, ln (Timing + 1) to compute the log-transformation of Timing. A similar transformation was 
performed for Magnitude, Own Precedence and Competitive Precedence (see ter Braak et al. 2013 for a similar practice). 
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Prior research suggests that the firm’s overall reputation is likely to influence 
investors’ evaluations of its announcements, where investors might discount the reliability of 
PIPs from low-reputation firms (Sorescu, Shankar, and Kushwaha 2007). Consistent with 
existing research, we use a firm’s presence on Fortune magazine’s Most Admired Company 
list to account for the firm’s overall Reputation (e.g., Mishra and Modi 2016).  
In addition, due to the potential spill-over effects of a PIP from one brand to other 
brands in the firm’s portfolio (e.g., Larkin 2013), the impact of a PIP from a mono-brand firm 
may differ significantly from that of a multi-brand firm. Hence, we control for whether a firm 
adopts a Corporate Branding strategy. Following Rao, Agarwal, and Dahlhoff 2004), we 
determine the branding strategy of firms for a particular financial year by examining their 10-
K statements obtained from the SEC (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission) and their 
corporate webpages to uncover information regarding the product and/or service brands 
marketed by these firms. A firm is coded as having a corporate branding strategy if it 
predominantly uses its corporate name on its products and/or services.  
Following prior research, we also control for several firm financial characteristics. 
Specifically, a firm’s profitability encompasses financial information that influences 
investors’ evaluations of a firm’s stock (Luo 2007). Following Srivastava, Shervani, and 
Fahey (1998), we use a firms’ net operating Cash Flows to account for its profitability (also 
see Gruca and Rego 2005). To take into account the capital structure of the firm, we include 
Leverage and Liquidity, as investors are likely to prefer firms with lower leverage (Malshe 
and Agarwal 2015) and higher liquidity (Luo, Homburg, and Wieseke 2010). Since investors 
tend to have a preference for the stocks of larger firms (Rubera and Kirca 2012), we also 
control for Firm Size. Finally, the expected profits following a PIP are likely to be different 
for firms facing different operating costs (Rust, Moorman, and Dickson 2002). As such, we 
include a firm’s cost of goods sold, i.e., its COGS, as a control variable.  
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We include several industry covariates to account for the differences in investor 
responses to PIP across different industries. Following Fang, Palmatier, and Steenkamp 
(2008), we include Industry Concentration, Industry Growth and Industry Turbulence as they 
are likely to have an impact on firm value. We also account for whether or not a PIP is made 
by a firm operating in a Service Industry, as investors may evaluate the stock of a product- 
(vs. service-) focused firm differently (Morgan and Rego 2009). Finally, we control for 
whether a firm is operating in a Business-to-Consumer industry as the price dynamics in such 
industries are typically different from industries that sell mainly to businesses.  
Table 2.2 outlines the control variables, their measures, data sources and examples of 
studies that support the use of these measures.  
[Insert Table 2.2 about here]  
2.3.4 Model Specification 
We test our hypotheses using Equation 2, where the abnormal returns (ARijt) are a function of 
the information that investors have at the time of the preannouncement:  
ARijt = γ0 + γ1TIMEijt + γ2MAGijt + γ3DBijt + γ4CBijt + γ5OWNijt    
                     +γ6COMPijt + γ7CNTRLSijt + ϵijt ,                                                    (2) 
where TIMEijt and MAGijt are the (log-transformed) timing and magnitude of the 
preannounced increase featured in the PIP from firm i of industry j on day t, DBijt and CBijt 
are dummy variables indicating whether or not there are demand and cost attributions, 
OWNijt and COMPijt represent the (log-transformed) own and competitive precedence, and 
the coefficient vector γ7 denotes the effect of the set of control variables CNTRLSijt (i.e., 
Spokesperson, Reputation, Corporate Branding, Cash Flows, Leverage, Liquidity, Firm Size, 
COGS, Industry Concentration, Industry Growth, Industry Turbulence, Service Industry and 
Business-to-Consumer). To account for the potential correlation among PIPs from firms 
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within the same industry, we allow the error terms of observations of firms within an industry 
to be correlated with each other (Robinson, Tuli, and Kohli 2015).  
Using OLS to estimate the proposed model (i.e., Equation 2) can lead to biased 
estimates as there are two potential sources of endogeneity (Gielens et al. 2017). First, 
because some of the factors that influence the abnormal returns might also affect the firm’s 
probability of making a PIP, the model specified in Equation 2 is likely to yield biased 
estimates due to a selection bias (Hamilton and Nickerson 2003). For example, whereas 
investors are likely to view price increases more favorably for firms with higher costs, such 
firms are also more likely to make a PIP. Thus, we specify a selection model to estimate a 
firm’s likelihood of making a PIP to address this concern.  
Second, our hypothesized main effects can also potentially suffer from omitted 
variable bias, as these variables could be correlated with unobservable factors that affect the 
abnormal returns following a PIP. To address this concern, we follow Gielens et al. (2017) 
and draw upon Park and Gupta (2012)’s Gaussian copulas approach to account for the 
potential endogeneity of the continous PIP characteristics (Timing, Magnitude, Own and 
Competitive Precedence). In addition, we use the Hausman-Wu test to assess the potential 
endogeneity of the dummy variables that reflect, respectively, Demand and Cost Attribution 
(e.g., Clement, Wu, and Fischer 2014; Gielens and Dekimpe 2001).  
Addressing Selection Bias. We jointly estimate Equation 2, i.e., the outcome model, 
and the selection model (Equation 3) using Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation as it 
produces estimates that are more efficient than the Heckman (1979) two-stage estimations 
(Breen 1996; see also ter Braak et al. 2013):  
LICijT = δ0 + δ1CORPijT + δ2REPijT + δ3CFTAijT + δ4LEVijT + δ5LIQijT + δ6SIZEijT                           
                      +δ7COGSijT + δ8ICjT + δ9IGRTHjT + δ10ITURBjT + δ11SVCj 
                      +δ12B2Cj + [δ13INSTijT + δ14EGRTHijT + ∑ δkYEART
18
k=15 ] + μijT ,                (3)   
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where LICijT is 1 if firm 𝑖 in industry j made a PIP in year T, else 0, ϵijt is the error term for 
the outcome model ~𝑁(0,1), μijT is the error term for the selection model ~𝑁(0,1), and 𝜌 
denotes the correlation between ϵijt and μijT.  
The selection model includes several of the firm and industry control variables that 
are also included in the outcome model as these variables arguably affect not just the 
abnormal returns following a PIP, but are likely to also influence whether or not a firm makes 
a PIP.9 Specifically, we include Reputation (REPijT) and Corporate Branding (CORPijT) 
because the firm’s overall reputation and/or branding strategy is likely to influence 
customers’ price sensitivity towards its products and services (Bharadwaj, Tuli, and Bonfrer 
2011), and hence can affect its likelihood to make a PIP.  
Firms with lower Cash Flows (CFTAijT) but higher COGS (COGSijT) are more likely 
to preannounce a price increase. This is because such firms generally have lower profits, and 
hence need the additional revenues expected from the PIP more than firms that already have 
higher earnings or lower costs (Homburg, Hoyer, and Koschate 2005). Thus, we include 
these variables in the selection model. We also include Leverage (LEVijT) and Liquidity 
(LIQijT), as a firm with higher leverage and lower liquidity is more likely to preannounce a 
price increase to realize an increase in cash flows (Robinson, Tuli, and Kohli 2015). Finally, 
we also include Firm Size (SIZEijT), as larger firms are more likely to make a PIP as they 
have more power to exert control and influence consumption patterns within the industry 
(Rubera and Kirca 2012). 
The selection model also accounts for factors that reflect a firm’s operating 
environment. Firms in industries with greater Industry Concentration (ICijT) are more likely 
                                                          
9 Some firm and industry factors included in the outcome model cannot be conceptualized/measured in the absence of a PIP 
(i.e., Magnitude, Timing, Demand Attribution, Cost Attribution, Own Precedence, Competitive Precedence and 
Spokesperson). Therefore, these variables are not included in the selection model. 
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to make a PIP, as economic theory suggests that higher concentration will result in higher 
prices (Ramaswamy, Gatignon, and Reibstein 1994). Similarly, firms in industries with 
greater Industry Growth (IGRTHjT) and Industry Turbulence (ITURBjT) are more likely to 
preannounce a price increase, because customers are less sensitive to prices in growing 
markets (Ramaswamy et al. 1993), and are less likely to switch to unfamiliar brands in 
turbulent markets (Erdem and Keane 1996). Finally, given that our sample also includes PIPs 
from service-focused firms and/or firms that sell mainly to end-consumers, we also include 
Service Industry (SVCj) and Business-to-Consumer (B2Cj) in the selection model to control 
for potential systematic differences in firms’ likelihood to make a PIP in these industries. 
The selection model includes some additional variables – exclusion restrictions – that 
are not incorporated in the outcome model (i.e., the variables in the square brackets in 
Equation 3). A firm with a higher percentage of institutional holdings is under greater 
scrutiny to reduce information asymmetry through the disclosure of information that may 
affect its future cash flows (Bushee and Noe 2000). Since a price increase is likely to affect 
the future cash flows of a firm, we expect that firms with a higher percentage of institutional 
holdings are more likely to preannounce a price increase. That said, according to the 
efficient-market hypothesis, there is no reason to expect investors’ evaluations of a PIP to be 
influenced by the level of institutional holdings of a firm’s outstanding shares (Fama 1991). 
As such, we include Percentage of Institutional Holdings (INSTijT) as an exclusion restriction. 
Firms are less likely to make PIPs during periods of low economic growth as 
customers tend to be more price conscious in their purchase decisions (Estelami, Lehmann, 
and Holden 2001) and are likely to slow down their spending (Deleersnyder et al. 2004). As 
such, we also include Economic Growth (EGRTHijT) as an exclusion restriction. Finally, to 
account for the argument that unobserved time-related events may have influenced the firms’ 
likelihood of making a PIP, we include Year Dummy variables (YEART) that correspond to 
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the year in which the PIP was made. However, economic growth and the year dummy 
variables do not influence the abnormal returns. This is because the calculation of abnormal 
returns includes the return on a value-weighted portfolio of the total stock market (i.e., 𝑅𝑚𝑡 in 
Equation 1), which takes into account the macro-economic factors and the year-specific 
effects by using overall stock-market returns (Flannery and Protopapadakis 2002).10  
We outline the exclusion restrictions, their measures, data sources and examples of 
prior literature supporting the use of these measures in Table 2.2. In addition, we also 
describe how we arrive at the sample for the selection model in Appendix 2.D. 
Addressing Potential Endogeneity. Following recent event studies in marketing (e.g., 
Gielens et al. 2017), we adopt Park and Gupta (2012)’s Gaussian copulas approach to account 
for the potential endogeneity of our hypothesized continous variables. Specifically, we first 
assess the distribution of Timing, Magnitude, Own Precedence and Competitive Precedence 
to confirm the suitability of this method. Results from the Shapiro-Wilk test suggest that 
these variables are not normally distributed (𝑊TIMEijt = 0.95, 𝑝 < 0.001; 𝑊MAGijt = 0.98, 𝑝 <
0.001; 𝑊OWNijt = 0.97, 𝑝 < 0.001; 𝑊COMPijt = 0.92, 𝑝 < 0.001). In this way, the inclusion of 
the copula correction terms for these variables through a control function approach allows us 
to separate the variation due to these variables from that of the error term so that the effects of 
these variables can be estimated consistently (Papies, Ebbes, and Heerde 2017).  Following 
Park and Gupta (2012), we obtain the copula correction terms as follows: 
𝑐𝑜𝑝(TIMEijt) = 𝜙
−1 (𝐻(TIMEijt)) , 𝑐𝑜𝑝(MAGijt) = 𝜙
−1 (𝐻(MAGijt)),  
𝑐𝑜𝑝(OWNijt) = 𝜙
−1(𝐻(OWNijt)), 𝑐𝑜𝑝(COMPijt) = 𝜙
−1(𝐻(COMPijt)),                         (4 − 7) 
                                                          
10 To verify our exclusion restrictions, we estimated a model where the exclusion restrictions were included as additional 
control variables in the outcome equation. Consistent with our expectations, we find that their effect on abnormal returns is 
not significant (𝜒2(6) = 3.76, 𝑝 > 0.10).  
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where 𝜙−1 is the inverse of the cummulative normal distribution function, and 𝐻(TIMEijt), 
𝐻(MAGijt), 𝐻(OWNijt) and 𝐻(COMPijt) are the empirical distribution functions. These 
copula correction terms are first added one at a time to our model to test for their statistical 
significance. Consistent with existing studies (Gielens et al. 2017; Mathys, Burmester, and 
Clement 2016), we then keep the statistically significant copula correction terms in our final 
model as the terms that are not statistically significant suggest that their corresponding 
variables are not endogeneous (Park and Gupta 2012). 
 As the distribution of dummy variables is not suitable for the Gaussian copulas 
approach, we draw on an alternative procedure to address the potential endogeneity of 
Demand Attribution and Cost Attribution. Following recent studies in marketing (e.g., 
Clement, Wu, and Fischer 2014; Lamey et al. 2012), we assess the endogeneity of these 
variables using the Hausman-Wu test (Greene 2006). In particular, we first estimate two 
auxiliary regressions using Demand Attribution and Cost Attribution as the dependent 
variables, along with the excluded variable and all other control variables that we include in 
our focal model.  
Drawing on existing marketing studies that use lagged variables as exclusion 
restrictions (e.g., Albers 2012; Gielens, Gijsbrechts, and Dekimpe 2014), we use the 
attribution that the firm cites in its previous PIP as the excluded variable in both of the 
auxiliary regressions.11 We argue that the attribution that the firm cites in its previous PIP is a 
valid exclusion restriction because firms tend to adopt similar decision choices over a short 
time period such that if the firm cites a demand attribution in its previous PIP, it is likely to 
also cite a demand attribution in its current PIP. However, this excluded variable is unlikely 
to influence abnormal returns following the current PIP as the efficient-market hypothesis 
                                                          
11 The excluded variable for Demand (Cost) Attribution is measured as follows: = 1 if the firm cites a demand (cost) 
attribution in its closest preceding PIP, = 0 if the firm did not cite a demand (cost) attribution in its closest preceding PIP or 
did not make any previous PIPs from the start of our data year, i.e., before 2010. 
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suggests that the stock price of the firm can only be influenced by the information provided in 
the firm’s current PIP (MacKinlay 1997).12  
Upon obtaining the predicted values from the auxiliary regressions, we then included 
these values as instruments for Demand Attribution and Cost Attribution in our focal model 
using a stepwise approach. Each estimation is accompanied by a 𝜒2-test to assess the 
statistical significance of the instruments (see Gielens and Dekimpe 2001 for a similar 
approach). Results suggest that the potential endogeneity of Demand Attribution and Cost 
Attribution is not an issue, as we find that neither test is significant (𝑝 = 0.22 for Demand 
Attribution and 𝑝 = 0.41 for Cost Attribution). 
2.4 Results 
Table 2.3 reports the abnormal returns on the day of the PIP, as well as up to 5 days before 
and after the PIP. We use both a parametric test, the Cross-Sectional Error t-test (Brown and 
Warner 1985), and two nonparametric tests, the Rank test (Corrado 1989) and the Jackknife 
test (Giaccotto and Sfiridis 1996), to test the significance of the abnormal returns. 
[Insert Table 2.3 about here] 
Across the three tests, we find that the abnormal returns are most significant on day 
𝑡 + 1, with a positive abnormal return of 0.25% (𝑝 < 0.02). In addition, the cumulative 
average abnormal returns (CAAR) is most significant for the event window [0, 1]. 
Accordingly, we use the CAAR for the event window [0, 1] as the dependent variable to test 
the proposed hypotheses (for similar practice, see Cao and Sorescu 2013; Kalaignanam et al. 
2013). We find that the CAAR for the event window [0, 1] is .41%. However, there is wide 
variation in the CAARs. Almost 42% of the PIPs experience a negative CAAR. In terms of 
                                                          
12 The excluded variables were highly significant in the auxiliary regressions (𝜒2(1) = 12.18, 𝑝 < 0.001 for the excluded 
variable for demand attribution; 𝜒2(1) = 30.19, 𝑝 < 0.001 for the excluded variable for cost attribution), which testifies to 
the strength of the excluded variables. 
31 
 
 
 
the range, while some PIPs yield returns as low as -11.41%, other PIPs result in positive 
returns as high as 15.59%. Clearly, investors’ evaluations differ considerably across PIPs.  
Table 2.4 reports the estimation results (we refer to Appendix 2.E, Table 2.E1 for the 
descriptive statistics). The maximum VIF statistic of the model is 4.56, well below the 
threshold of 10, suggesting that multicollinearity is not an issue for our model. We report 
one-sided significance levels for the parameter estimates of the directional hypotheses, and 
two-sided significance levels for all other parameter estimates. 
[Insert Table 2.4 about here] 
We first discuss the results of our selection equation. The error correlation is negative 
and significant (𝜌 = −0.33, 𝑝 < 0.10), indicating the importance of accounting for a 
selection bias. We find support for the exclusion restrictions as we find that a higher 
percentage of institutional holdings results in a higher likelihood of making a PIP (𝛿13 =
0.76, 𝑝 < 0.01). In addition, relative to 2010, there is a lower likelihood of making a PIP in 
all subsequent years, except in 2011 (𝛿15 = −0.13, 𝑝 > 0.10; 𝛿16 = −0.72, 𝑝 < .01; 𝛿17 =
−0.85, 𝑝 < .01; 𝛿18 = −0.47, 𝑝 < .01). However, contrary to our expectations, we find that 
firms’ likelihood of making PIPs does not differ across different periods of economic growth 
(𝛿14 = 0.05, 𝑝 > 0.10).  
Results show that timing has a significant negative effect on abnormal returns (𝛾1 =
−0.34, 𝑝 < 0.01). Therefore, H1 is supported. The impact of magnitude on abnormal returns 
is significantly positive (𝛾2 = 3.16, 𝑝 < 0.05), thereby supporting H2a (and rejecting H2b). 
We also find strong support for H3, as the effect of a PIP citing demand attribution on 
abnormal returns is significantly positive (𝛾3 = 0.50, 𝑝 < 0.05). 
We do not find support for H4, as a PIP with a cost attribution does not have a 
significant effect on abnormal returns (𝛾4 = −0.02, 𝑝 > 0.10). H5, however, is supported as 
the impact of own precedence on abnormal returns is negative and significant (𝛾5 =
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−0.34, 𝑝 < 0.05). Consistent with H6, we find that PIPs with higher competitive precedence 
have a significant negative impact on abnormal returns (𝛾6 = 0.43, 𝑝 < 0.05).  
2.4.1 Sensitivity Analyses 
We conduct several sensitivity analyses to assess the robustness of our conclusions (see Table 
2.5; for complete estimation results, see Appendix 2.F, Table 2.F1). Results across 15 
different sensitivity tests underscore the robustness of our conclusions, as we find that in 
more than 96% of the cases, our substantive conclusions remain unchanged. 
Alternative Dependent Variables. We examine the sensitivity of our results by using 
alternative methods to compute the dependent variable. First, we use the abnormal returns 
obtained from the estimation of two alternative models – the Fama and French (1993) three 
factor model and the market model (Brown and Warner 1985). Second, we also estimate the 
abnormal returns using an equally-weighted market-index. Finally, following Skiera, Bayer, 
and Schöler (2017, p.6), we examine the robustness of our results to the abnormal returns that 
account for only the value of the operating business. Our conclusions remain unchanged. 
Sensitivity to Outliers. Consistent with existing event studies in marketing (e.g., 
Robinson, Tuli, and Kohli 2015), we assess the impact of outliers by removing observations 
with residuals at the one percentile of each tail. We find the same results as in our focal 
analysis. 
Alternative Standard Errors. We explore the sensitivity of our results to alternative 
computations of the standard errors in the following ways. First, to account for the possible 
correlation among multiple PIPs made by the same firm, we re-estimate the models by 
clustering the errors at the firm level. Second, we re-estimate a model with errors clustered at 
both the industry and year level to allow for possible correlation among PIPs made by 
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different firms within the same industry in the same year.13 Third, we also re-estimate the 
models without the use of clustered standard errors, but using heteroscedasticity-robust 
standard errors (Wooldridge 2009). Across the analyses, our conclusions remain, as shown in 
Table 2.5, largely unchanged.  
Alternative Industry Classification. Given that the number of firms included in the 
selection sample might vary depending on the granularity of the NAICS codes utilized, we 
also consider an alternative industry classification, and repeat the estimation process using 
five-digit NAICS codes. Again, our substantive conclusions remain unchanged. 
Heckman Two-Step Estimation. We re-estimate our models using the more traditional 
Heckman (1979) two-step estimation technique. Our conclusions remain unchanged. 
Reputation of Following through on PIPs. Whether a firm followed through on its 
previous PIP could affect investors’ evaluations of its subsequent PIPs. To that extent, we 
consider whether PIPs in our sample were preceded by announcements of a price increase 
retraction in the one year preceding its preannouncement date. Specifically, we checked 
whether there were news articles reporting that the firm was cancelling, delaying, or cutting 
back on a previously announced price increase, regardless of whether the announced price 
increase had eventually been implemented. We find that only 10 of the PIPs within our 
sample are preceded by such announcements. We re-estimated our model by first dropping 
these 10 PIPs. In addition, we estimated the model with an indicator variable for such an 
occurrence. In both instances, our conclusions remain unchanged, while the parameter of the 
indicator variable is not statistically significant (𝑝 > 0.10).  
Alternative Measures. We assess the robustness of our model to alternative measures. 
First, to account for the possibility that the PIP history of the firm and its competitors extend 
                                                          
13 To cluster the standard errors at both the industry- and year-level, we use a variable that contains a unique value for each 
industry-year pair, i.e., we create this variable by multiplying the firms’ six-digit NAICS codes with the data year, and use 
this variable as the cluster variable (see Petersen 2009 for a similar practice).   
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beyond a one-year period, we re-estimate our model using Own and Competitive Precedence 
measured over a two-year time window. Second, we also estimate our model using an 
alternative measure of Reputation. In particular, we use the corporate social performance data 
from the Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini (KLD) Social Ratings Database as an alternative 
proxy for the firm’s overall Reputation. The KLD database contains social ratings on how 
well a firm caters to issues like climate change, waste management, employee involvement, 
product safety, corruption and political instability, and financial-system instability (MSCI 
ESG Research 2015). Our conclusions remain unchanged.  
Alternative Specification of the Selection Model. The selection model specified in our 
focal analysis reflects a firm’s decision to make a PIP on the condition that the PIPs provide 
information on timing and magnitude. To account for a possible sample selection bias due to 
the lack of information on the timing and/or the magnitude of the preannounced price 
increase, we specify a multinomial selection model to demonstrate an alternative decision 
structure. Specifically, the first-stage is a multinomial logit model that accounts for a firm’s 
decision to make a PIP that provides information on timing and magnitude (n = 265), make a 
PIP with incomplete information (i.e., PIPs that do not provide information on either the 
timing or the magnitude of the preannounced price increase or both; n = 343), or not make a 
PIP at all (n = 3,349).  
Using the “conditional expectations correction method” as proposed by Dubin and 
McFadden (1984)14, we use the parameter estimates from the first-stage model to obtain the 
predicted conditional probabilities for each of the decision outcomes given the conditional 
probabilities of all other decision outcomes. These predicted conditional probabilities are then 
used to compute a set of correction terms to be included in the second-stage model to control 
for the possible sample selection bias. Following Bourguignon, Fournier, and Gurgand 
                                                          
14 We refer to Fang et al. (2016) and Gijsbrechts, Campo, and Vroegrijk (2018) for recent marketing applications of this 
method. 
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(2007), we include three correction terms to account for each of the three decision outcomes 
and bootstrap the second-stage regression (500 bootstrap replications) to account for the 
standard errors from the first-stage model. 
Results show that our substantive conclusions remain largely unchanged if we use this 
approach. Importantly, none of the coefficients of the correction terms are statistically 
significant in the model (using a significance level of 𝑝 < 0.10), thus suggesting that there is 
no evidence of a sample selection bias in this decision structure. These results, therefore, 
support the use of the simpler Heckman approach that we use in our focal analysis. 
In addition, we also computed the abnormal returns following the PIPs with 
incomplete information using the event-study method. We find that the abnormal returns are 
not statistically significant on the day of the PIP, as well as up to 5 days before and after the 
PIP (for details, see Appendix 2.F, Table 2.F2). The CAAR for the event window [0, 1] is 
also not statistically significant (−0.09%, 𝑝 > 0.10). This analysis suggests that investors 
respond to PIPs only when the firm provides investors with implementation information, i.e., 
the Timing and Magnitude, as they need this information to make an educated estimate of the 
impact of a PIP on the change in future cash flows for the firm. PIPs with incomplete 
information do not significantly influence abnormal returns.  
[Insert Table 2.5 about here] 
2.5 Discussion 
Firms regularly preannounce their price increases because it signals their ability to raise 
prices (Krishna, Feinberg, and Zhang 2007), provides timely information to customers and 
investors (Smith 2011) and can also be a valuable competitive market signal (Prabhu and 
Stewart 2001). Existing research, however, offers neither a theoretical nor an empirical 
examination of how investors evaluate public announcements of future price increases. This 
study seeks to fill this void, and has both theoretical and managerial implications. 
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2.5.1 Theoretical Implications 
By presenting a systematic examination of how investors evaluate PIPs, we respond to recent 
calls for a better understanding of investors’ evaluations of firms’ pricing actions (Edeling 
and Fischer 2016, p. 533). Results indicate that, on average, a PIP leads to positive abnormal 
returns of 0.41%, i.e., an increase of $30.39 million in a firm’s market capitalization. This 
impact of a PIP is comparable to other marketing actions, such as the announcements of 
internet channel additions (0.71%, £16.38 million, per Geyskens, Gielens, and Dekimpe 
2002) and brand licensing (0.33%, $37.52 million, per Robinson, Tuli, and Kohli 2015).  
Interestingly, there is significant variation in investors’ evaluations of a PIP with 42% 
of the PIPs resulting in negative abnormal returns. In fact, in our sample, investors’ responses 
to PIPs range from a gain of $4.42 billion to a loss of $3.21 billion in market capitalization.15 
Accordingly, we build a conceptual framework to examine investors’ evaluations of PIPs. As 
such, the current study complements extant literature on customers’ perceptions of price 
increases (e.g., Homburg, Hoyer, and Koschate 2005; Homburg, Koschate, and Totzek 2010).  
A key contribution of the proposed framework is that it underscores the moderating 
effects of the three key factors of a PIP, i.e., implementation information, attribution, and 
precedence. These moderating effects identify boundary conditions for the impact of a PIP on 
abnormal returns. In this way, the current study advances theory development in this nascent 
domain. To further illustrate these boundary conditions, we calculate the marginal effects on 
abnormal returns, and plot them across the actual values of the corresponding hypothesized 
variables (Figure 2.2a and 2.2b).  
[Insert Figure 2.2a and 2.2b about here] 
As shown in Figure 2.2a, Panel A, a PIP has a negative effect on abnormal returns as 
timing increases and this effect increases at a slower rate at larger values of timing. These 
                                                          
15 We compute the change in market capitalization by multiplying the abnormal returns by the market capitalization of the 
firm at the close of the day prior to the PIP (for similar practice, see Robinson, Tuli, and Kohli 2015). 
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results complement recent research that suggests that investors are likely to punish firms that 
delay the implementation of preannounced marketing actions (e.g., Eilert et al. 2017). 
Consistent with the widely accepted view that price increases are an effective marketing 
instrument to increase profits (e.g., Hayes and Singh 2013; Subhedar and Rees 2017), we find 
that a PIP has a positive effect on abnormal returns as magnitude increases (see Panel B). 
However, we also find that this effect increases at a slower rate at larger values of magnitude. 
Taken together, the results suggest that although the positive impact of a PIP on abnormal 
returns can be strengthened with higher magnitude, there is a limit to raising prices as 
customers want to pay less not more, and the customer perspective becomes more important 
in investors’ evaluations of PIPs featuring larger price increases.16  
We also find that a PIP results in greater abnormal returns if it features a demand 
attribution (see Panel C). In contrast to our hypothesis, we find that citing a cost attribution 
does not significantly influence the impact of a PIP on abnormal returns.17 One probable 
explanation for this result might be that with respect to a firm’s costs, investors value the 
actual financial information more than the information provided in the preannouncement. 
This explanation coincides with the results for the control variables in Table 2.4, as we 
observe that the impact of a firm’s cost of goods sold, i.e., COGS, on abnormal returns is 
statistically significant (𝑝 < 0.01). Taken together, the findings on demand and cost 
attributions add to the literature on strategic preannouncements (e.g., Calantone and Schatzel 
2000; Sorescu, Shankar, and Kushwaha 2007), as they identify when the provision of certain 
information (in this case, the reasons for the upcoming price increase) is useful or 
inconsequential.  
Figure 2.2b identifies boundary conditions for the observed negative effects of 
precedence on abnormal returns. Specifically, we find that a PIP results in negative abnormal 
                                                          
16 We thank an anonymous reviewer for providing this insight. 
17 We do not generate the plot for cost attribution because the hypothesized effect is not significant. 
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returns as the firm’s own precedence of prior PIPs increases, even though this negative effect 
increases at a slower rate at higher values of own precedence (see Panel A). Similarly, we 
also find that the negative impact of a PIP on abnormal returns increases as competitive 
precedence increases; again, the rate of the increase slows down at greater values of 
competitive precedence (see Panel B). While precedence-related variables have received 
some attention in the preannouncement literature (e.g., Gao et al. 2015), prior studies on 
prices increases (e.g., Homburg, Koschate, and Totzek 2010) rarely examine their impacts. 
By synthesizing both literatures, our findings show how operational decisions can 
considerably influence the financial consequences of the marketing actions featured in a 
preannouncement.  
2.5.2 Managerial Implications 
Results of the current study also provide guidance to managers engaged in making PIPs. To 
articulate the managerial implications, we follow Fang et al. (2016), and conduct 
counterfactual analyses to illustrate to managers the economic consequences of 
preannouncing price increases (we refer to Appendix 2.G for technical details). 
[Insert Table 2.6 about here] 
 Based on the results of our counterfactual analyses, we suggest that managers should 
be cautious making PIPs with implementation dates too far into the future. Preannouncing a 
price increase 33 days before its implementation date is likely to result in significantly lower 
abnormal returns than one with 19 days (−0.18%, 𝑝 < .01). That is, a difference of two 
weeks can result in an average loss of nearly $39 million in market capitalization.  
Our counterfactual analyses also illustrate the economic impact of magnitude, as 
preannouncing a 7.5% price increase results in significantly higher abnormal returns than a 
5.5% price increase (0.85%, 𝑝 < .05). In light of the concerns related to estranging or losing 
customers following large price increases (Homburg, Hoyer, and Koschate 2005), a direct 
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implication for managers is that they should not, from an investor’s perspective, de facto shy 
away from implementing bigger price increases as a mere two percentage points increase in 
magnitude can mean a difference of as much as $183.06 million in market capitalization. 
Managers face a choice in providing investors with the underlying reasons for the PIP. 
Our results suggest that managers should not hesitate from revealing an underlying demand 
attribution as it can mean a difference of 0.50% in abnormal returns (𝑝 < .05) or more than 
$107 million in market capitalization. While customers may be less appreciative of a 
demand-inspired price increase, our results show that investors value this information. 
Finally, we also caution managers about the perils of making too frequent PIPs and/or 
falling too far behind competition before making a PIP. Specifically, the results of the 
counterfactual analyses indicate that the abnormal returns following a PIP are likely to be 
smaller if the given PIP is the second, as opposed to the first PIP for a firm in the last year 
(−0.76%, 𝑝 < .05). In other words, even one additional prior PIP can result in a loss 
amounting to more than $164 million. The counterfactual analyses also outline the benefits of 
not waiting for competitors to make PIPs, as we find the abnormal returns following PIPs are 
significantly lower when the given PIP is the second, as opposed to the first, within an 
industry in the last year (−0.59%, 𝑝 < .01). Thus, managers should preannounce price 
increases as early as possible, as being pre-empted by even one competitor’s PIP can amount 
to a loss of almost $130 million in market capitalization.  
2.5.3 Limitations and Future Research 
Results of the current study should be interpreted in light of its limitations, some of which 
provide opportunities for future research. First, while the current study examines investors’ 
evaluations of a PIP, future research can complement this study by examining the effect of 
PIPs on various operational metrics, such as changes in sales revenues following the PIP or 
changes in the penetration and/or purchase frequency of the products involved in the PIP. 
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Second, since the focus of this study is on the abnormal returns in the event window 
surrounding the PIP, the realized long-run value of the preannounced price increase is not 
perceptible in our findings. Following the PIP, investors’ might dynamically alter their 
evaluations after observing the subsequent reactions of competitors and customers. These 
reactions might even cause the firm to retract the preannounced price increase. Although we 
do take into account prior announcements of price retraction in our sensitivity analyses, these 
announcements may act more like reputation builders for investors. Thus, more research is 
required to examine the long-run effects of a PIP.  
Third, even though event studies are quasi-experiments (Srinivasan and Hanssens 
2009), it is important to keep in mind that we use cross-sectional data. As such, readers 
should be cautious in drawing too strong causal implications from this study. Fourth, as this 
study focuses on understanding, both theoretically and empirically, investors’ evaluations of 
PIPs, we do not explore investors’ evaluations of preannouncements of price decreases or 
elaborate on firms’ motivations for making PIPs. Given that the topic of preannouncements 
of price changes is not heavily explored in the marketing literature, more research is required 
to also examine the preannouncements of price decreases and the reasons why some firms 
preannounce price changes and/or provide information on the specific timing and size of the 
price increase in the preannouncement while others don’t.  
Finally, while we examine investors’ evaluations of the future cash flows of the firm 
making the PIP, we did not consider the impact of such PIPs on investors’ evaluations of the 
firm’s competitors. In the context of new-product introductions, existing research finds that a 
firm’s preannouncements can have a significant effect on the abnormal returns of its 
competitors (Fosfuri and Giarratana 2009). Thus, an interesting extension of this study would 
be to examine whether this also holds in the context of PIPs.    
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Table 2.1 
Conceptual Framework for Developing Hypotheses 
 
Customer Economic Competitive 
Net Effect on Investors’ 
Evaluations of the PIP 
Implementation Information     
H1 Timing + – –   
H2 Magnitude – + +/– ? 
Attribution     
H2 Demand Attribution – + + +  
H4 Cost Attribution + – –   
Precedence     
H5 Own Precedence      
H6 Competitive Precedence + –    
 
Notes. PIP = Price-Increase Preannouncement. Consistent with Geyskens, Gielens, and Dekimpe (2002), a “+” signifies that we expect the hypothesized variable in question 
to have a favourable effect on the firm’s expected future cash flows (and hence investors’ evaluations of the PIP) , a “” signifies a negative effect, a “+/ –“ signifies 
that there are good arguments for both a positive and a negative effect, and a “?” signifies that we do not advance any a priori hypothesis on the net effect. 
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Table 2.2 
Control Variables, Measures, and Data Sources 
Variable Measure Source Prior Support 
Spokesperson Equals 1 if the PIP is made by members of the top management team or the chief executive officer; 0 
otherwise. 
FACTIVA Sorescu, Shankar, and Kushwaha 
(2007) 
Reputation Equals 1 for firms that were on the list of Fortune magazine’s Most Admired Company; 0 otherwise. Fortune Magazine Most 
Admired Company 
Mishra and Modi (2016) 
Corporate Branding Equals 1 if the firm predominantly uses its corporate name on its products and/or services; 0 otherwise. SEC; Company Webpage Rao, Agarwal, and Dahlhoff (2004) 
Cash Flows Net cash flows from operating activities of the firm (DT: OANCF) scaled by its total assets (DT: AT). COMPUSTAT Vomberg, Homburg, and Bornemann 
(2015) 
Leverage  Ratio of the firm’s total long-term debt (DT: DLTT) to its market capitalization, where market capitalization is 
the product of the stock price (DT: PRCC) and the total number of outstanding shares (DT: CSHO). 
COMPUSTAT Grewal, Chandrashekaran, and Citrin 
(2010) 
Liquidity Ratio of the current assets (DT: ACT) to the current liabilities (DT: LCT). COMPUSTAT Luo, Homburg, and Wieseke (2010) 
Firm Size The natural logarithm of a firm’s total revenues (DT: REVT). COMPUSTAT Robinson, Tuli, and Kohli (2015) 
COGS Ratio of the firm's cost of goods sold expenses (DT: COGS) to the firm's total revenues (DT: REVT). COMPUSTAT Mittal et al. (2005) 
Industry Concentration Hirschman–Herfindahl index (HHI) within the firm's six-digit NAICS (DT: REVT). COMPUSTAT Fang, Palmatier, and Grewal (2011) 
Industry Growth  Average of the three year-over-year revenue growth in an industry, where the year-over-year revenue growth is 
the percentage change in the sum of the revenues of the firms within the same six-digit NAICS code at the end 
of the current fiscal year from the end of the preceding fiscal year (DT: REVT). 
COMPUSTAT Bahadir, Bharadwaj, and Srivastava 
(2008) 
Industry Turbulence Standard deviation of the sum of the revenues of the firms in the same six-digit NAICS code across the prior 
four years divided by the mean value of the sum of the total revenues of the firms within the same six-digit 
NAICS code for those four years (DT: REVT). 
COMPUSTAT Fang, Palmatier, and Steenkamp 
(2008) 
Service Industry Firms with a six-digit NAICS code beginning with 42-92 are coded as firms in the service industry. COMPUSTAT Rust and Huang (2012) 
Business-to-Consumer Equals to 1 if the firm's six-digit NAICS code sells mostly to end-consumers; 0 otherwise. COMPUSTAT Kalaignanam and Bahadir (2013) 
Exclusion Restrictions for Selection Equation 
Percentage of 
Institutional Holdings 
Percentage of shares outstanding with all reporting institutions for each firm (DT: INSTOWN_PERC). Thomson Financial 
Institutional Holdings (13F) 
Nagel (2005) 
Economic Growth Percentage change in gross domestic product (based on current dollars) reported in the preceding fiscal quarter. BEA of the US Department 
of Commerce 
Lee and Grewal (2004) 
Year Dummy 
Variables 
Year dummy variables corresponding to the five data years in our sample (i.e., 2010 – 2014) FACTIVA Homburg, Vollmayr, and Hahn (2014) 
Notes. PIP = Price-Increase Preannouncement; DT = Data Item; SEC = U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission; BEA = Bureau of Economic Analysis; COGS = Cost of Goods Sold; NAICS = North American 
Industry Classification System. All variables in this table are measured using the financial information from the annual report released in the closest financial year preceding the PIP. In line with prior research, we 
replace the missing values of the following variables with zero: long-term debt (e.g., Robinson, Tuli, and Kohli 2015) and percentage of institutional holdings (e .g., Nagel 2005). 
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Table 2.3 
Abnormal Returns, N = 265 
Day Average 
AR  
(in %) 
Number of PIPs 
with Positive 
(Negative) AR 
% of PIPs with 
Positive (Negative) 
AR 
CSectErr 
(t) 
p-value Rank Test 
(Z) 
p-value Jackknife 
(Z) 
p-value 
-5 -0.01 126 (139) 48 (52) -0.08 0.47 -0.24 0.40 -0.78 0.22 
-4 0.07 132 (133) 50 (50) 0.68 0.25 0.17 0.43 -0.43 0.33 
-3 0.04 129 (136) 49 (51) 0.47 0.32 0.10 0.46 -0.36 0.36 
-2 -0.16 111 (154) 42 (58) -1.40 0.08 -2.09 0.02 -1.98 0.02 
-1 -0.03 136 (129) 51 (49) -0.27 0.39 0.85 0.20 0.58 0.28 
0 0.16 148 (117) 56 (44) 1.49 0.07 2.28 0.01 2.12 0.02 
1 0.25 148 (117) 56 (44) 2.67 0.00 2.04 0.02 1.87 0.03 
2 0.00 129 (136) 49 (51) -0.01 0.50 0.24 0.40 0.30 0.38 
3 0.03 131 (134) 49 (51) 0.30 0.38 0.42 0.34 -0.04 0.48 
4 -0.02 128 (137) 48 (52) -0.26 0.40 0.19 0.42 0.01 0.50 
5 -0.02 130 (135) 49 (51) -0.26 0.40 -0.34 0.37 -1.38 0.08 
 
Notes. PIP = Price-Increase Preannouncement; N = Number of observations pertaining to the outcome equation; AR = Abnormal returns; CSectErr (t) = Cross-
Sectional Error t-statistic. The p-values are two-sided. Consistent with existing studies (e.g., Robinson, Tuli, and Kohli 2015), in determining the significance 
of the abnormal returns, we use a parametric test – the Cross-Sectional Error t-test (Brown and Warner 1985) – and two nonparametric tests – the Rank test 
(Corrado 1989) and the Jackknife test (Giaccotto and Sfiridis 1996). 
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Table 2.4 
Factors Predicting Abnormal Returns 
 
HP Outcome Model Coeff SE  
– H1 Timing -0.34 0.12 ††† 
? H2 Magnitude 3.16 1.30 ** 
+ H3 Demand Attribution 0.50 0.25 †† 
– H4 Cost Attribution -0.02 0.24 
– H5 Own Precedence -0.34 0.17 †† 
– H6 Competitive Precedence -0.43 0.19 †† 
         Firm-Level Controls   
  Spokesperson -0.30 0.22 
  Reputation 0.01 0.42 
 Corporate Branding -0.38 0.34 
 Cash Flows 7.31 3.52 ** 
  Leverage 0.67 0.43 
 Liquidity -0.13 0.14 
 Firm Size -0.24 0.18 
  COGS 4.16 1.38 *** 
         Industry-Level Controls   
 Industry Concentration -0.82 1.17  
 Industry Growth  1.63 1.92 
  Industry Turbulence  0.84 1.99 
  Service Industry -0.58 0.49 
  Business-to-Consumer -0.15 0.46  
         Copula Correction Termsa   
 Copula Correction Term for Magnitude -1.67 0.77 ** 
 Copula Correction Term for Competitive Precedence 0.53 0.20 *** 
         Constant -5.07 2.74 * 
  Selection Model Coeff SE  
         Firm-Level Controls   
  Reputation 0.20 0.26 
 Corporate Branding 0.15 0.23  
 Cash Flows 0.28 1.04  
  Leverage 0.06 0.09 
 Liquidity -0.01 0.08 
 Firm Size 0.41 0.09 *** 
  COGS 0.03 0.01 ** 
         Industry-Level Controls   
 Industry Concentration 0.25 0.59  
 Industry Growth  0.48 1.04 
  Industry Turbulence  1.95 1.24 
  Service Industry -0.45 0.36 
  Business-to-Consumer -0.69 0.30 ** 
         Exclusion Restrictions   
 Percentage of Institutional Holdings 0.76 0.27 *** 
  Economic Growth 0.05 0.03 
  Year Dummy 1: 2011 -0.13 0.12 
  Year Dummy 2: 2012 -0.72 0.17 *** 
  Year Dummy 3: 2013 -0.85 0.21 *** 
  Year Dummy 4: 2014 -0.47 0.17 *** 
         Constant -4.50 0.71 *** 
  𝜌 -0.33 0.18 * 
  Wald Chi-Square (df) 134.74 (21) 
 Maximum VIF 4.56 
  R2   0.13 
 
 
Notes. † p < .10; †† p < .05; ††† p < .01 (one-sided); * p < 0.10; ** p <0 .05; *** p < 0.01 (two-sided); a We do not include the 
copula correction terms for Timing and Own Precedence in the final model as they were not statistically significant when we 
included them in our preliminary (one variable at a time) endogeneity testing (i.e., p = 0.25 and p = 0.89 respectively); COGS = 
Cost of Goods Sold; HP = Hypothesis and its expected sign; Coeff = Coefficient; SE = Standard Error; df = Degrees of 
Freedom; Maximum VIF = Highest variance inflation factor of the outcome equation; R2 = R-squared value of the outcome 
equation. There are 265 (2,463) observations pertaining to the outcome (selection) equation. We Winsorize all continuous 
variables at the 1st and 99th percentile levels. We allow the error terms within a given six-digit North American Industry 
Classification System to be correlated with each other.  
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Table 2.5 
Sensitivity Analyses 
   Focal 
Model 
Results 
Alternative  
Dependent Variables 
Dropping 
Outlying 
Residuals 
 
percentile 
Alternative Standard Errors Alternative 
Industry 
Classification: 
Using 5-Digit 
NAICS 
Heckman 
Two-Step 
Estimation 
Reputation 
Concerning Past 
PIPs 
Alternative 
Measures 
Alternative 
Specification 
of the 
Selection 
Model  
 
Fama and 
French 
(1993) 
Market 
Model 
Equally- 
Weighted 
Model CAROB 
Clustering Robust 
Standard 
Errors 
Dropping 
PIPs 
Indicator 
Variable1 
2-Year 
Time 
Window2 CSR HP 
Firm-
Level 
Industry- 
and Year-
Level 
– H1 Timing –                
? H2 Magnitude +                
+ H3 Demand Attribution +                
– H4 Cost Attribution –                
– H5 Own Precedence –                
– H6 Competitive Precedence –      ()a  ()a       ()a 
Notes. 1 = The indicator variable is not statistically significant in the model; 2 = Using a 2-year time window to measure Own Precedence and Competitive Precedence; HP = Hypothesis and its expected 
sign; CAROB = Cumulative abnormal returns on the value of the operating business; NAICS = North American Industry Classification System; PIP = Price-Increase Preannouncement; CSR = Using 
Corporate Social Responsibility to proxy for firm Reputation;  = The findings from the focal estimation are replicated; ()a = Although the estimated coefficient for this effect is in the expected direction, 
its p-value failed to reach significance (p > 0.10, one-tailed). 
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Table 2.6 
Results of the Counterfactual Analyses 
  Counterfactual Conditions Difference in Predicted 
Abnormal Returns  
(in %) 
Dollar Value of the Difference 
in Predicted Abnormal Returns 
(in Millions of Dollars) 
Implementation Information         
Timing Preannouncing a price increase 33 days (versus 19 days) ahead of its 
implementation  
-0.18 *** -$38.68 
Magnitude Preannouncing a 7.5% (versus 5.5%) price increase 0.85 ** $183.06 
Attribution        
Demand Attribution Preannouncing a price increase with (versus without) a demand 
attribution 
0.50 ** $107.33 
Precedence        
Own Precedence Preannouncing a price increase when the PIP is the second (versus 
first) for the firm in the last one year 
-0.76 ** -$164.28 
Competitive Precedence Preannouncing a price increase when the PIP is the second (versus 
first) within an industry in the last one year 
-0.59 *** -$128.38 
Notes. * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 (two-sided). Note that we do not compute the counterfactuals for cost attribution because the hypothesized effect is not significant. 
The technical details of the counterfactual analyses are presented in Appendix 2.G. 
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Figure 2.1 
Conceptual Model 
 
 
Notes. PIP = Price-Increase Preannouncement; COGS = Cost of Goods Sold.   
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● Magnitude
Attribution Precedence
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Figure 2.2a 
Marginal Effect of Implementation Information and Attribution on 
Abnormal Returns Across Actual Values of the Corresponding 
Hypothesized Variables 
A: Timing 
 
B: Magnitude 
 
C: Demand Attribution 
 
 
Notes. TIME (D) = Actual values of Timing in number of days; MAG (%) = Actual values of 
Magnitude in percentages; DA = Demand Attribution. The horizontal axis of every graph represents 
the different values of the corresponding hypothesized variable across the data range in our sample. 
The dashed lines indicate the 90% confidence interval bands. The vertical axis of every graph 
represents the marginal effects of the hypothesized variable on abnormal returns across changes in 
its corresponding values. Note that we do not generate the plot for cost attribution because the 
hypothesized effect is not significant. 
 
2.50 
2.00 
1.50 
1.00 
0.50 
0.00 
Without DA With DA 
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Figure 2.2b 
Marginal Effect of Precedence on Abnormal Returns Across Actual 
Values of the Corresponding Hypothesized Variables 
A: Own Precedence 
 
B: Competitive Precedence 
 
 
Notes. OWN (No.) = Actual values of Own Precedence in number of previous price-increase 
preannouncements + 1; COMP (No.) = Actual values of Competitive Precedence in number of price-
increase preannouncements from competitors + 1. The horizontal axis of every graph represents the 
different values of the corresponding hypothesized variable across the data range in our sample. The 
dashed lines indicate the 90% confidence interval bands. The vertical axis of every graph represents 
the marginal effects of the hypothesized variable on abnormal returns across changes in its 
corresponding values. 
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Appendix 2 
Appendix 2.A: PIPs that were Excluded Due to Confounding Events 
 
Table 2.A1: PIPs that were Excluded Due to Confounding Events 
Company Date of PIP PIP Headline News Source Reason for Exclusion 
Albemarle Corp. March 01, 2010 Albemarle to Increase Price of Elemental Bromine and Hydrobromic Acid PR Newswire Proximity to Other PIPs 
Albemarle Corp. March 02, 2010 Albemarle to Increase Price of SAYTEX(R) CP-2000 Brominated Flame Retardant PR Newswire Proximity to Other PIPs 
Albemarle Corp. March 25, 2010 Albemarle to Increase Price of ETHANOX(R) Antioxidants for Fuel and Lubricant Market 
Segments 
PR Newswire Proximity to Other PIPs 
Albemarle Corp. March 26, 2010 Albemarle to Increase Price of MARTINAL Flame Retardant PR Newswire Proximity to Other PIPs 
Celanese Corp. March 29, 2010 Celanese Announces Price Increases for Ticona POM and PBT Products in North and South 
America 
Business Wire Proximity to Other PIPs 
Celanese Corp. March 30, 2010 Celanese Announces Emulsions Price Increases in Asia Business Wire Proximity to Other PIPs 
Celanese Corp. March 31, 2010 Celanese Announces Emulsions Price Increases in Europe, North Africa and the Middle East Business Wire Proximity to Other PIPs 
Carpenter Technology Corp. October 12, 2010 Carpenter Technology Raises Prices on Stainless and Specialty Alloys in All Product Forms Business Wire Proximity to Other PIPs 
Carpenter Technology Corp. October 13, 2010 Talley Metals Raises Prices on All Stainless Products Business Wire Proximity to Other PIPs 
Albemarle Corp. November 15, 2010 Albemarle to Increase Prices of Saytex® Brominated Flame Retardants PR Newswire Proximity to Other PIPs 
Albemarle Corp. November 16, 2010 Albemarle to Increase Price of MARTINAL® Fine Precipitated Aluminium Trihydrate Flame 
Retardants 
PR Newswire Proximity to Other PIPs 
Albemarle Corp. November 17, 2010 Albemarle to Increase Prices of SAYTEX® BT-93W and BT-93 Brominated Flame 
Retardants 
PR Newswire Proximity to Other PIPs 
Costco Wholesale Corp. October 06, 2011 Costco to Raise Membership Fees To Offset Tighter Operating Margin The Wall 
Street Journal 
Proximity to Earnings 
Announcement 
Sonoco Products Co. February 14, 2014 Sonoco Protective Solutions Announces Price Increase PR Newswire Proximity to Earnings 
Announcement 
Allegheny Technologies Inc. April 10, 2014 ATI increasing stainless, alloy base prices American 
Metal Market 
Proximity to Other PIPs 
Allegheny Technologies Inc. April 11, 2014 ATI increasing stainless, alloy base prices American 
Metal Market 
Proximity to Other PIPs 
 
Notes. PIP = Price-Increase Preannouncement. 
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Appendix 2.B: Distribution of PIPs by Year and Industry 
 
Table 2.B1: Distribution of PIPs by Year 
Year Number of PIPs % Average Abnormal Returns (in %) 
2010 77 29.06 0.92 
2011 67 25.28 0.13 
2012 38 14.34 0.09 
2013 32 12.08 0.55 
2014 51 19.25 0.14 
Total 265 100.00 0.41 
Notes. PIP = Price-Increase Preannouncement. 
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Table 2.B2: Distribution of PIPs and Abnormal Returns by Industry 
Industry (Six-Digit NAICS) Number of 
PIPs 
% Average Abnormal 
Returns 
(in %) 
Andalusite mining and/or beneficiating (212325) 1 0.38 0.27 
Breakfast cereals manufacturing (311230) 2 0.75 -0.48 
Fruit and vegetable canning, pickling, and drying (31142) 1 0.38 0.26 
Cheese curls and puffs manufacturing (311919) 1 0.38 0.29 
Coffee concentrates (i.e., instant coffee) manufacturing (311920) 4 1.51 1.54 
Artichokes, canned, manufacturing (311421) 3 1.13 0.43 
Artificially carbonated waters manufacturing (312111) 4 1.51 0.68 
Chewing tobacco manufacturing (312230) 1 0.38 -1.38 
Bobbins, fiber, made from purchased paperboard (322219) 13 4.91 -0.12 
Bar soaps manufacturing (325611) 1 0.38 -0.57 
Adrenal medicinal preparations manufacturing (325412) 1 0.38 -1.80 
Architectural coatings (i.e., paint) manufacturing (325510) 4 1.51 -1.06 
Alkalies manufacturing (325180) 1 0.38 4.73 
Basic chemical manufacturing (3251) 6 2.26 0.30 
Accelerators (i.e., basic synthetic chemical) manufacturing (325199) 12 4.53 1.28 
Activated carbon or charcoal manufacturing (325998) 19 7.17 -0.18 
Acetal resins manufacturing (325211) 2 0.75 0.82 
Resin, synthetic rubber, and artificial synthetic fibers and filaments manufacturing (3252) 1 0.38 0.59 
Adhesives (except asphalt, dental, gypsum base) manufacturing (325520) 1 0.38 2.38 
Ant poisons manufacturing (325320) 3 1.13 1.27 
Acetylene manufacturing (325120) 26 9.81 0.32 
Aircraft tire manufacturing (326211) 4 1.51 3.87 
Plastics product manufacturing (3261) 1 0.38 4.42 
Film, plastics, packaging, manufacturing (326112) 3 1.13 0.70 
Acrylic film and unlaminated sheet (except packaging) manufacturing (326113) 1 0.38 0.78 
Antimony refining, primary (331410) 6 2.26 2.46 
Armor plate made in iron and steel mills (331110) 38 14.34 0.55 
Annular ball bearings manufacturing (332991) 1 0.38 -0.43 
Aftercoolers (i.e., heat exchangers) manufacturing (332410) 1 0.38 0.52 
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Table 2.B2: (Continued) 
Industry (Six-Digit NAICS) Number of 
PIPs 
% Average Abnormal 
Returns 
(in %) 
Adding machines manufacturing (333318) 1 0.38 10.83 
Bale throwers manufacturing (333111) 6 2.26 0.17 
Aggregate spreaders manufacturing (333120) 3 1.13 -1.65 
Diesel and semidiesel engines manufacturing (333618) 3 1.13 -1.08 
Air-conditioners, unit (e.g., motor home, travel trailer, window), manufacturing (333415) 8 3.02 -0.41 
Electrical equipment, appliance, and component manufacturing (335) 2 0.75 0.08 
Brush blocks, carbon or molded graphite, manufacturing (335991) 1 0.38 -11.41 
Aircraft engine and engine parts (except carburetors, pistons, piston rings, valves) manufacturing (336412) 2 0.75 0.45 
Air bag assemblies manufacturing (336390) 4 1.51 2.49 
Aircraft seats manufacturing (336360) 13 4.91 0.31 
Beds, sleep-system ensembles (i.e., flotation, adjustable), manufacturing (337910) 1 0.38 3.17 
Bakery machinery and equipment merchant wholesalers (423830) 7 2.64 -0.18 
Audio and video content downloading retail sales sites (454111) 1 0.38 2.59 
Air commuter carriers, scheduled (481111) 4 1.51 2.48 
Barge transportation, coastal or Great Lakes (including St. Lawrence Seaway) (483113) 1 0.38 0.08 
General freight trucking, long-distance, less-than-truckload (LTL) (484122) 1 0.38 1.71 
Air courier services (except establishments operating under a universal service obligation) (492110) 12 4.53 -0.02 
Applications software, computer, packaged (511210) 2 0.75 -0.93 
Cable broadcasting networks (515210) 20 7.55 0.44 
Broadcasting networks, television (515120) 1 0.38 0.53 
Cable program distribution operators (517110) 1 0.38 -2.23 
Beeper (i.e., radio pager) communication carriers (517210) 2 0.75 0.10 
Advertising periodical publishers, exclusively on Internet (519130) 1 0.38 -2.18 
Ash collection services (562111) 1 0.38 0.07 
Carryout restaurants (722513) 5 1.89 -1.90 
Total 265 100.00 0.41 
Notes. PIP = Price-Increase Preannouncement; NAICS = North American Industry Classification System. 
 
  
54 
 
 
 
Appendix 2.C: Examples of the Measurements of Timing, Magnitude, Demand and Cost Attribution 
 Table 2.C1: Examples of the Measurements of Timing and Magnitude 
Company Date of PIP PIP Headline News 
Source 
Timing and Magnitude (of the preannounced price increase) Cited 
from Excerpts of PIPs 
Timing 
(Days) 
Magnitude  
(%) 
Starbucks 
Corp. 
May 25, 2011 Starbucks to Raise 
Packaged Coffee 
Price by 17 Percent 
Reuters "The world's biggest coffee shop chain Starbucks Corp will boost the cost of 
its packaged coffee for the second time since March, but this time it will take 
place in its own U.S. stores and by a steep 17 percent…The price increase, 
effective July 12…" 
48 17.00 
Airgas Inc. October 1, 2014 Airgas to Increase 
Argon Prices 
Business 
Wire 
" Airgas, Inc. (NYSE: ARG), one of the nation's leading suppliers of 
industrial, medical, and specialty gases, and related products, today 
announced that its operating units will increase prices on argon by up to 
15%, effective November 1 or as contracts permit. Price adjustments may 
vary based on specific market conditions or contractual provisions." 
31 15.00 
 
Notes. PIP = Price-Increase Preannouncement. 
 
Table 2.C2: Examples of the Measurements of Demand and Cost Attribution 
Company Date of PIP PIP Headline News Source Reasons Cited (of the preannounced price increase) Cited from 
Excerpts of PIPs that Reflects a Demand Attribution 
Tempur-Sealy 
International, 
Inc. 
February 3, 2010 Tempur-Pedic Raises 
Prices On New Cloud 
Mattress Line 
Dow Jones News 
Service 
“Tempur-Pedic International Inc. (TPX) is raising prices on its new Cloud line 
of mattresses amid strong sales. “Customer response at retail has been so 
positive that retailers were urging the company to raise the list price,”…” 
AT&T Inc. January 19, 2012 AT&T Hikes Rates on 
Smartphone Plans 
CNN Money “AT&T said it raised rates as customers' data usage continues to grow by an 
astounding 40% per year. "Our new plans are driven by this increasing 
demand in a highly competitive environment," David Christopher, AT&T 
Mobility's chief marketing officer, said in a prepared statement.” 
Company Date of PIP PIP Headline News Source Reasons Cited (of the preannounced price increase) Cited from 
Excerpts of PIPs that Reflects a Cost Attribution 
Smucker J M Co. February 8, 2011 The J. M. Smucker 
Company Announces 
Coffee Price Increases 
The J.M. Smucker 
Company Corporate & 
Financial News Release 
"The increase in price is driven by sustained increases in green coffee costs." 
Lydall Inc. October 3, 2014 Lydall Performance 
Materials Announces a 
Price Increase 
Globe Newswire “…announced a general price increase...This adjustment is necessary as a 
result of industry-wide increases in the costs of fibers, resins, energy, and 
freight..” 
 
Notes. PIP = Price-Increase Preannouncement. 
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Appendix 2.D: Data for Selection Model 
 
Data for Selection Model 
The sample to estimate the likelihood of a firm doing a price-increase preannouncement (PIP) 
involves both the 78 firms appearing in the outcome analysis along with their competitors 
that did not preannounce a price increase in the same year. We identify competing firms as all 
publicly-listed firms in the primary six-digit North American Industry Classification System 
(NAICS) code of the 78 focal firms for each year T in which a PIP took place in our sample. 
This yielded a total of 1,320 firms (including the 78 focal firms in the dataset for the outcome 
model) across 54 six-digit NAICS codes. Restricting firms to the same NAICS code enables 
us to control for the effects of industry factors likely to influence the decision to preannounce 
a price increase. However, data for several variables in the selection model were only 
available for 2,463 observations from 619 unique firms. These 2,463 observations were used 
to estimate the selection model.  
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Appendix 2.E: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
 
 Table 2.E1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
    Correlation Matrix 
  Outcome Equation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1 Timing (D) 1.00                                     
2 Magnitude (%) -0.02 1.00                                   
3 Demand Attribution -0.14 0.14 1.00                                 
4 Cost Attribution 0.03 0.15 0.08 1.00                               
5 Own Precedence (No.) 0.04 0.14 0.00 -0.16 1.00                             
6 Competitive Precedence (No.) -0.15 -0.06 0.29 -0.19 0.11 1.00                           
7 Spokesperson -0.07 -0.01 0.30 0.20 -0.08 0.03 1.00                         
8 Reputation 0.00 -0.16 -0.17 -0.01 -0.22 -0.38 0.02 1.00                       
9 Corporate Branding -0.19 0.02 0.17 -0.09 -0.06 0.31 0.18 0.04 1.00                     
10 Cash Flows 0.09 0.06 -0.03 0.09 -0.29 -0.21 -0.04 0.21 0.08 1.00                   
11 Leverage -0.03 -0.03 -0.06 0.03 0.03 0.14 -0.09 -0.08 -0.05 -0.30 1.00                 
12 Liquidity 0.00 -0.05 0.13 -0.11 0.10 0.32 0.14 -0.39 0.10 -0.11 -0.08 1.00               
13 Firm Size (No.) 0.04 -0.03 -0.15 -0.10 0.02 -0.19 -0.28 0.63 -0.05 0.22 -0.01 -0.65 1.00             
14 COGS 0.05 -0.24 -0.15 -0.23 0.30 0.20 -0.04 -0.13 0.25 -0.44 0.04 0.37 -0.22 1.00           
15 Industry Concentration  0.00 -0.11 -0.05 0.21 -0.15 -0.42 0.08 0.21 -0.16 -0.06 -0.18 -0.14 0.13 0.10 1.00         
16 Industry Growth -0.07 -0.04 0.03 0.13 -0.12 0.07 0.22 -0.01 0.07 -0.10 0.10 0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.02 1.00       
17 Industry Turbulence -0.02 -0.10 0.02 -0.03 -0.09 0.19 0.14 -0.29 -0.02 -0.23 -0.05 0.34 -0.45 0.17 -0.10 0.44 1.00     
18 Service Industry -0.08 0.08 0.04 -0.01 -0.32 -0.08 -0.03 0.40 0.17 0.35 0.18 -0.29 0.38 -0.29 -0.35 0.09 -0.16 1.00   
19 Business-to-Consumer 0.02 -0.02 -0.11 0.21 -0.41 -0.36 0.23 0.48 0.05 0.36 0.07 -0.27 0.22 -0.37 -0.08 0.15 -0.10 0.57 1.00 
Mean 3.08 2.13 0.28 0.48 1.07 1.07 0.28 0.37 0.31 0.10 0.40 2.03 8.66 0.70 0.32 0.04 0.15 0.22 0.46 
Standard Deviation 0.85 0.60 0.45 0.50 0.90 1.29 0.45 0.48 0.46 0.06 0.57 1.32 1.43 0.15 0.19 0.08 0.08 0.42 0.50 
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 Table 2.E1: (Continued) 
    Correlation Matrix 
  Selection Equation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18  
1 Reputation 1.00                                    
2 Corporate Branding -0.12 1.00                                  
3 Cash Flows 0.11 -0.01 1                                
4 Leverage 0.04 0.02 0.01 1.00                              
5 Liquidity -0.18 -0.02 -0.10 -0.20 1.00                            
6 Firm Size (No.) 0.52 -0.15 0.55 0.18 -0.38 1.00                          
7 COGS -0.04 -0.04 -0.36 -0.02 0.12 -0.36 1.00                        
8 Industry Concentration  0.19 -0.14 0.14 -0.01 -0.14 0.31 -0.08 1.00                      
9 Industry Growth -0.06 0.04 0.05 -0.14 0.02 -0.05 -0.03 0.07 1.00                    
10 Industry Turbulence -0.11 0.01 0.06 -0.14 0.02 -0.01 -0.06 0.19 0.56 1.00                  
11 Service Industry 0.00 0.23 0.19 0.13 -0.19 -0.02 -0.11 -0.27 0.24 0.02 1.00                
12 Business-to-Consumer 0.07 0.05 -0.04 0.00 -0.03 -0.20 0.04 -0.35 0.16 -0.21 0.49 1.00              
13 Institutional Holdings (%) 0.09 -0.03 0.30 -0.03 -0.05 0.34 -0.12 0.10 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.14 1.00            
14 Economic Growth 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.00 -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 0.03 1.00          
15 Year Dummy 1: 2011 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.04 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.17 -0.06 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.36 1.00        
16 Year Dummy 2: 2012 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.08 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.47 -0.25 1.00      
17 Year Dummy 3: 2013 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.27 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.26 -0.25 -0.24 1.00    
18 Year Dummy 4: 2014 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.05 0.00 0.05 -0.03 0.02 0.13 0.08 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.39 -0.26 -0.25 -0.25 1.00  
Mean 0.12 0.42 0.05 0.36 2.66 6.50 1.50 0.21 0.06 0.14 0.51 0.80 0.60 2.76 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.20  
Standard Deviation 0.33 0.49 0.22 0.79 2.35 2.25 9.17 0.17 0.08 0.08 0.50 0.40 0.31 1.94 0.40 0.39 0.40 0.40  
 
Notes. D = Days; No. = Number; PIP = Price-Increase Preannouncement; COGS = Cost of Goods Sold. There are 265 (2,463) observations pertaining to the outcome (selection) equation. All 
correlations that are significant at p < 0.10 (two-sided) are put in bold. We Winsorize all continuous variables at the 1st and 99th percentile levels. The reported mean, standard deviation and correlations 
of all continuous variables in this table are before taking the logarithm (if applicable). We report the mean and standard deviation of dummy variables as the proportion of observations where the 
dummy variable takes the value of 1. 
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Appendix 2.F: Detailed Results of Sensitivity Analyses and Event Study Results of PIPs with Incomplete Information 
 
 Table 2.F1: Detailed Results of Sensitivity Analyses 
   Alternative  
Dependent Variables 
Dropping 
Outlying 
Residuals 
 
percentile 
Alternative Standard Errors Alternative 
Industry 
Classification: 
Using 5-Digit 
NAICS 
Heckman 
Two-Step 
Estimation 
Reputation 
Concerning Past 
PIPs 
Alternative 
Measures 
Alternative 
Specification 
of the 
Selection 
Model  
 
Fama and 
French 
(1993) 
Market 
Model 
Equally- 
Weighted 
Model CAROB 
Clustering Robust 
Standard 
Errors 
Dropping 
PIPs 
Indicator 
Variable1 
2-Year 
Time 
Window2 CSR HP Firm-Level 
Industry- 
and Year-
Level 
– H1 Timing -0.30 ††† -0.34 ††† -0.33 ††† -0.23 †† -0.25 †† -0.34 ††† -0.34 ††† -0.34 ††† -0.32 ††† -0.34 ††† -0.39 ††† -0.35 ††† -0.31 ††† -0.35 ††† -0.33 †† 
? H2 Magnitude 3.27 ** 3.53 *** 3.10 ** 2.25 ** 2.69 ** 3.16 ** 3.16 ** 3.16 *** 3.39 ** 3.09 ** 3.24 ** 3.07 ** 3.18 ** 3.23 ** 3.01 ** 
+ H3 Demand Attribution 0.48 †† 0.42 † 0.57 †† 0.51 ††† 0.57 ††† 0.50 †† 0.50 †† 0.50 †† 0.40 † 0.51 †† 0.57 †† 0.51 †† 0.48 †† 0.47 †† 0.51 †† 
– H4 Cost Attribution 0.00 -0.07 -0.11 0.09 0.05 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.09 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 
– H5 Own Precedence -0.31 †† -0.29 †† -0.34 †† -0.26 †† -0.41 ††† -0.34 †† -0.34 †† -0.34 †† -0.23 † -0.35 †† -0.33 †† -0.35 †† -0.18 † -0.31 †† -0.36 †† 
– H6 Competitive Precedence -0.32 †† -0.26 † -0.37 †† -0.39 ††† -0.30 †† -0.43 -0.43 †† -0.43 -0.35 †† -0.44 † -0.28 † -0.42 †† -0.31 †† -0.46 ††† -0.48 
Notes. 1 = The indicator variable is not statistically significant in the model; 2 = Using a 2-year time window to measure Own Precedence and Competitive Precedence; HP = Hypothesis and its expected 
sign; CAROB = Cumulative abnormal returns on the value of the operating business; NAICS = North American Industry Classification System; PIP = Price-Increase Preannouncement; CSR = Using 
Corporate Social Responsibility to proxy for firm Reputation; † p < .10; †† p < .05; ††† p < .01 (one-sided); * p < 0.10; ** p <0 .05; *** p < 0.01 (two-sided); Coeff = Coefficient. In conducting the sensitivity 
analyses, we apply the same variable transformations and include the same set of control variables and exclusion restrictions as in our focal analysis. 
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Table 2.F2: Abnormal Returns for PIPs with Incomplete Information, N = 343 
Day Average 
AR  
(in %) 
Number of PIPs 
with Positive 
(Negative) AR 
% of PIPs with 
Positive (Negative) 
AR 
CSectErr 
(t) 
p-value Rank Test 
(Z) 
p-value Jackknife 
(Z) 
p-value 
-5 -0.19 157 (186) 46 (54) -2.07 0.02 -0.35 0.36 -0.58 0.28 
-4 0.08 158 (185) 46 (54) 0.86 0.20 -0.21 0.42 -0.40 0.35 
-3 -0.11 161 (182) 47 (53) -1.11 0.13 -0.82 0.21 -1.01 0.16 
-2 0.13 174 (169) 51 (49) 1.61 0.05 1.16 0.12 1.42 0.08 
-1 -0.11 158 (185) 46 (54) -1.23 0.11 -0.81 0.21 -1.34 0.09 
0 -0.11 166 (177) 48 (52) -1.17 0.12 0.23 0.41 0.44 0.33 
1 0.02 171 (172) 50 (50) 0.21 0.42 0.16 0.44 -0.07 0.47 
2 -0.04 161 (182) 47 (53) -0.45 0.32 0.02 0.49 -0.12 0.45 
3 0.03 168 (175) 49 (51) 0.32 0.38 0.67 0.25 0.23 0.41 
4 -0.03 163 (180) 48 (52) -0.30 0.38 -0.56 0.29 -1.10 0.14 
5 0.17 186 (157) 54 (46) 1.58 0.06 1.19 0.12 -0.08 0.47 
 
Notes. PIP = Price-Increase Preannouncement; N = Number of observations; AR = Abnormal returns; CSectErr (t) = Cross-Sectional Error t-statistic. The p-
values are two-sided. Consistent with existing studies (e.g., Robinson, Tuli, and Kohli 2015), in determining the significance of the abnormal returns, we use a 
parametric test – the Cross-Sectional Error t-test (Brown and Warner 1985) – and two nonparametric tests – the Rank test (Corrado 1989) and the Jackknife 
test (Giaccotto and Sfiridis 1996). 
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Appendix 2.G: Counterfactual Analyses 
 
Counterfactual Analyses 
The specified conditions for the counterfactual analyses are as follows. The conditions 
specified for Timing compare the predicted abnormal returns following PIPs with greater 
timing values, i.e., that are 1 week above its median (i.e., 33 days), and those with lower 
timing values, i.e., that are 1 week below its median (i.e., 19 days). Similarly, the conditions 
specified for Magnitude compare the predicted abnormal returns following PIPs with higher 
magnitude values, i.e., that are one percentage point above its median (i.e., 7.5%) and those 
with lower magnitude values, i.e., that are one percentage point below its median (i.e., 5.5%). 
On a similar valence, the conditions specified for Own (Competitive) Precedence compare 
the predicted abnormal returns following PIPs that are the second and the first PIPs made by 
the firm (within an industry) in a one-year time period, where Own (Competitive) Precedence 
takes the value of 1 and 0 respectively. Finally, the conditions specified for Demand 
Attribution compare the predicted abnormal returns following PIPs with and without a 
demand attribution. We do not compute the counterfactual conditions for Cost Attribution as 
its hypothesized effect in the focal model is not statistically significant (see Table 2.4). 
 We conduct the counterfactual analyses by using the estimates of the coefficients 
from the focal model (Table 2.4) and applying the specified conditions on our outcome 
sample to derive the predicted abnormal returns. Consistent with our measurement approach, 
we derive the values for all of the counterfactual conditions by matching the values of interest 
to the corresponding transformed values that were used to estimate our focal model, i.e., after 
taking the natural logarithm (if applicable) and Winsorizing to the focal outcome sample. For 
example, for the counterfactual condition for which a price increase is preannounced 33 days 
prior to its implementation, we impute the value of the post-transformed timing variable 
when the pre-transformed timing variable takes the value of 33. Following Fang et al. (2016), 
we hold all other independent variables at their sample means when conducting these 
analyses (see also Ghosh and John 2009; Mayer and Nickerson 2005).   
We illustrate the steps to derive the counterfactual results using the hypothesized 
effect of Magnitude. First, to compute the predicted abnormal returns following PIPs with 
7.5% magnitude, we set magnitude to 7.5% and hold all other variables at their sample 
means. We repeat the preceding step with the value of magnitude set at 5.5%. Second, to 
compute the dollar values of the predicted abnormal returns, we take the product of the 
predicted abnormal returns and the average market capitalization in our 265 outcome sample. 
All other counterfactual analyses are conducted using the preceding steps. The 
variables with set values (i.e., in step one) vary according to the specified conditions.  
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Chapter 3 
Customer Satisfaction and Costs of Selling and Producing 
 
3.1 Introduction 
At the nucleus of current marketing thinking is the customer (Hanssens et al. 2014); as such, 
customer satisfaction has become one of the most widely used and extensively studied 
marketing metric (Fornell, Rust, and Dekimpe 2010; Mittal and Frennea 2010). Whereas an 
impressive body of work examines the impact of customer satisfaction on firm performance 
(e.g., Kumar et al. 2011), we know little about its impact on the costs incurred by a firm.18 
This lack of emphases is surprising as costs are a critical concern for the top management. 
Indeed, over the last three years, reducing costs has been the top most concern for CEOs 
according to the Annual Global CEO Survey conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers (see 
PwC 2014a; 2015; 2016; 2017). Not surprisingly, investors and analysts also keep a close 
watch on the costs incurred by a firm (see Gupta, Pevzner, and Seethamraju 2010). As such, 
firms are constantly looking for marketing initiatives that produce the same product-market 
outcomes at lower costs (e.g., Hanssens, Wang, and Zhang 2016; Katsikeas et al. 2016). 
Marketing scholars do recognize that while marketing actions can drive sales, they 
can also increase costs that might not be reflected in the aggregated profit metrics (see 
Boulding and Christen 2008; Hanssens et al. 2014). Indeed, the conventional wisdom in 
accounting even considers marketing efforts as a cost/expense (see Mizik and Nissim 2011). 
However, recent research suggests that certain marketing initiatives such as customer 
relationship management could actually lower firm costs (e.g., Krasnikov, Jayachandran, and 
Kumar 2009). Given the opposing views on the cost implications of marketing efforts, and 
                                                          
18 Scholars have studied the effect of customer satisfaction on both stock market-based measures (e.g., Fornell, Morgeson, 
and Hult 2016; Lee et al. 2015) and operational measures of firm performance (e.g., Malshe and Agarwal 2015; Rego, 
Morgan, and Fornell 2013). 
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recognizing the importance of customer satisfaction and costs along with the paucity of 
research examining the relationship between the two, we study the effects of customer 
satisfaction on the costs incurred by a firm.  
Specifically, we draw on the Motivation-Ability-Opportunity (MOA) framework to 
suggest that while customer satisfaction indicates organizational ability to understand 
customers’ requirements, the extent to which this ability is utilized should depend on 
organizational motivation and/or the opportunity provided (e.g., Wu, Balasubramanian, and 
Mahajan 2004; Wuyts, Rindfleisch, and Citrin 2015). We propose that by driving customer 
retention, customer satisfaction offers both downstream (related to customers) and upstream 
(related to suppliers) learning benefits that influence costs of selling (COS; related to 
customers) and costs of producing (COP; related to suppliers). 
COS denote the marketing and sales expenditures associated with products and 
services offered, while COP assess the manufacturing expenditures for the products and 
services (Boulding and Christen 2008). COS and COP form the “core expenses” of a firm 
(see McVay 2006) and together, COS and COP account for almost 85% of the total costs 
incurred by a firm (see Donelson, Jennings, and McInnis 2011).19 Given that cost reduction is 
a top priority for CEOs (e.g., PwC 2017) and that firms often engage in initiatives to improve 
customer satisfaction (e.g., Keiningham et al. 2014), it becomes important to examine the 
influence of customer satisfaction on both COS and COP.  
Our primary contribution is to develop an understanding of the COS and COP 
associated with customer satisfaction, which we believe has not received empirical scrutiny. 
In the process, we respond to recent calls by Katsikeas and colleagues (2016) for marketing 
scholars to examine the effect of marketing actions on the costs incurred by a firm. To deepen 
our understanding of the effect of customer satisfaction on COS and COP, we use the MOA 
                                                          
19 Both COS and COP are viewed as variable costs incurred by a firm (e.g., Kinney and Raiborn 2011). As such, we do not 
focus on the fixed costs incurred by a firm in this study.  
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framework to develop a contingency approach. The proposed contingency approach 
integrates recent research on myopic marketing decisions (e.g., Chakravarty and Grewal 
2016), operations research (e.g., Modi and Mishra 2011), and research on industry level 
factors (e.g., Fang, Palmatier, and Steenkamp 2008).  
Consistent with the proposed hypotheses, we find that an increase in customer 
satisfaction reduces COS and this effect is stronger for firms with lower stock returns or stock 
returns volatility, or for firms facing lower industry turbulence. We also find that an increase 
in customer satisfaction increases COS when inventory slack or industry growth increases. 
Finally, an increase in customer satisfaction decreases COP when stock returns or stock 
returns volatility decreases, or when inventory slack increases.  
3.2 Motivation-Ability-Opportunity Framework 
A large body of literature examines the impact of customer satisfaction on both investor 
sentiment and operational performance. Studies that focus on the investor sentiment examine 
the effects of customer satisfaction on metrics such as stock returns (e.g., Fornell, Morgeson, 
and Hult 2016), Tobin’s Q (e.g., Grewal, Chandrashekaran, and Citrin 2010), portfolio 
returns (e.g., Aksoy et al. 2008), and stock returns risk (e.g., Tuli and Bharadwaj 2009). 
Studies that focus on the operational performance, investigate the effects of customer 
satisfaction on return on investment (e.g., Anderson, Fornell, and Lehmann 1994), growth 
and volatility in cash flows (e.g., Gruca and Rego 2005), sales (e.g., Morgan and Rego 2006), 
financial leverage (e.g., Malshe and Agarwal 2015), and market share (e.g., Rego, Morgan, 
and Fornell 2013). Missing from this impressive body of research on customer satisfaction is 
the cost angle and thereby the relationship between customer satisfaction and COS and COP. 
This lack of emphasis on costs is surprising because existing studies in the service-profit 
chain literature suggest that disregarding the cost of customer satisfaction may reduce a 
firm’s profitability (e.g., Kamakura et al. 2002; Mittal et al. 2005). Furthermore, both COS 
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and COP are closely watched by the top management of a firm, investors, and financial 
analysts (e.g., Banker, Huang, and Natarajan 2011).  
Against this background, we study the effects of customer satisfaction on COS and 
COP. We draw on the MOA framework that has been used to study multiple organizational 
actions (e.g., Wu, Balasubramanian, and Mahajan 2004; Wuyts, Rindfleisch, and Citrin 
2015). Briefly, in this framework, motivation refers to the willingness of a firm to act, 
opportunity refers to the contextual factors that surround an action, while ability refers to 
organizational skills and knowledge bases that are required to conduct an action (see Wuyts, 
Rindfleisch, and Citrin 2015). We propose that as customer satisfaction increases, 
organizational ability to learn about customers and markets increases as well; utilization of 
this knowledge should reduce COS and COP. Figure 3.1 outlines our conceptual framework. 
[Insert Figure 3.1 about here] 
3.2.1 Customer Satisfaction and Downstream and Upstream Advantages  
Downstream effects. Higher customer satisfaction is likely to result in reductions in a 
firm’s COS through two mechanisms – customer retention and customer acquisition. First, 
higher customer satisfaction leads to greater customer retention (see Gustafsson, Johnson, 
and Roos 2005). Greater customer retention, in turn, implies a more stable customer base for 
the firm. This stability enables a firm to better understand its customers’ requirements and 
hence form long-term relationships with their customers (e.g., Kaufman, Jayachandran, and 
Rose 2006). Stability of customer relationships and long-term relationships, in turn, are likely 
to lower the costs of customer retention, thereby lowering the firm’s COS (e.g., Kalwani and 
Narayandas 1995; Patatoukas 2012). Second, having higher customer satisfaction also signals 
that the firm’s products and/or services are of higher quality relative to its competitors (e.g., 
Daughety and Reinganum 2008a; 2008b). Indeed, increase in customer satisfaction generates 
positive word-of-mouth (e.g., Luo and Homburg 2007), which reduces the spending required 
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to acquire new customers (e.g., Villanueva, Yoo, and Hanssens 2008) and hence lower the 
firm’s COS. Therefore, we expect: 
H1a: The higher the customer satisfaction, the lower the COS.  
Upstream effects. Higher customer retention and greater understanding of customer 
requirements, which emanates from higher customer satisfaction, also translate into lower 
demand uncertainty about the type and quantity of products/services that customers want. 
Lower demand uncertainty is likely to lower COP for four reasons. First, lower demand 
uncertainty shortens lead times in production, which, in turn, lower the input costs pertaining 
to raw materials (see Fisher, Maltz, and Jaworski 1997; Yan, Liu, and Hsu 2003). Second, 
lower demand uncertainty also translates into lower instances of supply and demand 
mismatches between a firm and its suppliers. Such mismatches are known to increase costs 
by almost 11% (see Hendricks and Singhal 2005).  
Third, suppliers covet stable relationships with firms that have lower demand 
uncertainty because such firms can lower the supplier’s demand risk (see for example, Irvine, 
Park, and Yıldızhan 2016). In return for lowering uncertainty, suppliers are likely to offer 
more favorable input prices thus lowering the COP (e.g., Boulding and Christen 2008; 
Cachon 2003). Fourth, stable relationships between the firm and supplier lower the 
coordination costs of managing production for the firm as both parties have more knowledge 
about each other’s operations (see Anderson and Dekker 2009; Cannon and Homburg 2001). 
Taken together, we suggest: 
H1b: The higher the customer satisfaction, the lower the COP. 
Higher customer satisfaction indicates organizational ability to understand customers and 
therefore reduce COS and COP. However, these effects are more likely to be realized if the 
firm is motivated and has the opportunity to utilize this ability (see Morgan, Anderson, and 
Mittal 2005; Wuyts, Rindfleisch, and Citrin 2015). Drawing on recent research in marketing, 
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finance, and operations (see Bond, Edmans, and Goldstein 2012; Hendricks and Singhal 
2009; Mizik 2010), we propose that the stock price movements motivate the firm to capitalize 
on higher customer satisfaction to lower COS and COP. Further, the organizational resources 
that the firm possesses and its operating environment determine whether the firm has an 
opportunity to capitalize on higher customer satisfaction to lower COS and COP.  
Firms are more likely to be motivated to utilize their ability to reduce COS and COP if 
they have the incentives to do so. Since the compensation of senior managers is usually tied 
to the firm’s stock price, a firm’s motivation to utilize its ability to lower COS and COP will 
depend on the behavior of the firms’ stock price (Bond, Edmans, and Goldstein 2012). For 
example, Kau, Linck, and Rubin (2008) propose that when faced with negative stock returns, 
firms are likely to terminate their investment plans. Previous research also finds that an 
increase in volatility is likely to lead to firms avoiding new initiatives or making risky 
decisions (see Devers et al. 2008; Matta and McGuire 2008). Therefore, we use both a firm’s 
stock returns and stock returns volatility to assess the stock market behavior of a firm.  
The impact of customer satisfaction on COS and COP is also likely to be contingent 
on the degree to which organizational resources and operating environment provide an 
opportunity for firms to utilize their ability to reduce COS and COP. We propose that larger 
organizational resources provide higher opportunity for the firm to utilize its ability to reduce 
its COS and COP. Consistent with prior research (e.g., Lee and Grewal 2004; Modi and 
Mishra 2011), we conceptualize organizational resources as the amount of inventory and 
operating slack a firm possesses. In addition, we propose that the opportunity for a firm to 
utilize its ability to lower COS and COP is likely to be a function of its operating 
environment as reflected in industry concentration, growth, and turbulence (e.g., Fang, 
Palmatier, and Steenkamp 2008). 
67 
 
 
 
3.2.2 Moderating Effect of Stock Price Behavior  
Stock returns. We argue that lower stock returns represent a negative evaluation of 
firm’s actions and therefore increase managers’ motivation to explore avenues for improving 
the financial performance of the firm. Investors expect the future earnings of firms with lower 
stock returns to be lower than prior expectations. In this way, lower stock returns increase the 
pressure on managers to show improvements in future profits (e.g., Mizik 2010). As such, 
managers faced with lower stock returns are more likely to be motivated to capitalize on the 
upstream and downstream benefits of higher customer satisfaction to lower their COS and 
COP. Thus, the effects of customer satisfaction on COS and COP are likely to be stronger for 
firms with lower stock returns. Formally: 
H2: The negative effect of customer satisfaction on (a) COS and (b) COP is 
likely to be stronger (weaker) for firms with lower (higher) stock returns. 
 
Stock returns volatility. Stock returns volatility reflects the level of uncertainty about 
the future prospects of the firm. We argue that managers facing greater stock returns 
volatility should be less motivated to utilize customer satisfaction information to lower their 
COS and COP. This lower motivation results because in order to incorporate the tacit 
knowledge of customers and hence reap the cost benefits of having higher customer 
satisfaction, firms must continuously undergo substantial transitions in their corporate 
routines (see Kim, Kumar, and Kumar 2012). For firms that do not already have these 
routines in place, they are unlikely to invest in them when there is higher stock returns 
volatility as the higher uncertainty is likely to make senior managers risk averse such that 
they are less likely to explore new initiatives (e.g., Devers et al. 2008; Matta and McGuire 
2008). Similarly, since firms with higher stock returns volatility are also more likely to cut 
back on their future investments (e.g., Panousi and Papanikolaou 2012), the greater 
uncertainty is likely to deter firms that already have these routines in place from making 
additional improvements to boost their existing customer satisfaction levels. Therefore, this 
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response to higher uncertainty suggests that when faced with greater stock returns volatility, 
firms are likely to be less motivated to utilize the learning benefits of customer satisfaction to 
lower their COS and COP. As such, we expect: 
H3: The negative effect of customer satisfaction on (a) COS and (b) COP is 
likely to be weaker (stronger) for firms with higher (lower) stock returns 
volatility. 
 
3.2.3 Moderating Effect of Organizational Resource 
Inventory slack. Inventory slack refers to the spare physical inventory that a firm 
possesses (e.g., Azadegan, Patel, and Parida 2013; Hendricks and Singhal 2009). Even 
though inventory slack may make a firm less efficient, it allows a firm to better respond to 
supply and demand variations (Kovach et al. 2015). More importantly, a firm with greater 
inventory slack possesses the flexibility of providing a wider range of products, hence 
enabling it to “better adapt to changing customer needs” (Modi and Mishra 2011 p. 256). As 
such, inventory slack facilitates the execution of strategic behaviors (Tan and Peng 2003; 
Thompson 1967), thereby creating an opportunity for firms to realize the benefits of higher 
customer satisfaction. Thus, we propose that greater inventory slack provides a better 
opportunity for the firm to utilize the learning benefits of customer satisfaction to lower its 
COS and COP. Hence, the effects of customer satisfaction on COS and COP are likely to be 
stronger for firms with higher inventory slack. Formally: 
H4: The negative effect of customer satisfaction on (a) COS and (b) COP is 
likely to be stronger (weaker) for firms with higher (lower) inventory slack. 
 
Operating slack. Operating slack reflects excess capacity of the firm’s production 
process (Azadegan, Patel, and Parida 2013). Unlike inventory slack, prior research suggests 
that operating slack cannot be readily deployed (Voss, Sirdeshmukh, and Voss 2008). Since 
operating slack is bound by the existing operations of the firm, it corresponds to additional 
costs, rather than uncommitted resources to the firm (Tan and Peng 2003). As such, firms 
with higher operating slack are likely to focus more on cutting losses as opposed to investing 
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in future gains (Voss, Sirdeshmukh, and Voss 2008). In this way, operating slack impedes 
current and future investments, thereby reducing the opportunities for firms to realize the 
benefits of higher customer satisfaction to lower their COS and COP. Thus, the effects of 
customer satisfaction on COS and COP are likely to be stronger for firms with lower 
operating slack. Formally: 
H5: The negative effect of customer satisfaction on (a) COS and (b) COP is 
likely to be stronger (weaker) for firms with lower (higher) operating slack. 
 
3.2.4 Moderating Effect of Operating Environment 
Industry concentration. Industry concentration reveals the degree of competition a 
firm faces within an industry (Bharadwaj, Tuli, and Bonfrer 2011). A more concentrated 
industry entails lower competitive intensity, where customers have fewer options to choose 
from (Fang, Palmatier, and Grewal 2011). The lack of options in such industries makes it 
difficult for dissatisfied customers to discontinue their relationships with the firm (see Luo, 
Homburg, and Wieseke 2010). Therefore, there is lower incentive for firms to use customer 
satisfaction information in more concentrated industries (see Morgan, Anderson, and Mittal 
2005). Thus, industries with higher concentration ratio provide firms with fewer opportunities 
to utilize the benefits of higher customer satisfaction to lower their COS. As such, we expect 
the effect of customer satisfaction on COS to be weaker for firms in more concentrated 
industries. Formally:  
H6a: The negative effect of customer satisfaction on COS is likely to be weaker 
(stronger) for firms operating in industries with higher (lower) industry 
concentration. 
 
In contrast, firms in industries with higher concentration ratio are likely to have 
greater opportunities to utilize the learning benefits of higher customer satisfaction to 
lower their COP. Having higher customer satisfaction allows a firm to accumulate 
knowledge about the preferences of its customers. Since firms operating in highly 
concentrated industries tend to have more consistent sales, these learning benefits of 
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higher customer satisfaction are likely to be more effective in translating to lower COP 
in such industries (e.g., Besanko et al. 2010). Thus, we expect the effect of customer 
satisfaction on COP to be stronger for firms in more concentrated industries. Formally: 
H6b: The negative effect of customer satisfaction on COP is likely to be stronger 
(weaker) for firms operating in industries with higher (lower) industry 
concentration. 
 
Industry growth. Industry growth indicates the rate of demand growth in the firm’s 
industry (Homburg, Vollmayr, and Hahn 2014). The downstream benefit of the positive 
word-of-mouth generated by more satisfied customers, and the subsequent lowering of a 
firm’s COS is likely to be stronger as industry growth increases. This benefit emanates 
because customers tend to rely more on word-of-mouth in industries with higher growth (see 
You, Vadakkepatt, and Joshi 2015).  
In addition, firms operating in industries with higher growth also typically have to 
manage a growing number of new customers, thus increasing their COP (Robinson and Min 
2002). As industry growth increases, the upstream benefits of better understanding customer 
demand patterns become more beneficial as each mistake in demand prediction can be 
costlier, i.e., in terms of production delays having a stronger effect on COP. In this way, an 
increase in industry growth provides better opportunity for firms to leverage the benefits of 
customer satisfaction to lower their COS and COP. As such, the effects of customer 
satisfaction on COS and COP are likely to be stronger in such industries. Formally:  
H7: The negative effect of customer satisfaction on (a) COS and (b) COP is 
likely to be stronger (weaker) for firms operating in industries with higher 
(lower) industry growth. 
 
Industry turbulence. Industry turbulence reflects the extent to which industry demand 
changes rapidly and unpredictably (see Fang, Palmatier, and Grewal 2011); the higher the 
industry turbulence, the greater the unpredictability in the nature and quantity of customers’ 
requirements (Homburg, Vollmayr, and Hahn 2014). As such, the knowledge gained from 
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understanding customer requirements is likely to be less valuable in more turbulent industries 
because the constant changes in customers’ preferences and requirements in such industries 
make it difficult to rely on prior knowledge of customers (Kumar et al. 2011). In this way, as 
industry turbulence increases, firms should have fewer opportunities to capitalize on the 
benefits of higher customer satisfaction to lower their COS. Therefore, we expect: 
H8a: The negative effect of customer satisfaction on COS is likely to be weaker 
(stronger) for firms operating in industries with higher (lower) industry 
turbulence. 
 
Higher industry turbulence also implies that products and services have to be 
modified frequently to meet the changing customer preferences (see Zhou, Yim, and 
Tse 2005). These frequent changes, in turn, mean that there is a higher probability of 
production costs increasing for firms operating in more turbulent industries (see Grover 
and Malhotra 2003). These increasing costs, in turn, suggest that turbulent industries 
present a valuable opportunity for firms to utilize the benefits of higher customer 
satisfaction to lower their COP. Consequently, we expect the effect of customer 
satisfaction on COP to be stronger for firms in more turbulent industries. Formally: 
H8b: The negative effect of customer satisfaction on COP is likely to be stronger 
(weaker) for firms operating in industries with higher (lower) industry 
turbulence. 
 
3.3 Model Specification 
3.3.1 Model Specification and Identification Strategy 
We can use a linear regression model specification to test our hypotheses, where we treat 
COS and COP as a function of customer satisfaction, moderators, and control variables 
including sales. We also need to temporally separate costs and the explanatory variables as 
current costs are likely to depend on past levels of customer satisfaction and other 
explanatory variables. Specifically: 
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(1a) 𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑗(𝑡+1) =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 × 𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 × 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡) + 𝛽4(𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 ×
𝐼𝑆𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑡) + 𝛽5(𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 × 𝑂𝑆𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑡) + 𝛽6(𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 × 𝐻𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑗𝑡) + 𝛽7(𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 × 𝐺𝑅𝑇𝐻𝑗𝑡) + 𝛽8(𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 ×
𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐵𝑗𝑡) + 𝛽9𝐶𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗(𝑡+1) 
(1b) 𝐶𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑗(𝑡+1) =  𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾2(𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 × 𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡) + 𝛾3(𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 × 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡) + 𝛾4(𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 ×
𝐼𝑆𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑡) + 𝛾5(𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 × 𝑂𝑆𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑡) + 𝛾6(𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 × 𝐻𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑗𝑡) + 𝛾7(𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 × 𝐺𝑅𝑇𝐻𝑗𝑡) + 𝛾8(𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 ×
𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐵𝑗𝑡) + 𝛾9𝐶𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖𝑗(𝑡+1) 
where 𝐶𝑂𝑆(𝐶𝑂𝑃)𝑖𝑗(𝑡+1) is the future cost of selling (producing) of firm 𝑖 in industry 𝑗 at time 
𝑡 + 1, 𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 is Customer Satisfaction of firm 𝑖 in industry 𝑗 at time 𝑡, 𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 is Stock Returns, 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡 is Stock Returns Volatility, 𝐼𝑆𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑡 is Inventory Slack, 𝑂𝑆𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑡 is Operating Slack, 
𝐻𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑗𝑡 is Industry Concentration, 𝐺𝑅𝑇𝐻𝑗𝑡 is Industry Growth, 𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐵𝑗𝑡 is Industry 
Turbulence, 𝐶𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 is vector of firm- and industry-specific control variables, and 𝜖𝑖𝑗(𝑡+1) 
and 𝜔𝑖𝑗(𝑡+1) are the random error terms. 
Despite temporal separation, our key explanatory variable, customer satisfaction, 
could be endogenous due to three types of omitted variables that could potentially influence 
both costs in period 𝑡 + 1 and customer satisfaction in period 𝑡. First, we need to account for 
certain exogenous shocks that change both customer satisfaction level and costs. These 
shocks could be boom and bust business cycles, where it is well documented that marketing 
budgets are curtailed during bust periods (e.g., Srinivasan, Rangaswamy, and Lilien 2005). 
Second are variables like organizational culture that are largely stable over time but influence 
both how much a firm spends on customer satisfaction (i.e., costs) and the level of customer 
satisfaction it achieves. For example, firms that lay more emphasis on customer engagement 
should spend more on attaining customer satisfaction (i.e., higher costs) and should have 
higher levels of customer satisfaction. Third are firm specific variables that change over time 
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and can potentially influence costs in period 𝑡 + 1 and customer satisfaction in period 𝑡. For 
example, the mindset of the chief executive officer (CEO) and/or chief marketing officer 
(CMO) could determine the emphasis on customer satisfaction over 2-5 year periods (i.e., 
average tenures of CEOs and CMOs; e.g., Germann, Ebbes, and Grewal 2015). 
We use a three-pronged approach to identify the effects of these endogenous variables 
of interest (total sales and customer satisfaction). First, we use a rich set of covariates; 
specifically, we include the lagged dependent variable, lagged sales, and other control 
variables. As there is likely to be some persistence in spending, lagged dependent variable is 
needed as a control variable. Lagged dependent variable can also be seen as serving as a 
proxy for many difficult to measure variables such as organizational ethos with respect to 
various costs. Lagged sales is also an important control variable as costs are often determined 
based on sales (such as spending on advertising and perhaps customer satisfaction). As such, 
lagged sales can be seen as an important decision variable on costs.  
To account for the capital market factors, we control for the firms’ stock returns and 
the volatility of stock returns as they are likely to have an effect on firm spending behavior 
(see Chakravarty and Grewal 2011). We also control for inventory slack and operating slack 
because the amount of organizational resources a firm possesses may affect its strategic 
behavior (e.g., Lee and Grewal 2004). In addition, to account for the firm’s financial 
performance, we also control for cash flows and firm leverage (see Grewal, 
Chandrashekaran, and Citrin 2010).  
We account for the number of business segments a firm has as it captures the extent of 
diversification of the firm which, in turn, is likely to have an effect on the costs incurred by 
the firm (see Morgan and Rego 2006). We also control for asset intensity of the firm because 
it is likely to have an impact on the firm’s ability to respond to changing demands of 
customers (Homburg, Krohmer, and Workman 2004). Finally, to account for industry-
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specific factors, we follow Fang, Palmatier, and Steenkamp (2008) and control for industry 
concentration, growth and turbulence. 
With all these control variables, the identifying assumption here is that these variables 
account for or proxy any omitted variables. As our control variables include the lagged 
dependent and sales variables, which proxy many other variables, in the language of 
Germann, Ebbes, and Grewal (2015), we believe we have a strong argument to claim that we 
have a rich data model. As a result, a potential identification strategy would be to claim that 
our parameters of interest are identified in the model presented in equations 1a and 1b.  
Second, to explicitly capture firm specific variables that do not vary over time, we use 
firm-specific fixed effects. On average, our unbalanced panel data has nine years of data per 
firm; variables such as organizational culture that are stable and slow to change can be 
accounted for by these firm-specific fixed effects. We also include time-specific fixed effects 
to control for exogenous shifters, such as boom and bust business cycles that might jointly 
affect both costs and customer satisfaction. Since prior research suggests that industry 
idiosyncrasies can be teased out using both the firm- and time-specific fixed effects (Kang, 
Germann, and Grewal 2016), the inclusion of these fixed effects also account for industry 
variables that do not change over time. The identifying assumption with this fixed effects 
specification is that beyond the control variables, the omitted variables do not vary over time 
(Germann, Ebbes, and Grewal 2015). Thus, we can augment equations 1a and 1b as: 
(2a) 𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑗(𝑡+1) =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 × 𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 × 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡) + 𝛽4(𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 ×
𝐼𝑆𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑡) + 𝛽5(𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 × 𝑂𝑆𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑡) + 𝛽6(𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 × 𝐻𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑗𝑡) + 𝛽7(𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 × 𝐺𝑅𝑇𝐻𝑗𝑡) + 𝛽8(𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 ×
𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐵𝑗𝑡) + 𝛽9𝐶𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗(𝑡+1) 
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(2b) 𝐶𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑗(𝑡+1) =  𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾2(𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 × 𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡) + 𝛾3(𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 × 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡) + 𝛾4(𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 ×
𝐼𝑆𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑡) + 𝛾5(𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 × 𝑂𝑆𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑡) + 𝛾6(𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 × 𝐻𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑗𝑡) + 𝛾7(𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 × 𝐺𝑅𝑇𝐻𝑗𝑡) + 𝛾8(𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 ×
𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐵𝑗𝑡) + 𝛾9𝐶𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖𝑗(𝑡+1) 
where 𝜇𝑖 and 𝜙𝑖 denote the firm-specific fixed effects, 𝛼𝑡 and 𝛿𝑡 represent the time-specific 
fixed effects. 
Third, to account for time varying omitted variables that impact both costs and 
customer satisfaction, we use an instrumental variable approach. We first difference 
equations 2a and 2b to remove the firm-specific fixed effects: 
(3a) ∆ 𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑗(𝑡+1) =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1∆𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2∆(𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 × 𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡) + 𝛽3 ∆( 𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 × 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡) +
𝛽4 ∆( 𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 × 𝐼𝑆𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑡) + 𝛽5 ∆( 𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 × 𝑂𝑆𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑡) + 𝛽6 ∆( 𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 × 𝐻𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑗𝑡) + 𝛽7 ∆( 𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 ×
𝐺𝑅𝑇𝐻𝑗𝑡) + 𝛽8 ∆( 𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 × 𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐵𝑗𝑡) + 𝛽9∆𝐶𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 + ∆𝛼𝑡 + ∆𝜖𝑖𝑗(𝑡+1) 
(3b) ∆ 𝐶𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑗(𝑡+1) =  𝛾0 + 𝛾1 ∆ 𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾2 ∆( 𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 × 𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡) + 𝛾3 ∆( 𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 × 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡) +
𝛾4 ∆( 𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 × 𝐼𝑆𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑡) + 𝛾5 ∆( 𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 × 𝑂𝑆𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑡) + 𝛾6 ∆( 𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 × 𝐻𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑗𝑡) + 𝛾7 ∆( 𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 ×
𝐺𝑅𝑇𝐻𝑗𝑡) + 𝛾8 ∆( 𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 × 𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐵𝑗𝑡) + 𝛾9∆𝐶𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 + ∆𝛿𝑡 + ∆𝜔𝑖𝑗(𝑡+1) 
We follow Blundell and Bond (1998) and use the lagged differences of the 
endogenous variables as instruments for the equation in levels (i.e., equations 2a and 2b) and 
the lagged levels as instruments for the equation in the first differences (i.e., equations 3a and 
3b). The Blundell and Bond (1998) method has been widely used in marketing (e.g., 
Banerjee, Prabhu, and Chandy 2015; Saboo, Kumar, and Ramani 2016), economics (e.g., 
Bloom, Bond, and Van Reenen 2007; Dearden, Reed, and Van Reenen 2006) and finance 
(e.g., Antoniou, Guney, and Paudyal 2008; Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender 2008).  
Following recent recommendations, we now delve into the conceptual quality of our 
instruments by discussing instrument relevance and exclusion restrictions (see Germann, 
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Ebbes, and Grewal 2015; Rossi 2014). Instrument relevance implies that the proposed 
instruments are conceptually correlated with the endogenous variables. Firms that experience 
an increase (decrease) in customer satisfaction are more likely to have higher (lower) 
customer satisfaction in the subsequent period. Thus, lagged change in customer satisfaction 
is a relevant instrument for current level of customer satisfaction. Similarly, prior levels of 
customer satisfaction are likely to be correlated with the current changes in customer 
satisfaction as firms with high customer satisfaction are likely to find it more difficult to 
increase customer satisfaction (e.g., Homburg, Wieseke, and Hoyer 2009). Thus, lagged level 
of customer satisfaction is a relevant instrument for current changes in customer satisfaction. 
Exclusion restriction implies that the proposed instruments are not correlated with the 
omitted variables that are expected to be correlated with the endogenous variables, i.e., 
customer satisfaction. Variables that are typically excluded include the time varying 
organizational variables which are unobserved in secondary panel data settings and are likely 
to be correlated with customer satisfaction and costs. An example will be the level of TMT 
integration, which reflects the extent of collaboration, shared information, joint decision 
making, and shared vision within the TMT (Hambrick 1994). These attributes, in turn, are 
critical for coordinating actions among TMT members and for improving the quality of 
strategic decisions (Carmeli and Schaubroeck 2006). As such, TMT integration is likely to be 
correlated with customer satisfaction, sales, and costs (see Simsek et al. 2005). Importantly, 
TMT integration is likely to change with the concurrent changes in the size of the team, 
diversity of the team members, and factors such as CEO mindset (see Ou et al. 2014; Simsek 
et al. 2005). Thus, TMT integration is influenced more by the current attributes of the TMT 
and the CEO, rather than changes or levels of prior factors. This logic suggests that it is 
unlikely that TMT integration is influenced by either the level or change in customer 
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satisfaction two to three years ago. As such, lagged levels and lagged changes in customer 
satisfaction are likely to be valid instruments in our context. 
 We estimate equations 2a, 2b, 3a, and 3b using the system GMM procedure outlined 
in Blundell and Bond (1998). To avoid the problems associated with instrument proliferation, 
we use only the first two lags of the levels as instruments for the first differences and the first 
two lags of the differences as instruments for the levels (see Tuli, Bharadwaj, and Kohli 2010 
for a similar approach). We follow Blundell and Bond (1998) and examine the relevance and 
validity of the proposed instruments using three tests, AR(I) and AR(II) tests and the Hansen 
test of over-identifying restrictions. Consistent with Dutt and Padmanabhan (2011), we 
estimate the equations for each variable using robust standard errors. 
3.3.2 Measures and Data 
Customer satisfaction. We use the American Customer Satisfaction Index (ACSI) to 
obtain the customer satisfaction data. The ACSI collects customer satisfaction data from over 
50,000 customers every year by using telephone interviews. The customer satisfaction scores 
for each firm are scaled from 0-100 (for details see Fornell et al. 1996). The ACSI releases 
customer satisfaction score of firms on an annual basis, but does so in different quarters for 
firms in different industries. We, therefore, collect quarterly accounting data from 
COMPUSTAT and align it to the four quarters between the releases of the ACSI scores.  
Dependent variables. Consistent with prior research (see Coombs, Jenkins, and Hobbs 
2005), we measure COS as the firm’s selling, general and administrative expenditures 
(COMPUSTAT DATA ITEM: ‘XSGAQ’). Since the ACSI data and firm fiscal years are 
unlikely to match, we use the sum of the total sales, general, and administrative expenses 
reported by the firms between the ACSI surveys. From this figure we exclude the R&D 
expenses of the firm (XRDQ) as they are unlikely to be associated with the selling expenses 
of the firm. To measure a firms’ COP, we use the sum of total cost of goods sold (COGSQ) 
78 
 
 
 
during the four quarters between the ACSI surveys (see Jack and Raturi 2003). We log 
transform the dependent variables and customer satisfaction scores to lower the impact of 
influential outliers (see Anderson, Fornell, and Rust 1997).  
Control variables. In Table 3.1 we present all the control variables, their measures, 
data sources, and examples of prior literature supporting the use of these measures. We mean 
center all continuous variables to facilitate the interpretation of the interaction effect 
parameter estimates. 
[Insert Table 3.1 about here] 
3.3.3 Data Collection 
The data for the current study are from the ACSI database that provides the customer 
satisfaction score of each firm and the Standard & Poor’s COMPUSTAT database that 
provides the accounting data for publicly listed firms. Following precedent in finance and 
accounting literature, we do not include firms from the utilities sector and the financial 
services industry (e.g., Dichev and Tang 2009). Firms in the utilities sector operate in a 
monopoly environment and have different financial reporting requirements that make it 
difficult to compare their financial performance metrics with firms from other industries. 
Similarly, the financial reporting requirements and the regulatory restrictions of firms in the 
financial services industries (banks, insurance firms, and brokerage firms) differ significantly 
from firms in other industries. 
We obtained the ACSI scores from the fourth quarter of 1994 to the third quarter of 
2013. Since our models require both current and lagged values of customer satisfaction and 
the dependent variables, we only include firms for which at least 3 consecutive years of 
customer satisfaction data are available. Our sampling criteria yield 1022 pooled time series 
and cross-sectional observations from 115 firms. In Table 3.2 we outline the descriptive 
statistics and bivariate correlations between the variables.  
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[Insert Table 3.2 about here] 
3.4 Results 
In Table 3.3 we provide the results of the estimation of equations 2a, 2b, 3a, and 3b using the 
system GMM procedure. We report the estimated results of the model with COS as a 
dependent variable in Panel A and the model with COP as a dependent variable in Panel B. 
Further, the condition indices for both models are well below the more rigorous cutoff 
criterion of 20 (Greene 2012). Thus, multicollinearity is not an issue for either models (see 
Table 3.3).  We also find evidence for the relevance of the moderating effects as their 
inclusion in both models results in a significant increase in model fit (𝜒2(7) = 33.55, 𝑝 <
.01; 𝜒2(7) = 21.50, 𝑝 < .01). Results of the AR(I) and the AR(II) tests indicate that 
autocorrelation exists only in first differences and the instruments are hence not endogenous. 
Failure to reject the null hypothesis of the Hansen test also provides evidence for the 
exogeneity of the set of instruments utilized in both models. Taken together, the results of the 
three tests suggest that the instruments used in the models are valid (see Table 3.3). We now 
discuss the results of our hypotheses.  
[Insert Table 3.3 about here] 
Parameter estimates provide support for H1a but not for H1b as we find that customer 
satisfaction has a significantly negative effect on COS (𝛽1 = −.338, 𝑝 < .01) but does not 
have a significant impact on COP (𝛾1 = −.020, 𝑛. 𝑠. ). Results indicate that the interaction of 
customer satisfaction and stock returns increases both COS (𝛽2 = .381, 𝑝 < .01) and COP 
(𝛾2 = .445, 𝑝 < .01), hence providing strong support for H2a and H2b. Consistent with H3a 
and H3b, we also find that the interaction of customer satisfaction and stock returns volatility 
has a positive effect on both COS (𝛽3 = .226, 𝑝 < .10) and COP (𝛾3 = .302, 𝑝 < .01).  
As observed in Table 3.3, the interaction of customer satisfaction and inventory slack 
lowers both COS (𝛽4 = −3.465, 𝑝 < .05) and COP (𝛾4 = −3.952, 𝑝 < .05). As such, H4a 
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and H4b are supported. In contrast, we do not find support for H5a and H5b as the interaction 
of customer satisfaction and operating slack does not have a significant effect on COS (𝛽5 =
.250, 𝑛. 𝑠. ) and COP (𝛾5 = −.192, 𝑛. 𝑠. ). H6a and H6b are also not supported as the 
interaction of customer satisfaction and industry concentration does not significantly impact 
COS (𝛽6 = .940, 𝑛. 𝑠. ) and COP (𝛾6 = .537, 𝑛. 𝑠. ).  
Results support H7a but not H7b as we find that the interaction of customer 
satisfaction and industry growth has a negative effect on COS (𝛽7 = −1.249, 𝑝 < .05) but 
not on COP (𝛾7 = −.879, 𝑛. 𝑠. ). We also find that the interaction of customer satisfaction 
and industry turbulence has a positive effect on COS (𝛽8 = 3.592, 𝑝 < .01), thus supporting 
H8a. We do not, however, find support for H8b as the interaction of customer satisfaction and 
industry turbulence does not significantly impact COP (𝛾8 = .395, 𝑛. 𝑠. ). 
In order to assess the robustness of our results, we conduct several sensitivity 
analyses. First, consistent with prior research (e.g., Fornell, Rust, and Dekimpe 2010), we 
examine if our findings are subjected to the idiosyncrasies of the selected sample period. 
Particularly, we estimated a model using data prior to 2010 to control for the change in 
reporting standards in that year (ACSI 2016). In addition, we also estimated a model using 
data from a more recent time period, i.e., from 2000, so as to incorporate recent changes in 
the macroeconomic conditions. Second, we also examine the sensitivity of our results using 
different sets of instruments as the number of instruments utilized may significantly influence 
the model estimates (Tuli, Bharadwaj, and Kohli 2010). Specifically, we estimated two 
models – a model using all available instruments and a model using only the first lags as 
instruments. As shown in Table 3.4, our substantive conclusions remain largely unchanged. 
[Insert Table 3.4 about here] 
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3.5 Discussion 
Academic research (e.g., Fornell et al. 2006; Rego, Morgan, and Fornell 2013) and the 
business press (e.g., Hobbib 2016; McClafferty 2015) frequently articulate the benefits of 
enhancing customer satisfaction in terms of sales, profits, and stock market performance. 
Little is known, however, about the impact of customer satisfaction on the costs incurred by 
the firm. This lack of emphasis on costs is surprising as costs have been the upmost concern 
for CEOs (see PwC 2014a; 2015; 2016; 2017). With this research, we present the first 
empirical examination of the impact of customer satisfaction on the costs incurred by a firm. 
We now discuss the theoretical and managerial implications of our research.  
3.5.1 Theoretical Implications  
Synthesizing literature in marketing (e.g., Fang, Palmatier, and Steenkamp 2008), finance 
(e.g., Bond, Edmans, and Goldstein 2012), and operations (e.g., Hendricks and Singhal 
2009), we articulate the arguments for the impact of customer satisfaction on COS and COP. 
Importantly, we propose and test a contingency perspective that builds on the MOA 
framework. Results provide strong support for the contingency approach as shown by the 
variation in the marginal impact of customer satisfaction on the COS and COP and across 
changes in the moderating variables (see Figures 3.2 and 3.3). The proposed contingency 
framework complements extant literature in several ways. 
[Insert Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 about here] 
First, it contributes to the nascent literature that explores the impact of stock market 
performance of the firm on managerial actions such as advertising and R&D spending (e.g., 
Chakravarty and Grewal 2011). Consistent with the proposed arguments, we find that 
customer satisfaction has a negative effect on COS and COP if the firm is faced with lower 
stock returns and lower stock returns volatility (see Panels A and B of Figures 3.2 and 3.3). In 
contrast, customer satisfaction has a positive effect on COP if the firm has higher stock 
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returns and stock returns volatility (see Panels A and B Figure 3.3). These results, suggest 
that stock returns and stock return volatility, not only drive the spending behavior of firms (as 
shown in Chakravarty and Grewal 2011), but also influence the extent to which they are 
likely to utilize marketing assets, such as customer satisfaction. 
Second, the results also underscore the moderating impact of the operating resources. 
Consistent with the argument that inventory slack provides a firm with greater flexibility, we 
find that while customer satisfaction has a negative impact on COS only when the firm has 
higher inventory slack (see Panel C, Figure 3.2). Interestingly, the impact of customer 
satisfaction on COP is negative if the firm has high inventory slack, but it is positive if the 
firm has low inventory slack (see Panel C, Figure 3.3). Taken together, results bring to fore 
the importance of considering the role of operating resources in examining the impact of 
marketing assets such as customer satisfaction (e.g., Heikkilä 2002).  
Third, current findings highlight the influence of industry conditions on the impact of 
customer satisfaction on COS. Consistent with the proposed hypotheses, we find that 
customer satisfaction has a negative impact on COS only if the firm is in an industry with 
high growth and low turbulence (see Panels D and E of Figure 3.2). Conversely, customer 
satisfaction has a positive effect on COS if the firm is in a more turbulent industry (see Panel 
E of Figure 3.2). Complementing existing studies that examine the heterogeneity of customer 
satisfaction across different operating environments (e.g., Larivière et al. 2016), the proposed 
framework contributes to theory development by identifying the boundary conditions for the 
effect of customer satisfaction on a firm’s COS.  
3.5.2 Managerial Implications  
Firms are often looking for new ways to attain the same product-market outcomes with lower 
marketing costs (e.g., Hanssens, Wang, and Zhang 2016; Katsikeas et al. 2016). Accordingly, 
our findings identify improvements in customer satisfaction as an initiative that can reduce 
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both the COS and COP of the firm. Importantly, our contingency framework identifies 
specific conditions under which senior managers can expect improvements in customer 
satisfaction to have negative effects, positive effects, or no effects on COS and COP.  
In order to better articulate the managerial implications of our findings, we draw upon 
the marginal effects in Figures 3.2 and 3.3 and derive their dollar values.20 These values can 
serve as benchmarks for marketing managers to assess the dollar impact of improving 
customer satisfaction on COS and COP (see Figures 3.4 and 3.5). 
 [Insert Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5 about here] 
Considering COS, we find that a 1% increase in customer satisfaction can lower COS 
by .847% for firms with lower stock returns (see Panel A of Figure 3.4). That is, the COS 
elasticity of customer satisfaction is -.847 for firms with lower stock returns.21 Importantly, 
for the average firm in the ACSI sample, this translates into reduction of COS by almost 
$50.458 million. In contrast, if the firm has higher stock returns, COS elasticity of customer 
satisfaction is neither statistically nor economically significant (see Panel A of Figure 3.4). 
Similarly, COS elasticity of customer satisfaction is -.726 when a firm has lower stock 
returns volatility. In dollar terms, this means an average reduction $43.240 million in COS 
(see Panel B of Figure 3.4). COS elasticity, however, is not significant if stock returns 
volatility is high. Underscoring the impact of operating conditions, we find that COS 
elasticity of customer satisfaction is -1.085 with a dollar value of $64.649 million for firms 
with greater inventory slack (see Panel C of Figure 3.4).  
We also see the impact of industry conditions on COS elasticity. As shown in Panel D 
of Figure 3.4, for firms in high growth industries, COS elasticity of customer satisfaction is 
                                                          
20 Specifically, we multiply the marginal effects at three standard deviations above and below the means of each moderating 
variables by the average COS (COP) (i.e., before the taking the natural logarithm and mean centering) within our 
observation sample (see Gruca and Rego 2005 for a similar approach). Given our computation, the dollar values of the 
marginal effects represent the approximate monetary sizes of the effect for an average firm within our observation sample.  
21 Given that Customer Satisfaction, COS, and COP are log transformed, we can interpret our coefficients as elasticities. 
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– .782 with a dollar value of $46.573 million. In low growth industries, however, COS 
elasticity is not significant. In addition, while the COS elasticity of customer satisfaction is -
1.128 with a dollar value of $67.199 million for firms in industries with low turbulence, it is 
equivalent to .405 with a dollar value of $24.113 million for firms in high turbulence 
industries (see Panel E of Figure 3.4).  
In Figure 3.5 we identify conditions under which COP elasticity of customer 
satisfaction can be positive or negative. As shown in Panel A of Figure 3.5, COP elasticity of 
customer satisfaction is -.603 for firms with low stock returns. In sharp contrast, the COP 
elasticity of customer satisfaction is .533 if the firm has positive stock returns. Similarly, 
COP elasticity is -.523 for firms facing low stock returns volatility, but .442 for firms facing 
high stock returns volatility (see Panel B of Figure 3.5). We also find that the COP elasticity 
of customer satisfaction is .790 if firms have low inventory slack, but -.861 if firms have high 
inventory slack (see Panel C of Figure 3.5).  
In summary, results of the current study have direct implications to senior managers 
as they identify conditions under which customer satisfaction can increase or decrease a 
firm’s future COS and COP. Identification of these conditions is especially important as a 
number of firms have struggled with the lack of financial results even though they have 
improved their customer satisfaction (see Keiningham et al. 2014). 
3.5.3 Limitations and Future Research 
Although the current study contributes to the limited knowledge of how customer satisfaction 
relates to the future costs of the firm, it also offers several avenues for further research. First, 
customer satisfaction data from the ACSI comprises mainly of large business-to-consumer 
firms (Larivière et al. 2016). Given the importance of customer relationships for business-to-
business firms (see Tuli, Bharadwaj, and Kohli 2010), future research should explore the cost 
implications of customer satisfaction for such firms.  
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Second, our observation sample only comprises of ACSI firms that are publicly listed 
in the U.S. (e.g., Malshe and Agarwal 2015). There might exist differences in customer 
satisfaction across countries and cultures (e.g., Morgeson et al. 2011; Raithel et al. 2012) 
such that the cost advantages are greater for some but lower for others. Further research is 
required to examine the generalizability of the findings in this study across a larger sample of 
firms. Third, prior research in economics suggests that a firm’s COP may be broken down to 
several components, for example, marginal (see Besanko et al. 2010), fixed (see Jeon and 
Menicucci 2012), physical (see Sappington 2005). However, given that we measure a firm’s 
COP as its cost of goods sold, we are unable to distinguish the impact of customer 
satisfaction on different components of COP. Future research can hence explore the influence 
of customer satisfaction on each of these components using alternative data sources. 
Fourth, it would be important to understand how the revenue benefits of customer 
satisfaction interact with its cost benefits, i.e., in terms of whether the interaction is 
complementary or competitive in nature. We urge marketing researchers to develop models 
that simultaneously incorporate both revenue- and cost- related performance measures to 
examine possible countervailing forces of revenue and cost advantages of having higher 
customer satisfaction. Such research is likely to provide strong implications for marketing 
managers interested in optimizing their customer satisfaction spending based on both the 
revenue and the cost advantages. Finally, drawing on the heterogeneity in the cost 
implications of customer satisfaction, future studies can examine the generalizability of such 
effects to other marketing assets such as customer lifetime value (e.g., Venkatesan and 
Kumar 2004) and brand licensing (e.g., Jayachandran et al. 2013). 
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TABLE 3.1: CONTROL VARIABLES, MEASURES AND DATA SOURCES 
Variable Measure Data Source Reference 
Sales The natural logarithm of the sum of the sales (DT: REVTQ) reported by the firm. COMPUSTAT Morgan and Rego (2006)  
Stock Returns The difference in the natural logarithm of the market capitalization of the firm at the current year from 
the end of the preceding year, where market capitalization is the product of the stock price (DT: 
PRCCQ) and the total number of outstanding shares (DT: CSHOQ). 
COMPUSTAT Mizik and Jacobson 
(2008)  
Stock Returns Volatility The natural logarithm of the standard deviation of the firm’s monthly stock returns (DT: RET). CRSP Sorescu and Spanjol 
(2008)  
Inventory Slack Ratio of the firm’s total inventory (DT: INVTQ) to its sales (DT: REVTQ). COMPUSTAT Chen, Frank, and Wu 
(2005) 
Operating Slack Ratio of the firm’s gross property, plant, and equipment (DT: PPENTQ) to its sales (DT: REVTQ). COMPUSTAT Kovach et al. (2015) 
Cash Flows Net operating cash flows of the firm (DT: OANCF) scaled by its total assets (DT: ATQ). COMPUSTAT Gruca and Rego (2005) 
Leverage Ratio of the firm’s total long-term debt (DT: DLTTQ) to its market capitalization, where market 
capitalization is the product of the stock price (DT: PRCCQ) and the total number of outstanding 
shares (DT: CSHOQ). 
COMPUSTAT Grewal, Chandrashekaran, 
and Citrin (2010) 
Number of Business 
Segments 
Number of operating business segments as reported by the firm in its annual (10-K) and/or quarterly 
reports (10-Q). 
SEC Filings Morgan and Rego (2009) 
Asset Intensity Ratio of the firm’s net plant, property, and equipment (DT: PPENTQ) to its total assets (DT: ATQ). COMPUSTAT Tuli, Bharadwaj, and 
Kohli (2010) 
Industry Concentration The four-digit SIC Herfindahl index of firm sales  (DT: REVTQ). COMPUSTAT Bharadwaj, Tuli, and 
Bonfrer (2011) 
Industry Growth The difference in the natural logarithm of the sum of the total sales of the firms within the same four-
digit SIC code at the end of the current year from the end of the preceding year (DT: REVTQ). 
COMPUSTAT Bahadir, Bharadwaj, and 
Srivastava (2008) 
Industry Turbulence The standard deviation of the sum of the total sales of the firms within the same four-digit SIC across 
the prior four years scaled by the mean value of the sum of the total sales of the firms within the same 
four-digit SIC code for those four years (DT: REVT). 
COMPUSTAT Fang, Palmatier, and 
Steenkamp (2008) 
 
Notes. DT = Data Item; SIC = Standard Industrial Classification System; SEC = Securities and Exchange Commission.  We refer to year as the aggregation of data 
over the four quarters corresponding to the period between the American Customer Satisfaction Index scores. 
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TABLE 3.2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATION MATRIX 
    Correlation Matrix 
  Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 COSij(t+1) 1.000                             
2 COPij(t+1) .834 1.000                           
3 CSijt -.116 -.101 1.000                         
4 Salesijt .913 .969 -.116 1.000                       
5 SRijt .010 .025 .125 -.005 1.000                     
6 VOLijt -.268 -.228 -.161 -.253 -.172 1.000                   
7 ISLijt .019 .061 .279 .003 -.039 .001 1.000                 
8 OSLijt .052 .006 -.422 .053 .003 -.175 -.273 1.000               
9 CashFlowsijt .019 -.050 .053 -.022 .184 -.193 -.275 -.046 1.000             
10 Leverageijt -.012 .007 -.246 .009 -.145 .154 -.046 .170 -.170 1.000           
11 NBSijt .177 .178 .111 .206 -.001 -.093 -.019 -.123 -.016 -.063 1.000         
12 AssetIntensityijt .112 .217 -.272 .176 -.008 -.135 -.074 .568 .113 .029 -.337 1.000       
13 HERFjt .096 .071 .311 .068 .028 .003 .240 -.355 -.023 -.111 .197 -.286 1.000     
14 GRTHjt .054 .072 -.015 .061 .203 -.144 -.088 -.025 .054 .007 .027 -.035 -.025 1.000   
15 TURBjt -.031 .006 .008 -.012 -.034 .051 -.146 -.044 .044 .036 -.059 -.083 .119 .163 1.000 
Mean 7.964 9.067 4.349 9.549 .015 -2.538 .092 .297 .124 -.313 2.422 .317 .263 .039 .116 
Standard Deviation 1.247 1.351 .081 1.257 .426 .533 .070 .260 .074 2.606 1.495 .184 .177 .115 .071 
Minimum 4.314 4.358 3.932 6.003 -3.750 -4.222 .000 .013 -.297 -.869 1 .014 .041 -.535 .008 
Maximum 11.391 12.772 4.511 13.010 2.057 -.553 .448 1.724 .863 58.530 8 .835 1.000 .668 .488 
 
Notes. COSij(t+1) = Cost of Selling of firm i in industry j at time t+1; COPij(t+1) = Cost of Producing; CSijt = Customer Satisfaction of firm i in industry j at time t; SRijt = 
Stock Returns; VOLijt = Stock Returns Volatility; ISLijt = Inventory Slack; OSLijt = Operating Slack; NBSijt = Number of Business Segments; HERFjt = Industry 
Concentration; GRTHjt = Industry Growth; TURBjt = Industry Turbulence. All correlations that are significant at p < .10 (two-sided) are put in bold. The mean, standard 
deviation, minimum, maximum and correlation values of the variables are reported in their logarithm forms (if applicable) before mean centering. There are 1022 
observations from 115 firms. 
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TABLE 3.3: RESULTS 
  Panel A Panel B 
  COSij(t+1) COPij(t+1) 
  Coeff (SE)   Coeff (SE)   
CSijt -.338 (.122) *** -.020 (.124)  
CSijt*SRijt .381 (.078) *** .445 (.112) *** 
CSijt*VOLijt .226 (.125) * .302 (.115) *** 
CSijt*ISLijt -3.465 (1.602) ** -3.952 (1.851) ** 
CSijt*OSLijt .250 (.314)  -.192 (.313)  
CSijt*HERFjt .940 (.732)  .537 (.753)  
CSijt*GRTHjt -1.249 (.632) ** -.879 (.535)  
CSijt*TURBjt 3.592 (1.161) *** .395 (1.082)  
Control Variables             
DVijt .943 (.022) *** .863 (.056) *** 
Salesijt .052 (.024) ** .130 (.055) ** 
SRijt .092 (.020) *** .144 (.038) *** 
VOLijt -.044 (.017) *** -.017 (.019)  
ISLijt -.266 (.124) ** -.111 (.145)  
OSLijt .006 (.056)  -.010 (.070)  
CashFlowsijt .451 (.168) *** .007 (.135)  
Leverageijt .005 (.002) *** .001 (.001)  
NBSijt .005 (.010)  .017 (.011)  
AssetIntensityijt -.156 (.078) ** -.019 (.086)  
HERFjt .001 (.052)  -.070 (.050)  
GRTHjt .005 (.065)  .046 (.062)  
TURBjt -.065 (.113)  .246 (.118) ** 
Constant .020 (.020)  -.004 (.033)  
Summary Statistics             
Wald's χ2 (df) 35956.07 (40) *** 45379.27 (40) *** 
AR(1) test   -4.110 ***   -3.290 *** 
AR(2) test   .350    .210  
Hansen test χ2 (df) 70.19 (399)  83.49 (399)  
Condition Index 14.371 15.056   
N(n) 1022 (115)  1022 (115)  
 
Notes. * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 (two-sided); Coeff = Coefficient; SE = 
Robust Standard Error; COSij(t+1) = Cost of Selling of firm i in industry j at time 
t+1; COPij(t+1) = Cost of Producing; CSijt = Customer Satisfaction of firm i in 
industry j at time t; DVijt = Lagged dependent variable (i.e., Lagged Cost of 
Selling or Lagged Cost of Producing); SRijt = Stock Returns; VOLijt = Stock 
Returns Volatility; ISLijt = Inventory Slack; OSLijt = Operating Slack;  NBSijt = 
Number of Business Segments;  HERFjt = Industry Concentration; GRTHjt = 
Industry Growth; TURBjt = Industry Turbulence; χ2 = Chi-Square; df = degrees 
of freedom; N = Number of Firm-Year Observations; n = Number of Firms. 
The time-specific fixed effects are included in our model but not shown due to 
space constraints.   
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TABLE 3.4: SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
  
Using Data Before 2010 Using Data From 2000  Using All Available 
Instruments 
Using First Lags Only 
  COSij(t+1) COPij(t+1) COSij(t+1) COPij(t+1) COSij(t+1) COPij(t+1) COSij(t+1) COPij(t+1) 
  Coeff  Coeff   Coeff  Coeff   Coeff  Coeff   Coeff  Coeff   
CSijt -.283 ** -.093  -.335 *** .106  -.226 ** .062  -.427 *** -.108  
CSijt*SRijt .251 * .410 ** .381 *** .463 *** .308 *** .307 *** .435 *** .510 *** 
CSijt*VOLijt .327 *** .368 *** .167 *  .259 ** .221 ** .323 *** .243 ** .316 *** 
CSijt*ISLijt -4.220 ** -3.423 ** -4.062 *** -5.000 *** -1.494  -1.635 * -3.775 ** -3.881 ** 
CSijt*OSLijt .131  -.033  .238  -.164  .022  -.318  .305  -.377  
CSijt*HERFjt 1.327 * -.283  .520  .850  -.115  -.035  .867  .675  
CSijt*GRTHjt -1.365 ** -.997 ** -1.544 *** -.994 ** -1.197 ** -1.090 ** -1.269 ** -.827 *  
CSijt*TURBjt 3.438 *** -.344  3.296 *** -.370  2.952 *** .545  3.500 *** .436  
Summary Statistics                               
Wald's χ2 (40) 20221.190 *** 25338.900 *** 32984.450 *** 31671.160 *** 90320.570 *** 90456.060 *** 17249.110 *** 21845.290 *** 
AR(1) test -4.710 *** -2.820 *** -3.550 *** -2.930 *** -3.960 *** -3.250 *** -4.100 *** 3.110 *** 
AR(2) test -1.220  -1.610  .500  .370  .310  .080  .310  .220  
Hansen test χ2 (df) 70.18 (291)  79.17 (291)  73.46 (338)  74.60 (338)  78.60 (924)  83.11 (924)  68.17 (256)  77.26 (256)  
N(n) 752 (112)  752 (112)  877 (110)  877 (110)  1022 (115)  1022 (115)  1022 (115)  1022 (115)  
 
Notes. * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 (one-sided); Coeff = Coefficient; COSij(t+1) = Cost of Selling of firm i in industry j at time t+1; COPij(t+1) = Cost of 
Producing; CSijt = Customer Satisfaction of firm i in industry j at time t; DVijt = Lagged dependent variable (i.e., Lagged Cost of Selling or Lagged Cost of 
Producing); SRijt = Stock Returns; VOLijt = Stock Returns Volatility; ISLijt = Inventory Slack;  OSLijt = Operating Slack;  HERFjt = Industry Concentration; GRTHjt 
= Industry Growth; TURBjt = Industry Turbulence; χ2 = Chi-Square; df = degrees of freedom; N = Number of Firm-Year Observations; n = Number of Firms. The 
time-specific fixed effects and all the control variables are included in our model but not shown due to space constraints.   
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FIGURE 3.1 
ANALYZING THE IMPACT OF CUSTOMER SATISFACTION ON COS AND COP USING THE MOA FRAMEWORK 
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Operating Environment 
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Notes. COS = Cost of Selling; COP = Cost of Producing; MOA = Motivation-Opportunity-Ability. 
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FIGURE 3.2 
MARGINAL EFFECTS OF CUSTOMER SATISFACTION ON COST OF SELLING 
ACROSS CHANGES IN MODERATING VARIABLES 
A: Stock Returns   B:  Stock Returns Volatility 
 
 
 
C: Inventory Slack  D: Industry Growth 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
Notes. S.D. = Standard Deviation. The horizontal axis of every graph represents the different values of the 
corresponding moderating variable. The dashed lines indicate the 90% confidence interval bands. The 
vertical axis of every graph represents the marginal effects (in percentage change) of Customer Satisfaction 
on Cost of Selling across changes in the corresponding moderating variable. Note that we only generated the 
plots for the significant (p < .10, two-sided) interaction effects. 
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FIGURE 3.3 
MARGINAL EFFECTS OF CUSTOMER SATISFACTION ON COST OF PRODUCING 
ACROSS CHANGES IN MODERATING VARIABLES 
A: Stock Returns   B:  Stock Returns Volatility 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
Notes. S.D. = Standard Deviation. The horizontal axis of every graph represents the different values of the 
corresponding moderating variable. The dashed lines indicate the 90% confidence interval bands. The 
vertical axis of every graph represents the marginal effects (in percentage change) of Customer Satisfaction 
on Cost of Producing across changes in the corresponding moderating variable. Note that we only generated 
the plots for the significant (p < .10, two-sided) interaction effects. 
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FIGURE 3.4 
DOLLAR VALUES OF THE MARGINAL EFFECTS OF CUSTOMER SATISFACTION 
ON COST OF SELLING ACROSS CHANGES IN MODERATING VARIABLES 
A: Stock Returns   B:  Stock Returns Volatility 
   
C: Inventory Slack  D: Industry Growth 
   
   
 
 
 
 
Notes. * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 (two-sided). The p-values indicate the statistical significance of the 
marginal effects. The horizontal axis of every graph represents the different values of the corresponding 
moderating variable. The vertical axis of every graph represents the dollar values of the marginal effects of 
Customer Satisfaction on Cost of Selling across changes in the corresponding moderating variable. We 
identify the moderating variable to be High (Low) if its value is equivalent to 3 standard deviations above 
(below) the mean of the distribution within our sample of 1022 observations from 115 firms. We report all the 
marginal effects in percentage change and their dollar values in millions of dollars. We derive the dollar 
values of the marginal effects by multiplying the marginal effects with the average Cost of Selling within our 
sample of 1022 observations from 115 firms. Note that we only computed the dollar values of the marginal 
effects that are included in Figure 3.2. 
E: Industry Turbulence 
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FIGURE 3.5 
DOLLAR VALUES OF THE MARGINAL EFFECTS OF CUSTOMER SATISFACTION 
ON COST OF PRODUCING ACROSS CHANGES IN MODERATING VARIABLES 
A: Stock Returns   B:  Stock Returns Volatility 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
Notes. * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 (two-sided). The p-values indicate the statistical significance of the 
marginal effects. The horizontal axis of every graph represents the different values of the corresponding 
moderating variable. The vertical axis of every graph represents the dollar values of the marginal effects of 
Customer Satisfaction on Cost of Producing across changes in the corresponding moderating variable. We 
identify the moderating variable to be High (Low) if its value is equivalent to 3 standard deviations above 
(below) the mean of the distribution within our sample of 1022 observations from 115 firms. We report all the 
marginal effects in percentage change and their dollar values in millions of dollars. We derive the dollar 
values of the marginal effects by multiplying the marginal effects with the average Cost of Producing within 
our sample of 1022 observations from 115 firms. Note that we only computed the dollar values of the 
marginal effects that are included in Figure 3.3. 
 
  
C: Inventory Slack 
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Chapter 4 
Stakeholder-Specific Outcomes of Airlines Mergers and 
Acquisitions: Policy Implications from an Empirical 
Examination 
 
4.1 Introduction 
“Increasing consolidation among large airlines has hurt passengers. The airlines 
have copied each other in raising fares, imposing new fees on travellers, reducing or 
eliminating service on a number of city pairs, and downgrading amenities.”  
– The United States Department of Justice 2013 
 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are popular strategic alternatives for value creation (BCG 
2016; Deloitte 2016). Not surprisingly, recent years have witnessed a global surge in M&As 
with a record-setting $4.3 trillion in 2007, $4.4 trillion in 2015, and $3.7 trillion in 2016, the 
three most active years for mergers (Farrell 2015; Mattioli 2016). U.S. airlines are among 
those responsible for the huge waves of M&As (Elliott 2016). With a combined market 
capitalization of nearly $130 billion dollars (Holmes 2016), and transporting up to 719 
million passengers in a year (BTS 2017c), the U.S. airlines industry supports about 7.3% of 
the total employment and contributes up to 5.1% of the country’s GDP (ATA 2017). Since 
the Airlines Deregulation Act in 1978 (see Public Law 95-504 1978), the U.S. airlines 
industry had undergone a number of M&As. These mergers have changed the dynamics of 
the industry drastically. Today, four major airlines hold almost 85% of the total market share 
(Forbes Trefis Team 2016) and four out of five passengers travel on one of this four airlines 
(Mutzabaugh 2015). 
Despite their popularity, it is not clear if M&As bring more benefits than costs for the 
airlines industry. Regulators such as the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) often 
96 
 
argue that M&As lower competition which leads to fewer choices and higher prices for 
consumers (e.g., GAO 2013). For example, following its merger with US Airways in 2013, 
American Airlines increased the price of its main cabin extra seats from a range of $8 to $159 
to a range of $20 to $280 and reduced the usability of a discount fare program to only on 
selected routes (e.g., Elliott 2016; Gajanan 2016). Furthermore, M&As typically also result in 
reductions in employee benefits (e.g., Schultz 2000), pay cuts (e.g., Maynard 2005b), and 
even layoffs (e.g., Laryea 2016). In fact, investors have often viewed M&As with scepticism 
as the anticipated benefits of M&As are typically not realized (e.g., Rao, Yu, and 
Umashankar 2016) and most M&As end up destroying, rather than creating value (e.g., BCG 
2016). As such, it is not clear as to who really benefits from a M&A.  
 Extant research predominantly examines the impact of M&As on performance 
outcomes such as prices (e.g., Borenstein 1990; Peters 2006), with little focus on other 
performance outcomes such as the quality of the airline services, and those that reflect the 
impact of M&As for other stakeholders (see Table 4.1). More importantly, these outcomes 
are usually examined in isolation, and a holistic investigation of the costs and benefits of 
M&As for the key stakeholders is rarely undertaken. Considering the interests of key 
stakeholders is important because firms are under increasing pressure to deliver the 
anticipated benefits of a M&A to these stakeholders (Neely and Potter 2015; PwC 2014b). In 
addition, firms also have to fulfil their interests in order to ensure continued support for 
M&As (Donaldson and Preston 1995; Ferrell et al. 2010).  
[Insert Table 4.1 about here] 
Evaluating M&As from specific performance outcomes in isolation does not 
necessarily reflect the interests of a stakeholder as the resulting implications are confined to 
only the costs and benefits within that particular outcome. For example, if a M&A results in 
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lower prices, consumers may still not benefit from if the reduced price comes at the cost of 
lower quality. The decline in quality might have a negative impact on loyalty, thereby 
resulting in adverse consequences for the firm. Even if the M&A does not directly result in 
any unfavourable outcomes for consumers, if it is accompanied by layoffs and reduction in 
employee benefits, the firm is still susceptible to negative repercussions due to the higher 
workload per employee (e.g., Thompson 2017) and employees’ lack of incentive to improve 
performance (e.g., Goldmanis and Ray 2015) following the M&A. 
Given that M&As are often pursued due to their potential to create value for the firm 
(e.g., Rehm, Uhlaner, and West 2012; Zenger 2016), if the M&A does not result in benefits 
for any of the key stakeholders, it is likely to end up destroying, as opposed to creating value. 
In this way, adopting a stakeholder-specific approach provides a more comprehensive view 
of the implications of M&As which can also complement the findings of both the proponents 
and the oppositions of M&As in the airlines industry. Accordingly, we examine the 
consequences of M&As in the U.S. airlines industry through the evaluation of their effects on 
the airline’s primary stakeholders.  
4.2 Proposed Holistic View 
As advocated by stakeholder theory, it is important for firms to evaluate the impact of a 
strategic action by taking into account the needs of its primary stakeholders (Freeman 1984). 
Consistent with existing research (e.g., Eesley and Lenox 2006), we identify an airline’s 
primary stakeholders as the consumers, employees, senior managers and investors. A firm is 
contractually obligated to its primary stakeholders (Eesley and Lenox 2006) and hence is 
dependent on them for its continued survival (Freeman and Reed 1983). As such, by 
examining the impact of a M&A on an airline’s primary stakeholders, we are looking at the 
individuals or groups that are most affected by the M&A.  
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Given the relatively sparse literature that examines the impact of airlines M&As from 
the perspectives of primary stakeholders, we adopt an exploratory empirical approach in 
determining the respective performance outcomes that capture the interests of each of these 
primary stakeholders. In particular, we draw on the promises of the airlines involved in the 
five most significant M&As in the last decade – US Airways and American West in 2005, 
Delta and Northwest in 2008, United and Continental in 2010, Southwest and AirTran in 
2011 and American Airlines and US Airways in 2013 (Forbes Trefis Team 2016) – and the 
concerns raised by regulators and the business press relating to these M&As to establish the 
variables. Even though these five M&As form only part of the data we used for our empirical 
analyses (i.e., we analyse 14 M&As in this study), we choose to base the identification of the 
performance outcomes on these five M&As because they are widely viewed as the most 
influential within the industry.  
Our identification procedure is as follows. First, we identify the promises made by 
these airlines based on the text-analyses of their financial filings, i.e., U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) Form 425.22 Second, we obtain the information on the 
concerns relating to these M&As from the text-analyses of interviews, case studies, business 
articles and press coverages featuring the M&As. Finally, we compare the promises made by 
these airlines prior to the approval of the M&A to their related concerns in order to identify 
the performance outcome(s) that best captures the interests of each of the airline’s primary 
stakeholder. Table 4.2 provides some examples of the promises and concerns relating to these 
five most significant M&As, and Figure 4.1 lists the proposed variables. 
[Insert Table 4.2 and Figure 4.1 about here]  
                                                          
22 According to the Securities Exchange Act of 1933 rules 425 and 165, companies involved in a M&A are required to file 
prospectus form 425 describing the communication and information in relation to the M&A (SEC 1999). 
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4.3 Method 
4.3.1 Empirical Strategy 
To estimate the impact of M&As on the primary stakeholders of the airline industry, we 
compare the changes in the respective dependent variables of the acquiring airlines that 
undergo a M&A against other airlines that did not around the time in which each M&A 
occurred. In line with existing M&A studies (e.g., Prabhu, Chandy, and Ellis 2005; Sorescu, 
Chandy, and Prabhu 2007), we focus on the comparisons with the acquiring airlines because 
the outcomes of a M&A typically depends on the strategic decisions of these airlines 
following the M&A. Not only do they have a higher bargaining power over the target 
airlines, they also have a greater stake – the benefits accruing from a M&A are usually in 
favour of the acquirer.  
Drawing on existing research in finance, accounting and economics, we adopt a 
stacked generalized difference-in-difference (GDID) approach (see Gormley and Matsa 2011; 
Gormley and Matsa 2016; Wooldridge 2007). We first construct a cohort of acquiring airlines 
that undergo a M&A and other airlines that did not using airline-quarter observations for the 
two years before and after the M&A for each quarter in which a M&A occurred. We use a 
two-year time window because prior studies in the M&A literature, as well as practitioners, 
consider two years as the period that is necessary to realize most of the effects of a M&A 
(e.g., Focarelli and Panetta 2003). Next, we pool the data across cohorts (and hence across all 
M&As) to estimate the average treatment effect of M&As. This approach is similar to the 
traditional different-in-difference (DID) approach in the following ways: 1) airlines that had 
undergone a M&A belong to the treatment group and those that did not belong to the control 
group, where M&A is the treatment, 2) given that our research context requires the 
examination of multiple treatments, i.e., we have more than one M&A in our sample periods 
and an airline can undergo more than one M&A, the construction of the cohorts allow us to 
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isolate the impact of each treatment (i.e., M&A) as in the traditional DID approaches. 
Appendix A summarizes the number of airlines in the M&A group and the control group for 
each cohort. Accordingly, we specify the following equation:  
    Yict =  β0 + β1MAict + γic + αct + ωi + 𝜖𝑖𝑐𝑡                      (1.1) 
where Yict is one of the dependent variables that captures the impact of M&As on the primary 
stakeholders of airline 𝑖 in quarter 𝑡, MAict represents the impact of the M&A, a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if airline 𝑖 in cohort 𝑐 undergo a M&A in quarter 𝑡, γic is a 
set of cohort dummy variables to control for any possible mean differences in the specified 
dependent variable across cohorts, αct is a set of quarter dummy variables which is similar to 
time fixed effects and control for the mean differences between the period before and after 
the M&A, ωi is a set of airline dummy variables to account for possible covariance among 
airlines (i.e., to account for code sharing, alliances, cross-ownership, etc.), and 𝜖𝑖𝑐𝑡 is a 
random error term. From equation 1.1, the coefficient of interest is β1 as it can be interpreted 
as the causal estimate of a M&A if the parallel trends assumption (i.e., acquiring airlines that 
undergo a M&A and other airlines that did not are identical in the specified dependent 
variable before the occurrence of the M&A), a key identifying assumption of the stacked 
GDID approach (Angrist and Pischke 2009), is satisfied. 
Our approach has the following advantages. First, consistent with existing studies that 
have used the stacked GDID approach (Gormley and Matsa 2011; Gormley, Matsa, and 
Milbourn 2013), airlines are not required to be in our sample for the full four years and can 
be present in the control group in multiple cohorts even when they undergo a M&A at some 
point in the sample period. In the language of Gormley and Matsa (2016), we are adopting 
the matching with replacement strategy which can reduce the potential imbalances between 
the control and the M&A group (Stuart 2010). Second, the construction of the cohort of 
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airlines allows us to more easily isolate a particular window of interest around each M&A. 
Third, while the presence of multiple M&As in our sample mitigates concerns regarding the 
violation of the parallel trends assumption, the inclusion of the cohort dummy variables also 
mitigates these concerns as it accounts for any possible selection bias that is due to the time-
invariant cohort-specific or airline-specific omitted variables (see Gill, Sridhar, and Grewal 
2017). However, our approach is still susceptible to the criticism of endogeneity since an 
airline’s involvement in a M&A is not random and the possibility of selection bias might still 
exist if the bias is driven by airline-specific omitted variables that differ across airlines and 
time periods. Thus, we seek to account for the potential bias by augmenting equation 1.1 with 
Zit, a set of covariates that 1) have a relationship with the specified dependent variable and 2) 
can account for an airline’s likelihood to undergo a M&A: 
                          Yict =  β0 + β1MAict + γic + αct + ωi + β2Zit + 𝜖𝑖𝑐𝑡                  (1.2) 
Existing research on M&As suggests that an airline’s main motivation to enter a 
M&A is to increase its power and control within the industry (e.g., Ashenfelter, Hosken, and 
Weinberg 2015; Borenstein 1990). The power-related advantages stemming from the M&A, 
is likely to, in turn, influence the airline’s performance on the dependent variables that reflect 
the interests of its primary stakeholders. For example, an airline might choose to enter a 
M&A so as to exert influence on prices (e.g., Kim and Singal 1993). This may potentially 
result in unobserved systematic differences between acquiring airlines that undergo a M&A 
and other airlines that did not. As such, in order to preserve the parallel trends assumption, 
the set of covariates should include airline-specific variables that proxy for an airline’s 
strategic motives to enjoy power-related advantages through a M&A. In particular, we 
include Firm Size, Leverage, Liquidity and Competition as covariates because the financial 
structure of the airline and the level of competition it faces are likely to influence its 
102 
 
likelihood of enjoying greater power to influence its performance on the dependent variables 
for each stakeholder. 
Given that we are unable to observe all important variables that may influence an 
airline’s decision to enter a M&A, we combine the stacked GDID approach with the 
Heckman (1979) two-step selection model (see Gill, Sridhar, and Grewal 2017; Shi et al. 
2017 for examples of a similar approach). Specifically, in the first-step, we specify a 
selection model to estimate an airline’s likelihood of undergoing a M&A using a probit 
specification:  
  MAict =  𝛿0 + 𝛿1Zit + [𝛿2PMAit + 𝛿3MAPit] + 𝜇𝑖𝑐𝑡                         (1.3) 
where MAict represents the impact of the M&A, and  𝜇𝑖𝑐𝑡 is the error term.  
The selection model includes the set of covariates (Zit) that are also included in 
equation 1.2, as they predict an airline’s choice of entering a M&A (i.e., Firm Size, Leverage, 
Liquidity, Competition). For the purpose of identification, we also include additional 
variables (i.e., exclusion restrictions, the variables in the square brackets in equation 1.3) that 
affect this choice but do not directly influence any of the dependent variables. We include 
two exclusion restrictions that proxy for peer influence in an airline’s decision to enter a 
M&A. Building on the argument that “mergers occur because other mergers have already 
occurred” (e.g., Haleblian et al. 2012, p. 1039), we calculate two exclusion restrictions. First, 
we use a simple count measure that takes into account the influence of peers’ decisions at the 
industry level, by calculating the number of competing airlines that entered into a M&A in 
the preceding four quarters, i.e., Prior M&A (PMAit).  
A key limitation of the preceding variable is that it assumes that M&As by all rivals 
are likely to exert equal pressure on the focal airline. To address this limitation, we calculate 
a second exclusion restriction, MAPROB (MAPit) that presents a weighted measure of M&A 
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pressure on the focal airline. Specifically, we first calculate the route overlap between the 
focal airline and all other airlines that operate in the domestic US market. Next, we identify 
whether these airlines underwent a M&A in a given quarter. Finally, using the route overlap 
as a weight, we calculate the weighted average of the number of M&As undertaken by an 
airline’s rivals. Using route overlaps allows us to adopt a more granular measure of the M&A 
pressures that an airline faces. In summary, we argue that both Prior M&A and MAPROB are 
conceptually related to an airline’s decision to engage in M&As. However, there is little 
reason to expect these variables to directly influence firm-specific performance as they 
represent the joint decision by either the airline industry or the focal airline’s closest rivals 
(Lev and Sougiannis 1996; Sridhar et al. 2016).  
In the second step, we compute the inverse Mills ratio which we obtained from 
equation 1.3 (see Appendix C for more details) and we augment equation 1.2 by including the 
inverse Mills ratio as a selection correction term: 
                 Yict =  β0 + β1MAict + γic + αct + ωi + β2Zit + β3IMRit + 𝜖𝑖𝑐𝑡         (1.4) 
where IMRit represents the inverse Mills ratio of airline 𝑖 in quarter 𝑡.  
Given that we have multiple dependent variables, we estimate the system of equations 
(i.e., the system of equations comprises of fourteen equations all following the specification 
of equation 1.4) using seemingly unrelated regression in order to account for the potential 
correlations between the error terms across equations (Wooldridge 2010). 
4.3.2 Airline Data  
We construct the dataset for our study using information from multiple data sources managed 
by the U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS). First, we obtain the airlines’ financial 
data from the Air Carrier Financial Reports (ACF) Schedule P-1.2, P-6, P-1(a) and B-1. 
Second, we collect non-stop segment and on-flight market data from the Air Carrier 
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Summary (ACS): T2: U.S. Air Traffic and Capacity Statistics by Aircraft Type. Third, we 
obtain on-time departure and arrival data from the Airline On-Time Performance Data (OTP). 
Finally, we collect data on quality from the Air Travel Consumer Reports (ATCR). At the 
intersection of these databases, we obtain data for U.S. airlines that have more than $20 
million in annual operating revenues and have at least one percent of the total domestic 
market share. Given that we also hypothesize about the effects of M&As on consumers, we 
do not consider cargo airlines and non-scheduled/chartered airlines. To align the datasets, we 
aggregate the monthly-route-airline level data from OTP and the monthly-airline level data 
from ATCR to quarterly-airline level (see Luo and Homburg 2008 for a similar practice). Our 
final sample consists of an unbalanced quarterly panel of airline-quarter observations from 17 
airlines between 1998 to 2015. Based on this sample, we identified the quarters in which a 
M&A occurred and the airlines involved in these M&As. 
4.3.3 Identification Strategy 
Consistent with prior literature (e.g., Sorescu, Chandy, and Prabhu 2007; Swaminathan, 
Murshed, and Hulland 2008), we identify whether an airline in our sample had undergone a 
M&A in a given quarter using data from the Securities Data Corporation Thompson Mergers 
and Acquisitions (SDC) database. Specifically, we first review all the 1,932 M&A 
agreements undertaken by the airlines industry in the SDC database from the first quarter of 
1998 to the fourth quarter of 2015 before matching the M&A agreements to the airlines in our 
sample.23 We consider an airline to have undergone a M&A if the M&A agreement in the 
SDC database fulfils the following conditions: 1) SDC indicates that the M&A has been 
completed (not rumoured), 2) the acquirer acquires and owns 100% of the target after the 
transaction, 3) it is a horizontal merger, i.e., both the target and the acquirer are from the 
                                                          
23 We define the airlines industry in SDC as any M&A agreements that involve targets and/or acquirers from industries with 
the following Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes: 4513 Air Courier Services; 4522 Air Transportation, 
Nonscheduled; 4512 Air Transportation, scheduled; 4581 Airports, Flying Fields, and Airport Terminal Services (see OSHA 
2017 for the definition of the SIC codes). 
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same industry, 4) it is an operational merger (not financial mergers such as stock swaps), and 
5) both target and acquirer are U.S airlines. We draw upon the “Target” and “Acquirer” 
identifiers, as well as the synopsis of the M&As in the SDC database to identify the acquiring 
and target airlines. Taken together, all acquiring airlines that fulfil the above stated conditions 
are placed in the M&A group.  
As the reliability of the stacked GDID approach depends on the identification of a 
clean control group (e.g., Meyer 1995), we also adhere to several strict conditions in 
identifying the airlines that belong to the control group. In particular, we do not include any 
airlines that undergo any form of M&As (i.e., including but not limited to operational 
acquisitions, financial mergers, partial acquisitions, purchase of assets, stock swaps etc.) in 
the two years before and after the focal acquiring airline’s M&A. In addition, we also do not 
include the target airlines in the control group. 
We identify the quarter in which a M&A occurred based on its completion date (i.e., 
date effective in the SDC database). To ensure the reliability of our treatment window, we 
verify the completion dates using the electronic search engine FACTIVA. In cases where 
there are any discrepancies in the completion dates, we use the earliest one. Since we are 
using a two-year time window and the time period of our sample ranges from 1998 to 2015, 
we only consider M&As from 2000 to 2013.24 All in all, we consider a total of 14 M&As. 
4.3.4 Measures 
 Price. Consistent with existing research (e.g., Phillips and Sertsios 2013), we measure 
price using a common price indicator in the airline industry, i.e., “yield”, the ratio between an 
airline’s operating revenues and its revenue passenger miles. In this way, price captures the 
average price per mile that each revenue passenger is paying. While data on operating 
                                                          
24 This is to ensure that both airlines in the M&A group and the control group have up to two years of data both before and 
after the quarter in which the M&A occurred. 
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revenues is obtained from the ACS: Schedule P-1.2, data on revenue passenger miles is 
obtained from the ACS: T2: U.S. Air Carrier Traffic and Capacity Statistic by Aircraft Type. 
To make the coefficients more interpretable, price is scaled up by a factor of 1000. 
 Complaints. We measure complaints as the number of consumer complaints scaled by 
the total number of revenue passengers carried, which is equivalent to the quotient of revenue 
passenger miles and total aircraft miles flown in revenue service. We obtain data on 
consumer complaints from the ATCR, which comprises of the voluntary consumer 
complaints filed against all airlines both classified in a number of categories and aggregated 
across all categories.25 Airlines with at least five complaints filed against them during the 
reporting period are listed individually whereas an aggregated number is reported for airlines 
with less than five complaints (see ATCR 2016). Since it is not possible for us to breakdown 
the aggregated number individually for these airlines, we let airlines with less than five 
complaints be the lower bound. In other words, for all airlines for which data on consumer 
complaints are not listed individually in a particular reporting period, we set the total number 
of consumer complaints for that airline in that period to be four. To compute the total number 
of revenue passengers carried, we obtain data from the ACS: T2: U.S. Air Carrier Traffic and 
Capacity Statistic by Aircraft Type. 
 Delays. We measure delays as the number of flights that depart or arrive more than 
fifteen minutes after the scheduled time scaled by the total number of flights using data from 
the OTP. We compute number of flight delays using the departure delay and arrival delay 
indicators as provided by BTS in the dataset. Specifically, the departure (arrival) delay 
indicator takes the value of 1 if the difference between the actual departure (arrival) time of 
                                                          
25As of the report issued in February 2016 (see ATCR 2016), there are 12 complaint categories. However, there are also 
some existing categories that were added as new categories (i.e., previously they were subsumed under another category) 
and/or categories that were removed (i.e., previously they were reported as separate categories but are now subsumed under 
an existing category) in earlier reports. That said, these changes should not affect our results as we are using the total number 
of complaints across all complaint categories and there are no new complaint categories that are actually added or removed. 
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the airline is fifteen minutes longer than the scheduled departure (arrival) time (BTS 2017b; 
BTS 2017d). The summation of the instances in which these indicators take the value of 1 
provides the total number of flight delays.  
Mishandled Baggage and Denied Boarding. We measure the mishandled baggage 
(denied boarding) as the number of passengers per 1000 (10,000) passengers that faced 
problems of mishandled baggage (were denied boarding).  
Number of Flights. We measure number of flights using the variable “Flights” as 
provided by BTS in the OTP (see BTS 2017d).  
Number of Routes. Consistent with existing research (e.g., Mantin and Rubin 2016), 
we measure number of routes based on airport pairs using data from OTP. We define an 
airport pair as a pair of departure and arrival airport codes on a flight itinerary. For example, 
a flight departing from John F. Kennedy Airport to Los Angeles Airport is travelling on a 
separate route as one that departs from Los Angeles Airport to John F. Kennedy Airport26.  
Employee Salaries, Senior Manager Salaries and Employment Benefits. We measure 
Senior Manager Salaries using the variable “SalariesMgmt”, Employee Salaries by 
subtracting Senior Manager Salaries from the variable “Salaries” and employment benefits 
using the variable “Benefits”. Data on these three variables are as provided by BTS in the 
ACF: Schedule P-6. 
Number of Employees. BTS provides the monthly average of the total number of full-
time and part-time employees in the ACF: Schedule P-1(a) through the variable 
“TotalEmployees”. Therefore, to derive the number of employees within a quarter, we take 
the mean of the monthly averages to align it to the quarterly-level.   
                                                          
26 For all subsequent mentions of routes, we refer to this definition. 
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Operating Margin and Operating Expenses. Following BTS (e.g., BTS 2016), we 
compute operating margin as the ratio of an airline’s operating profit or loss to its operating 
passenger revenues using data from ACF: Schedule P-1.2. In addition, we also derive an 
airline’s operating expenses from the variable “OpExpenses” found in the same database. 
Revenue Passenger Miles. We obtain data on revenue passenger miles from the 
variable “RexPaxMiles” as provided by BTS in the ACS: T2: U.S. Air Carrier Traffic and 
Capacity Statistic by Aircraft Type. BTS defines revenue passenger miles as “one revenue 
passenger transported one mile in revenue service”, and compute this variable by taking the 
“summation of the products of the revenue aircraft miles on each interairport segment 
multiplied by the number of revenue passengers carried on that segment” (see BTS 2017a). 
Control Variables. We measure Firm Size using the airline’s total assets, Leverage 
using the debt-to-equity ratio and Liquidity using its current ratio. Data utilized for the 
computation of these three variables is obtained from ACF: Schedule B-1. As for 
Competition, we derive this variable using data from the OTP. Specifically, we first compute 
the number of competing airlines travelling on the same route as the focal airline and then 
scale this value by the total number of routes that the focal airline travels on. 
Exclusion Restrictions. We compute Prior M&A as the number of competing airlines 
that were involved in M&As in the two years prior to the focal airline’s M&A and we 
measure MAPROB as the product of competitors' percentage of route overlap with the focal 
airline and the dummy variable indicating whether these competitors were involved in M&As 
in the last two years. While the identification of the airlines that were involved in M&As is 
consistent with the derivation of the main effect variable, M&A, we derive the percentage of 
route overlap using data in the OTP. We first create a matrix of airline pairs, where each 
airline pair reflects the number of routes where they overlap. The percentage of route overlap 
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is then computed by dividing the number of route overlaps for each competing airline to the 
focal airline with the total number of routes that the focal airline travels on. 
Table 4.3 outlines the variables, their measures and data sources, while Table 4.4 
provides the descriptive statistics for the measures. Due to their skewed distributions (see 
Table 4.4), we take the natural logarithm of Number of Flights, Number of Routes, Employee 
Salaries, Senior Manager Salaries, Employment Benefits, Number of Employees, Revenue 
Passenger Miles, Operating Expenses and Firm Size. 
[Insert Table 4.3 and 4.4 about here] 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Assessing the Potential Violation of the Parallel Trends Assumption 
In order to further ensure the fulfilment of the parallel trends assumption, we pool the data 
across cohorts and compute the mean values of the fourteen dependent variables and four 
covariates across acquiring airlines that undergo a M&A and other airlines that did not both 
in the year before and two years before the M&A. To account for the potential covariance 
among airlines (i.e., to account for code sharing, alliances, cross-ownership, etc.), we use 
standard errors that are clustered at the firm-level in order to derive the t-test statistic and 
hence the p-values. This approach is consistent with prior research that utilize the stacked 
GDID approach (e.g., Gormley and Matsa 2011). We find that the dependent variables and 
the covariates do not differ significantly between firms that undergo a M&A and those that 
did not both in the year before and two years before the M&A (see Table 4.5). As such, the 
two groups of airlines are similar in these dimensions at the aggregate level.  
Taken together, these findings lower concerns against the violation of the parallel 
trends assumption and lends support to our use of the stacked GDID approach in the current 
research context. We will now discuss our findings.  
110 
 
 [Insert Table 4.5 about here] 
4.4.2 Results of the Focal Model 
We first discuss the results of the selection equation (i.e., equation 1.3) (see Appendix 4.C, 
Table 4.C1 for the results of the selection model). In particular, we find support for one of the 
exclusion restrictions as an airline’s likelihood of entering a M&A increases when it faces 
greater M&A pressures from its closest rivals (𝛿3 = 0.675, 𝑝 < 0.01). However, we find that 
whether more airlines within the industry are engaging in M&As does not significantly 
impact an airline’s probability of engaging in M&As  (𝛿2 = 0.031, 𝑝 > 0.10). In addition, 
we also find that the selection correction term is significant in all the equations in which the 
treatment variable, M&A, is also significant (see Table 4.6). As such, the results support the 
importance of accounting for selection bias. We now discuss the results of our focal model. 
Table 4.6 reports the estimation results of our focal model. 
[Insert Table 4.6 about here] 
 Results suggest that consumers face significantly higher prices (𝛽1𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 = 0.051, 𝑝 <
0.01) following a M&A. The impact of M&As on quality is negative; while M&As do result 
in greater complaints and delays (𝛽1𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠 = 1.517, 𝑝 < 0.01; 𝛽1𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑠 = 0.117, 𝑝 <
0.01), there is no impact on mishandled baggage or denied boarding (𝛽1𝑚𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒 =
−0.103, 𝑝 > 0.10; 𝛽1𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 0.249, 𝑝 > 0.10). However, it is clear that consumers 
face lower choices, as the number of flights and routes decline significantly following a 
M&A (𝛽1𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠 = −0.091, 𝑝 < 0.01; 𝛽1𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑠 = −0.215, 𝑝 < 0.01). 
 With respect to employees and senior managers, results indicate that M&As benefit 
only the senior managers. While senior managers can look forward to enjoying a pay raise 
following a M&A(𝛽1
𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑠′𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠
= 1.450, 𝑝 < 0.01), employees should brace 
themselves for pay cuts (𝛽1
𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠′𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠
= −0.272, 𝑝 < 0.01). More importantly, M&As 
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also result in reductions in employment benefits and headcount (𝛽1𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠 =
−0.412, 𝑝 < 0.01; 𝛽1𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠 = −0.216, 𝑝 < 0.01). 
 Results indicate that the impact of M&As for investors is unclear. Although a M&A 
can increase an acquiring airline’s profitability and also result in cost savings 
(𝛽1𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 = 0.113, 𝑝 < 0.01; 𝛽1𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠 = −0.157, 𝑝 < 0.01), it reduces the 
demand for the acquiring airline’s service (𝛽1𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑠 = −0.316, 𝑝 < 0.01). 
4.4.3 Sensitivity Analyses 
We performed several sensitivity analyses to examine the robustness of our results, which we 
summarize in Table 4.7 (detailed estimation results are available in Appendix 4.B, Table 
4.B1 and the estimation results for the selection model of these analyses are available in 
Appendix 4.C, Table 4.C1). We will discuss each of these analyses in the subsequent 
sections. 
 Alternative Exclusion Restrictions. We examine the robustness of our results to 
alternative exclusion restrictions. First, consistent with existing research (e.g., Gill, Sridhar, 
and Grewal 2017), we re-estimated our focal model by including only one of the two 
exclusion restrictions. Second, we also examined the robustness of our results when we 
measure the exclusion restrictions using a one-year, as opposed to a two-year time period 
prior to the quarter in which the focal M&A occurred. Across all analyses, our conclusions 
remain largely unchanged. 
 Alternative M&A Date. Given that findings from previous M&A studies suggest that 
operational synergies or strategic alliances may occur even before the completion of a M&A 
(e.g., Swaminathan, Murshed, and Hulland 2008), we also assess the sensitivity of our results 
to the identification of the quarter in which the M&A occurred. Specifically, we use the 
announcement, as opposed to the completion dates. Our results remain largely unchanged. 
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Alternative Time Windows to Construct Cohorts. Consistent with existing research 
that adopt the stacked GDID approach (e.g., Gormley and Matsa 2011), we also assess the 
robustness of our results to alternative time windows used to construct the cohorts. In 
particular, we repeat the estimation process using 1-year, 3-year, 4-year and 5-year time 
windows to construct the cohorts. Due to to the availability of data required to construct each 
cohort, the 2 M&As that occurred in 2013, i.e., Endeavor Air and Delta, and US Airways and 
American Airlines, are dropped in the sensitivity analyses that use the 3-year, 4-year and 5-
year time window, and the M&A that occurred in 2001, i.e., Trans World Airways and 
American Airlines, is also dropped in the sensitivity analyses that use the 4-year and 5-year 
time window. In addition, the 2 M&As that occurred in 2011, i.e., AirTran and Southwest 
Airlines, and ExpressJet Airlines and Atlantic Southeast Airlines, are also dropped in the 
sensitivity analysis that uses the 5-year time window. Our substantive conclusions remain 
largely unchanged across all of these analyses. 
[Insert Table 4.7 about here] 
4.5 Post-Hoc Analyses 
4.5.1 Exploring the Heterogeneity in M&As Effects: Moderating Role of Prior Service 
Emphasis 
The results of the main effects analysis (see Table 4.6) indicates that M&As do not only 
result in negative implications for consumers, they also result in negative implications for 
employees and the benefits for investors remain unclear. Despite the promises made by the 
airlines prior to the approval of the M&A, the only stakeholders that are benefiting from the 
M&A are the senior managers. Taken together, the results underscore the importance for 
regulators to consider evaluating the impact of M&As using a stakeholder-specific approach. 
However, several questions remain: Given that it is impractical for regulators to block all 
M&As, how can regulators identify the M&As that do lesser harm than others? For example, 
prior research suggests that an airline that puts more emphasis on serving its passengers are 
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more likely to adopt a customer-oriented as opposed to a cost reduction strategy to improve 
its profitability (Rust, Moorman, and Dickson 2002). Thus, are some of the negative 
consequences driven by different ex ante airline characteristics, such as an airline’s prior 
service emphasis? To answer these questions, we now examine the cross-sectional 
heterogeneity of the impact of M&As across airlines with different prior service emphasis.   
In order to explore the moderating role of airlines’ prior service emphasis, we modify 
our empirical examination so that we can compare the impact of M&As involving acquiring 
airlines with different prior service emphasis. Specifically, we augment equation 1.4 by 
including an airline’s prior service emphasis as a moderator:  
           Yict =  β0 + β1MAict + γic + αct + ωi + β2Zit + β3IMRit + β4MAict × 𝑃𝑆𝐸𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑐𝑡      (1.5) 
where 𝑃𝑆𝐸𝑖𝑐𝑡 corresponds to the prior service emphasis of airline 𝑖 in cohort 𝑐 in quarter 𝑡. 
We measure an airline’s service emphasis using its passenger service expenses (DT: 
PaxService, in Thousands of dollars) obtained from the ACS: Schedule P-1.2. This is a good 
proxy because it accounts for the total expenditure that an airline devotes to activities that 
contribute to the “comfort, safety and convenience of passengers while in flight and when 
flights are interrupted” (Code of Federal Regulations 2017). In order to account for the size of 
an airline with respect to the amount it spends on serving passengers, we scale passenger 
service expense by the total number of revenue passengers carried, which is equivalent to the 
quotient of revenue passenger miles (DT: RevPaxMiles, in Thousands) and total aircraft 
miles flown in revenue service (DT: RevAirMiles, in Thousands). We obtain this data from 
the ACS: T2: U.S. Air Carrier Traffic and Capacity Statistic by Aircraft Type. Since we wish 
to test the differential impact of M&As involving acquiring airlines with different ex ante 
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service emphasis, we take the value of this ratio in the year prior to the focal M&A to obtain 
the moderator specified in equation 1.5, Prior Service Emphasis (𝑃𝑆𝐸𝑖𝑐𝑡).
27  
To facilitate the interpretation of parameter estimates, we normalize Prior Service 
Emphasis by its sample standard deviation and demean it with respect to its sample mean.28 
Taken together, β1 represents the impact of a M&A involving acquiring airlines with average 
prior service emphasis and β4 represents the incremental impact of a M&A for a standard 
deviation increase in an acquiring airline’s prior service emphasis.  
[Insert Table 4.8 about here] 
 Table 4.8 presents that estimation results of the moderating effect of prior service 
emphasis. We find that the impact of M&As involving acquiring airlines with average prior 
service emphasis is consistent to that of the main effects analysis (see Table 4.6) in all but 
one instance. Specifically, we find that whereas the impact of M&As on denied boarding is 
not statistically significant in the main effects analysis, M&As involving acquiring airlines 
with average prior service emphasis result in significantly greater denied boarding 
(𝛽1𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 0.516, 𝑝 < 0.10). 
 Our results also suggest that there is significant heterogeneity in the impact of M&As 
involving acquiring airlines with different prior service emphasis. Although we do not find 
any differential impact on prices across airlines with different prior service emphasis 
(𝛽4𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 = 0.002, 𝑝 > 0.10), we find that a one standard deviation increase in an acquiring 
                                                          
27 We follow the same procedure as that of the fourteen dependent variables and the covariates to verify that the moderator, 
Prior Service Emphasis, does not violate the parallel trends assumption in the year before and two years before the focal 
M&A. In comparing the means for the 2 years before the M&A, we measure Prior Service Emphasis in the two years, as 
opposed to a year, before the occurrence of the focal M&A. We find that the mean value of Prior Service Emphasis does not 
differ significantly across the acquiring airlines and the other airlines that did not undergo a M&A in the year before 
(1013.149, 𝑝 > .10) and two years (1052.827, 𝑝 > .10) before the M&A. 
28 The main effect of this moderator drops out in the estimation of equation 1.5 because it is time-invariant and perfectly 
collinear with the cohort (γic) and the airline (ωi) dummy variables by construction (see Gormley, Matsa, and Milbourn 
2013 for a similar explanation). 
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airline’s prior service emphasis is associated with a smaller increase in complaints, delays 
and denied boarding (𝛽4𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠 = −0.455, 𝑝 < 0.01; 𝛽4𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑠 = −0.011, 𝑝 <
0.01; 𝛽4𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 = −0.135, 𝑝 < 0.05). Similarly, results also indicate that higher prior 
service emphasis cushions the negative impact of M&As on choices as there is a significantly 
smaller decline in the number of flights and routes following M&As involving acquiring 
airlines with higher prior service emphasis (𝛽4𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠 = 0.053, 𝑝 <
0.01; 𝛽4𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑠 = 0.066, 𝑝 < 0.01). 
 The impact of M&As, when evaluated from the perspectives of employees and senior 
managers, also exhibit differential responses with respect to the acquiring airlines’ prior 
service emphasis. Specifically, M&As involving acquiring airlines with higher prior service 
emphasis result in both a smaller reduction in employee salaries and a smaller increment in 
senior managers salaries (𝛽4
𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠′𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠
= 0.072, 𝑝 < 0.01; 𝛽4
𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑠′𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠
=
−0.202, 𝑝 < 0.01). More importantly, these M&As also result in smaller reductions in 
employment benefits and headcount (𝛽4𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠 = 0.066, 𝑝 <
0.01; 𝛽4𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠 = 0.039, 𝑝 < 0.01). 
 An acquiring airline’s prior service emphasis also moderates the impact of M&As 
when evaluated from the investor perspective. Although higher prior service emphasis is 
associated with a smaller decrease in the demand for an acquiring airline’s service 
(𝛽4𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑠 = 0.051, 𝑝 < 0.01), it is also associated with a smaller increase in its 
profitability and cost savings (𝛽4𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 = −0.015, 𝑝 < 0.01; 𝛽4𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠 =
0.071, 𝑝 < 0.01).  
The observed heterogeneous effects of M&As with respect to the different prior 
service emphasis of the acquiring airlines is also robust to alternative measures of the 
116 
 
moderator. Specifically, we assess the sensitivity of these results to three alternative measures 
– Prior Service Emphasis relative to industry average, Prior Service Emphasis before 
normalizing or demeaning, and computing Prior Service Emphasis in the two years, as 
opposed to a year, before the occurrence of the focal M&A.29 As observed in Table 4.8, our 
conclusions remain unchanged across all analyses.30 
4.6 Discussion 
The results underscore the importance of considering the impact of M&As using a 
stakeholder-specific approach, thereby responding to recent calls for more research that 
adopts the stakeholder perspective in marketing (see Mishra and Modi 2016, p. 43), and more 
studies that account for the societal consequences of marketing actions (Moorman and Day 
2016, p. 29). Specifically, we find that only senior managers of the acquiring airlines benefit 
from the M&As. While consumers face higher prices, poorer quality and fewer choices, 
employees find their wages and benefits being cut on top of the risk of being laid off. More 
importantly, it is also not clear if investors actually benefit. The higher profits and greater 
cost savings accruing from these M&As might be short-lived as the acquiring airline faces 
lower growth following the M&A.  
4.6.1 Implications for Policy Makers  
Through the exploration of the heterogeneous effects of M&As, this study not only 
underscores the main effects of mergers, but also identifies an airline’s prior service emphasis 
as an ex ante airline characteristic that regulators can consider when evaluating whether to 
approve a M&A. In particular, the moderating effect of prior service emphasis identify the 
                                                          
29 We take the difference between an airline’s Prior Service Emphasis and the industry average value to obtain Prior Service 
Emphasis relative to industry average. The industry average value of Prior Service Emphasis excludes the airline’s own 
value. To make the coefficients more interpretable, Prior Service Emphasis before normalizing or demeaning is scaled down 
by a factor of 1000. 
30 The estimation of all models except the Two Years Before M&A model results in a reduction in sample size from 1,312 (as 
in the main effects analysis) to 1,281 because there are some airlines in the control group that are not present in the year 
before the occurrence of the focal M&A but are present in the two years before (see Appendix A for more details). 
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boundary conditions for the main effects of M&As on the respective dependent variables. To 
illustrate these boundary conditions, we calculate the marginal effects of M&As on each of 
the dependent variables for which the interaction effects are significant (𝑝 < 0.05, two-sided) 
and plot them across different levels of prior service emphasis (see Figure 4.2a, 4.2b and 
4.2c). 
[Insert Figure 4.2a about here] 
 Figure 4.2a identifies the boundary conditions for the observed negative effects of 
M&As on the dependent variables that reflect the perspective of the consumer. As observed 
in Panels A, B and C, the negative effects of M&As on quality are significantly cushioned by 
the acquiring airline’s prior service emphasis – M&As involving acquiring airlines with high 
service emphasis can reduce the negative impact of M&A on delays by about 3%, denied 
boarding by more than 35% and complaints by almost 125%.31 In fact, the negative effects of 
M&As on delays are only significant for M&As involving acquiring airlines with low prior 
service emphasis (see Panel C). Similarly, higher prior service emphasis also lowers the 
reduction in choices following M&As (see Panel D and E). In particular, M&As involving 
acquiring airlines with high prior service emphasis can reduce the number of flight cuts by 
almost 15% and the number of route cuts by almost 18%. 
[Insert Figure 4.2b about here] 
 We present the marginal effects of M&As from the perspectives of employees and 
senior managers in Figure 4.2b. As illustrated in Panels A, C and D, acquiring airlines with 
high prior service emphasis tend to reduce employee salaries, benefits and headcount by 
almost 20%, 18% and 11% less than acquiring airlines with lower service emphasis following 
                                                          
31 We identify an acquiring airline to have high (low) prior service emphasis if its value of prior service emphasis is at the 95 
(5) percentile of the sample distribution. For all further mentions of high and low prior service emphasis in this section, we 
refer to this definition.  
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a M&A. The increase in senior manager salaries following M&As involving acquiring 
airlines with high prior service emphasis is also more than 50% lower than M&As involving 
acquiring airlines with low prior service emphasis.  
 [Insert Figure 4.2c about here] 
 Figure 4.2c illustrates the moderating effect of prior service emphasis on the impact of 
M&As with respect to the dependent variables reflecting the investor perspective. Although 
acquiring airlines with high, as opposed to low, prior service emphasis enjoy lower 
increments in operating margins following a M&A, it is only by a small amount of 4%. They 
also enjoy a 20% smaller reduction in operating expenses. However, acquiring airlines with 
high prior service emphasis result in a 14% smaller reduction in revenue passenger miles. 
Given that the airlines industry contributes up to 7.1% of the total employment in the 
U.S. (ATA 2017), and that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)’s objective is to prevent 
M&As that are likely to result in consumers facing “higher prices, lower quality, reduced 
service or fewer choices as a result of the merger” (FTC 2017), regulators should indeed 
consider adopting a more holistic approach and taking into account an airline’s prior service 
emphasis when evaluating future M&As in this industry.  
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Table 4.1 
Summary of Literature on M&As in the Airlines Industry 
Paper 
Dependent Variables Examined in this Study 
No. of 
M&As 
Examined Price Complaints Delays 
Mishandled 
Baggage 
Denied 
Boarding 
No. of 
Flights 
No. of 
Routes 
Salaries 
Benefits 
No. of 
Employees 
O. 
Margin 
O. 
Expenses 
RPM 
Employees 
Senior 
Managers 
Borenstein 
(1990) 
              2 
Brueckner, 
Dyer, and 
Spiller 
(1992) 
              2 
Kim and 
Singal 
(1993) 
              14 
Morrison 
(1996) 
              3 
Singal 
(1996) 
              14 
Peters (2006)               5 
Kwoka and 
Shumilkina 
(2010) 
              1 
Prince and 
Simon 
(2017) 
              5 
This paper               14 
Notes. M&A = Merger and Acquisition; No. = Number; O. = Operating; RPM = Revenue Passenger Miles. We do not argue that this is an exhaustive list of papers that examine M&As in the airlines industry but rather, we seek to 
provide examples of the representative studies that examined some of these dependent variables. 
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Table 4.2 
Examples of Concerns and the Promises Made by the Airlines involved in M&As 
Concern Promise Stakeholder Affected 
“The US Airways-America West deal may mimic what happened when 
American purchased the assets of bankrupt T.W.A. in 2001. It 
eliminated dozens of flights, particularly at T.W.A.'s home base in St. 
Louis and laid off thousands of T.W.A. employees.” 
- (Maynard 2005a, The New York Times) 
“…US Airways wants to bring the global airlines group an added bonus through its 
proposed merger with America West: more destinations.” 
- (US Airways 2005, SEC Filing Form 425) 
Consumers 
“In markets where Southwest and AirTran compete head to head, such 
as Baltimore, Orlando and Milwaukee, prices are likely to go up if they 
combine.” 
- (Hunter 2010, CNN) 
“Growth is possible due to the joining of two low-cost, low-fare airlines that have 
very little route overlap. Expanding Southwest’s low-fare service to additional 
domestic markets will generate hundreds-of-millions in annual savings to Consumers 
as well as increased economic activity in the markets we serve.” 
- (Southwest Airlines Co. 2011, SEC Filing Form 425) 
Consumers 
“But many of the employee unions at Northwest were quick to voice 
opposition to the deal, even though Delta said it is not looking to cut 
non-office staff.” 
- (Isidore 2008, CNN Money) 
“The merger will create a financially stronger airline, better positioned to protect 
jobs, compensation and benefits. Delta and Northwest worked side by side with their 
employees to obtain passage of the Pension Protection Act of 2006, to make pension 
funding more affordable. The transaction will make employee pensions and benefits 
more secure.” 
- (Delta Air Lines 2008, SEC Filing Form 425) 
Employees & 
Senior Managers 
“It seems to be understood that the merger will lead to lay-offs. It 
seems to be understood that the merger will lead to lay-offs. Bill 
McGee, aviation consultant at the Consumers Union, recently told a 
Congressional committee: "These sterile corporate terms – downsizing, 
rightsizing, outsourcing, offshoring, furloughing – really mean that two 
workforces already shell-shocked from two decades of layoffs will 
experience more trauma."” 
- (Clark 2010, The Guardian) 
“The Merger Provides Job Stability for Employees: …The merger will offer our 
employees improved long-term career opportunities and enhanced job stability by 
being part of a larger, financially stronger and more geographically diverse carrier 
that is better able to compete successfully in the global marketplace and withstand 
the volatility of our industry…we expect that any necessary reductions in front line 
employees will come from retirements, normal attrition and voluntary programs.” 
- (UAL Corporation 2010, SEC Filing Form 425) 
Employees & 
Senior Managers 
“While American has been losing money over the last several years, US 
Airways has improved its financial situation recently. But the 
combination of the two does not promise to generate tremendous 
improvements in their combined operating positions.” 
- (Cohan 2013, Forbes.com) 
“The transaction is expected to generate more than $1 billion in annual net synergies 
in 2015, including $900 million in network revenue synergies, resulting 
predominantly from increased passenger traffic, taking advantage of the combined 
carrier’s improved schedule and connectivity, an improved mix of high-yield 
business, and the redeployment of the combined fleet to better match capacity to 
customer demand. Estimated cost synergies of approximately $150 million are net of 
the impact of the new labour combined contracts at American Airlines and US 
Airways.”  
- (American Airlines 2013, SEC Filing Exhibit 99.1) 
Investors 
 
Notes. M&A = Merger and Acquisition. 
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Table 4.3 
Variables, Measures, and Data Sources 
Variable Operationalization Source 
M&A = 1 if airline undergoes a M&A. SDC; FACTIVA 
Price Ratio of operating passenger revenues (DT: TransRevPax, in Thousands of dollars) to revenue passenger miles (DT: 
RevPaxMiles, in Thousands) scaled up by a factor of 1000. 
ACF: Schedule P-1.2; ACS: T2 : U.S. Air Carrier 
Traffic and Capacity Statistics by Aircraft Type 
Complaints Number of consumer complaints scaled by total number of revenue passengers carried, which is equivalent to the 
quotient of revenue passenger miles (DT: RevPaxMiles, in Thousands) and total aircraft miles flown in revenue service 
(DT: RevAirMiles, in Thousands). 
Air Travel Consumer Reports; ACS: T2 : U.S. Air 
Carrier Traffic and Capacity Statistics by Aircraft 
Type 
Delays Number of flights that depart (DT: DepDel15) or arrive (DT: ArrDel15) more than 15 minutes after the scheduled time 
scaled by total number of flights (DT: Flights). 
Airline On-Time Performance Data 
Mishandled Baggage Number of passengers per 10,000 passengers that were denied boarding. 
Air Travel Consumer Reports 
Denied Boarding Number of passengers per 1000 passengers that faced problems of mishandled baggage. 
Number of Flights Total number of flights (DT: Flights). 
Airline On-Time Performance Data Number of Routes Total number of routes based on airport pairs, where an airport pair is defined as a pair of departure (DT: 
OriginAirportID) and arrival (DT: DestAirportID) airport codes on a flight itinerary. 
Employee Salaries Difference between total salaries (DT: Salaries, in Thousands of dollars) and salaries from general management 
personnel (DT: SalariesMgt, in Thousands of dollars). 
ACF: Schedule P-6 Senior Manager Salaries The salaries from general management personnel (DT: SalariesMgt, in Thousands of dollars). 
Employment Benefits Total related fringe benefits (DT: Benefits, in Thousands of dollars). 
Number of Employees Total employees (DT: TotalEmployees). ACF: Schedule P-1(a) 
Operating Margin Ratio of operating profit or loss (DT: OpProfitLoss, in Thousands of dollars) to operating passenger revenues (DT: 
TransRevPax, in Thousands of dollars). 
ACF: Schedule P-1.2 
Operating Expenses An airline's operating expenses (DT: OpExpenses, in Thousands of dollars). ACF: Schedule P-1.2 
Revenue Passenger Miles Revenue passenger miles (DT: RevPaxMiles, in Thousands), computed by summation of the products of the revenue 
aircraft miles on each interairport segment multiplied by the number of revenue passengers carried on that segment. 
ACS: T2: U.S. Air Carrier Traffic and Capacity 
Statistics by Aircraft Type 
Firm Size Total assets (DT: Assets, in Thousands of dollars). 
ACF: Schedule B-1 
Leverage Total long-term debt (DT: LongTermDebt, in Thousands of dollars) scaled by total assets (DT: Assets, in Thousands of 
dollars). 
Liquidity Ratio of current assets (DT: CurrAssets, in Thousands of dollars) to current liabilities (DT: CurrLiabilities, in 
Thousands of dollars). 
Competition Number of competing airlines that travel on the same routes as that of the focal airline scaled by the total number of 
routes that the focal airline travels on. 
Airline On-Time Performance Data 
Prior M&A Number of competing airlines that were involved in M&As in the last two years. SDC; FACTIVA 
MAPROB The product of competitors' percentage of route overlap with the focal airline and the dummy variable indicating 
whether these competitors were involved in M&As in the last two years. 
Airline On-Time Performance Data; SDC; 
FACTIVA 
 
Notes. M&A = Mergers and Acquisition; MAPROB = M&A Pressures from Closest Competitors; DT: Data Item; SDC = Securities Data Corporation Thompson Mergers and 
Acquisitions; ACF = Air Carrier Financials; ACS = Air Carrier Summary. All variables are measured at the quarterly level.  
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Table 4.4 
Descriptive Statistics 
    Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
1 M&A (D) 0.079 0.269 0 1 
2 Price 0.139 0.045 0.070 0.337 
3 Complaints 0.729 1.147 0.019 13.175 
4 Delays 0.172 0.061 0.030 0.375 
5 Mishandled Baggage 5.052 2.883 0.790 16.167 
6 Denied Boarding 0.994 0.827 0.000 5.010 
7 Number of Flights (No.) 90,938.040 60,485.760 11,997.000 298,762.000 
8 Number of Routes (No.) 312.143 197.889 34.000 1,058.000 
9 Employee Salaries (No.) 315,274.700 328,814.500 22,872.260 1,857,045.000 
10 Senior Manager Salaries (No.) 8,726.782 8,888.373 129.000 66,682.000 
11 Employment Benefits (No.) 143,700.300 157,432.300 8,705.910 848,543.700 
12 Number of Employees (No.) 23,549.880 22,070.950 2,670.000 106,972.700 
13 Operating Margin 0.019 0.117 -0.926 0.292 
14 Operating Expenses (No.) 1.637E+06 1.742E+06 1.259E+05 1.040E+07 
15 Revenue Passenger Miles (No.) 1.020E+10 1.010E+10 5.510E+08 5.460E+10 
16 Firm Size (No.) 8.469E+06 9.331E+06 2.090E+05 5.760E+07 
17 Leverage 0.319 0.227 0.000 0.954 
18 Liquidity 1.019 0.554 0.120 4.326 
19 Competition 0.925 0.398 0.200 2.552 
20 Prior M&A (No.) 6.836 3.694 0 13 
21 MAPROB 0.377 0.469 0.000 2.466 
Notes. M&A = Mergers and Acquisition; MAPROB = M&A Pressures from Closest Competitors; D = Dummy 
Variable; No. = Number. We take the natural logarithm of Number of Flights, Number of Routes, Employee Salaries, 
Senior Manager Salaries, Employment Benefits, Number of Employees, Operating Expenses, Revenue Passenger Miles 
and Firm Size due to their skewed distributions. There is a total of 1,312 observations from 17 airlines. All variables 
are ratios unless otherwise stated in parenthesis. The reported descriptive statistics in this table are before taking the 
logarithm (if applicable), where Employee Salaries, Senior Manager Salaries, Employment Benefits, Operating 
Expenses and Firm Size are in thousands of dollars, and Revenue Passenger Miles is in thousands. We report the 
descriptive statistics of M&A as the proportion of observations where the dummy variable takes the value of 1. 
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Table 4.5 
Comparing Means of Dependent Variables and  
Covariates before M&A 
 
    Control Group M&A 
Group 
Difference p-value of 
Difference 
  1 Year Before the M&A Mean Mean 
1 Price 0.142 0.132 0.011 0.723 
2 Complaints 0.701 1.465 -0.765 0.205 
3 Delays 0.177 0.191 -0.015 0.648 
4 Mishandled Baggage 5.330 4.348 0.982 0.529 
5 Denied Boarding 1.079 0.790 0.289 0.436 
6 Number of Flights 11.119 11.728 -0.609 0.257 
7 Number of Routes 5.440 6.102 -0.663 0.219 
8 Employee Salaries 12.060 12.917 -0.857 0.190 
9 Senior Manager Salaries 8.573 8.914 -0.342 0.505 
10 Employment Benefits 11.150 12.136 -0.986 0.207 
11 Number of Employees 9.590 10.367 -0.777 0.187 
12 Operating Margin 0.012 0.043 -0.031 0.642 
13 Operating Expenses 13.683 14.626 -0.943 0.194 
14 Revenue Passenger Miles 22.436 23.398 -0.962 0.172 
15 Firm Size 15.215 16.227 -1.012 0.233 
16 Leverage 0.334 0.238 0.096 0.452 
17 Liquidity 0.972 1.143 -0.171 0.641 
18 Competition 0.870 1.097 -0.226 0.393 
Observations 285 54    
Airlines 13 8    
    Control Group M&A 
Group 
Difference p-value of 
Difference 
  2 Years Before the M&A Mean Mean 
1 Price 0.140 0.128 0.012 0.708 
2 Complaints 0.686 1.536 -0.850 0.125 
3 Delays 0.173 0.183 -0.010 0.730 
4 Mishandled Baggage 5.029 4.290 0.739 0.637 
5 Denied Boarding 1.057 0.876 0.181 0.629 
6 Number of Flights 11.168 11.777 -0.609 0.262 
7 Number of Routes 5.472 6.123 -0.652 0.250 
8 Employee Salaries 12.123 13.035 -0.912 0.221 
9 Senior Manager Salaries 8.589 8.989 -0.400 0.494 
10 Employment Benefits 11.218 12.274 -1.057 0.237 
11 Number of Employees 9.654 10.471 -0.817 0.219 
12 Operating Margin 0.016 0.030 -0.014 0.835 
13 Operating Expenses 13.703 14.709 -1.006 0.203 
14 Revenue Passenger Miles 22.478 23.492 -1.014 0.186 
15 Firm Size 15.278 16.338 -1.060 0.176 
16 Leverage 0.342 0.246 0.096 0.476 
17 Liquidity 0.952 1.067 -0.115 0.721 
18 Competition 0.842 1.046 -0.205 0.400 
Observations 596 102    
Airlines 13 8    
Notes. M&A = Mergers and Acquisitions; M&A (Control) Group = Acquiring (other) airlines that 
did (not) undergo a M&A. We take the natural logarithm of Number of Flights, Number of Routes, 
Employee Salaries, Senior Manager Salaries, Employment Benefits, Number of Employees, 
Operating Expenses, Revenue Passenger Miles and Firm Size due to their skewed distributions. We 
compute the p-value (two-sided) from a t-test for the difference between airlines in the no M&A and 
M&A group, where the standard errors are clustered at the airline level to allow for potential 
covariance among airlines (i.e., in the airline context, to account for code sharing, alliances, cross-
ownership, etc.). 
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Table 4.6 
Results of Main Effects 
 
  CONSUMERS 
  
Price 
Quality Choice 
  
Complaints Delays Mishandled Baggage Denied Boarding Number of Flights Number of Routes 
Variables Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE) 
M&A 0.051 (0.006) *** 1.517 (0.258) *** 0.117 (0.015) *** -0.103 (0.513)   0.249 (0.253)   -0.091 (0.041) ** -0.215 (0.044) *** 
Firm Size 0.033 (0.002) *** 0.310 (0.086) *** -0.027 (0.005) *** 0.361 (0.171) ** -0.490 (0.084) *** 0.147 (0.013) *** 0.191 (0.015) *** 
Leverage 0.030 (0.005) *** -0.742 (0.215) *** -0.008 (0.012)   2.128 (0.427) *** 0.930 (0.211) *** -0.151 (0.034) *** -0.219 (0.037) *** 
Liquidity -0.009 (0.002) *** 0.061 (0.079)   -0.028 (0.005) *** 0.231 (0.157)   -0.101 (0.077)   -0.014 (0.012)   0.053 (0.014) *** 
Competition -0.011 (0.003) *** -0.286 (0.132) ** -0.041 (0.008) *** -2.014 (0.264) *** 0.052 (0.130)   -0.238 (0.021) *** 0.031 (0.023)   
IMR -0.030 (0.004) *** -0.720 (0.145) *** -0.061 (0.008) *** -0.092 (0.289)   -0.175 (0.143)   0.083 (0.023) *** 0.136 (0.025) *** 
  EMPLOYEES & SENIOR MANAGERS INVESTORS 
  
Employee Salaries 
Senior Manager 
Salaries 
Employment Benefits Number of  Employees Operating Margin Operating Expenses 
Revenue Passenger 
Miles 
Variables Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE)   Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE) 
M&A -0.272 (0.055) *** 1.450 (0.245) *** -0.412 (0.077) *** -0.216 (0.039) *** 0.113 (0.027) *** -0.157 (0.040) *** -0.316 (0.038) *** 
Firm Size 0.224 (0.018) *** -0.338 (0.081) *** 0.179 (0.026) *** 0.099 (0.013) *** 0.024 (0.009) *** 0.384 (0.013) *** 0.190 (0.013) *** 
Leverage -0.054 (0.046)   -0.117 (0.204)   -0.202 (0.064) *** -0.058 (0.032) * 0.032 (0.023)   0.050 (0.033)   -0.107 (0.032) *** 
Liquidity 0.130 (0.017) *** -0.349 (0.075) *** 0.098 (0.024) *** 0.088 (0.012) *** -0.017 (0.008) ** 0.047 (0.012) *** 0.047 (0.012) *** 
Competition -0.190 (0.028) *** -0.302 (0.126) ** -0.294 (0.040) *** -0.173 (0.020) *** -0.009 (0.014)   -0.136 (0.021) *** -0.120 (0.020) *** 
IMR 0.202 (0.031) *** -0.808 (0.138) *** 0.234 (0.043) *** 0.151 (0.022) *** -0.075 (0.015) *** 0.090 (0.022) *** 0.182 (0.021) *** 
Notes. * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 (two-sided); Coeff = Coefficient; SE = Standard Error; M&A = Mergers and Acquisitions; IMR = Inverse Mills Ratio. We take the natural logarithm 
of Number of Flights, Number of Routes, Employee Salaries, Senior Manager Salaries, Employment Benefits, Number of Employees, Operating Expenses, Revenue Passenger Miles and Firm 
Size due to their skewed distributions. There is a total of 1,312 observations from 17 airlines. The cohort dummy variables, year-quarter dummy variables and firm dummy variables are 
estimated but results are not shown due to space constraints. 
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Table 4.7 
Sensitivity Analyses 
Dependent Variable 
Alternative 
Exclusion Restrictions 
Alternative M&A 
Date 
Alternative Time Windows to Construct Cohorts 
Using Only Prior 
M&A 
Using Only 
MAPROB 
Using Alternative 
Measures 
Using 1-year 
Time Window 
Using 3-year 
Time Window 
Using 4-year 
Time Window 
Using 5-year 
Time Window 
Price         
Complaints         
Delays         
Mishandled Baggage            
Denied Boarding         
Number of Flights         
Number of Routes                 
Employee Salaries         
Senior Manager Salaries         
Employment Benefits         
Number of Employees         
Operating Margin         
Operating Expenses         
Revenue Passenger Miles         
Notes.  = The effect, in terms of its sign and statistical significance, is consistent to that of the focal analysis; M&A = Mergers and Acquisitions; IMR = Inverse Mills Ratio; MAPROB = M&A 
Pressures from Closest Competitors.  
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Table 4.8 
Results of Moderating Effect of Prior Service Emphasis 
      CONSUMERS 
      
Price 
Quality Choice 
      Complaints Delays Mishandled Baggage Denied Boarding Number of Flights Number of Routes 
     Variables Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE) 
Focal Model 
M&A 0.048 (0.007) *** 2.461 (0.289) *** 0.140 (0.017) *** -0.258 (0.571)   0.516 (0.290) * -0.212 (0.045) *** -0.371 (0.049) *** 
M&A*PSE 0.002 (0.002)   -0.455 (0.064) *** -0.011 (0.004) *** 0.123 (0.126)   -0.135 (0.064) ** 0.053 (0.010) *** 0.066 (0.011) *** 
Alternative 
Measures of 
Moderator 
Relative to 
Industry 
Average 
M&A 0.048 (0.007) *** 2.476 (0.293) *** 0.140 (0.017) *** -0.317 (0.577)   0.555 (0.293) * -0.215 (0.046) *** -0.376 (0.050) *** 
M&A*PSE 0.002 (0.002)   -0.450 (0.065) *** -0.010 (0.004) *** 0.146 (0.128)   -0.149 (0.065) ** 0.053 (0.010) *** 0.066 (0.011) *** 
Not 
Normalized or 
Demeaned 
M&A 0.046 (0.008) *** 2.923 (0.325) *** 0.150 (0.019) *** -0.383 (0.642)   0.652 (0.326) ** -0.266 (0.051) *** -0.437 (0.055) *** 
M&A*PSE 0.002 (0.002)   -0.450 (0.063) *** -0.010 (0.004) *** 0.122 (0.124)   -0.133 (0.063) ** 0.053 (0.010) *** 0.065 (0.011) *** 
Two Years 
Before M&A 
M&A 0.045 (0.007) *** 2.654 (0.297) *** 0.142 (0.017) *** -0.445 (0.602)   0.644 (0.296) ** -0.215 (0.047) *** -0.365 (0.051) *** 
M&A*PSE 0.003 (0.002)   -0.463 (0.065) *** -0.010 (0.004) *** 0.144 (0.133)   -0.167 (0.065) ** 0.052 (0.010) *** 0.063 (0.011) *** 
      EMPLOYEES & SENIOR MANAGERS INVESTORS 
      
Employee Salaries 
Senior Manager 
Salaries 
Employment 
Benefits 
Number of  
Employees 
Operating Margin Operating Expenses 
Revenue Passenger 
Miles 
     Variables Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE)   Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE) 
Focal Model 
M&A -0.450 (0.062) *** 1.893 (0.278) *** -0.573 (0.086) *** -0.317 (0.044) *** 0.145 (0.031) *** -0.313 (0.045) *** -0.440 (0.043) *** 
M&A*PSE 0.072 (0.014) *** -0.202 (0.061) *** 0.066 (0.019) *** 0.039 (0.010) *** -0.015 (0.007) ** 0.071 (0.010) *** 0.051 (0.009) *** 
Alternative 
Measures of 
Moderator 
Relative to 
Industry 
Average 
M&A -0.456 (0.063) *** 1.948 (0.281) *** -0.581 (0.087) *** -0.322 (0.044) *** 0.147 (0.031) *** -0.321 (0.045) *** -0.446 (0.043) *** 
M&A*PSE 0.073 (0.014) *** -0.222 (0.062) *** 0.068 (0.019) *** 0.040 (0.010) *** -0.015 (0.007) ** 0.073 (0.010) *** 0.052 (0.010) *** 
Not 
Normalized or 
Demeaned 
M&A -0.523 (0.070) *** 2.098 (0.312) *** -0.639 (0.097) *** -0.357 (0.049) *** 0.160 (0.035) *** -0.385 (0.050) *** -0.492 (0.048) *** 
M&A*PSE 0.071 (0.013) *** -0.200 (0.060) *** 0.065 (0.019) *** 0.038 (0.010) *** -0.015 (0.007) ** 0.070 (0.010) *** 0.050 (0.009) *** 
Two Years 
Before M&A 
M&A -0.424 (0.064) *** 1.940 (0.286) *** -0.551 (0.090) *** -0.295 (0.045) *** 0.144 (0.032) *** -0.316 (0.046) *** -0.427 (0.044) *** 
M&A*PSE 0.064 (0.014) *** -0.207 (0.063) *** 0.059 (0.020) *** 0.033 (0.010) *** -0.013 (0.007) * 0.067 (0.010) *** 0.047 (0.010) *** 
Notes. * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 (two-sided); Coeff = Coefficient; SE = Standard Error; M&A = Mergers and Acquisitions; PSE = Prior Service Emphasis. We take the natural logarithm of 
Number of Flights, Number of Routes, Employee Salaries, Senior Manager Salaries, Employment Benefits, Number of Employees, Operating Expenses, Revenue Passenger Miles and Firm Size due to 
their skewed distributions. There is a total of 1,281 observations from 17 airlines in all models except the Two Years Before M&A model, which contains a total of 1,312 observations from 17 airlines. 
The cohort dummy variables, year-quarter dummy variables, firm dummy variables and control variables are estimated but results are not shown due to space constraints. 
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Figure 4.1 
Proposed Holistic View 
 
 
Notes. The proposed holistic view and the included variables are derived based on the extant views of the impact of mergers and acquisitions in the airline industry, i.e., from regulators, business 
press, etc., as illustrated in-text and in Table 4.2. We do not argue that these variables are exhaustive but instead, we seek to empirically test a view that captures the actual opinions of the 
stakeholders. 
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Figure 4.2a 
Marginal Effects of M&A on Dependent Variables Reflecting the Consumer 
Perspective Across Levels of Prior Service Emphasis 
A: Complaints B: Delays 
  
C: Denied Boarding D: Number of Flights 
  
E: Number of Routes  
 
 
Notes. M&A = Mergers and Acquisitions; Low (High) = 5 (95) Percentile Value of Prior Service Emphasis; High – Low = Difference 
between M&A and control group when there is high (versus) low prior service emphasis. The horizontal axis of every graph represents 
the different values of Prior Service Emphasis across the data range in our sample. The dashed lines indicate the 90% confidence interval 
bands. The vertical axis of every graph represents the marginal effects of M&A on the corresponding dependent variables across changes 
in Prior Service Emphasis. Note that we only generate the plots for the significant (p < .05, two-sided) interaction effects. 
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Figure 4.2b 
Marginal Effects of M&A on Dependent Variables Reflecting the Employee and 
Senior Manager Perspective Across Levels of Prior Service Emphasis 
A: Employee Salaries B: Senior Manager Salaries 
  
C: Employment Benefits D: Number of Employees 
  
Notes. M&A = Mergers and Acquisitions; Low (High) = 5 (95) Percentile Value of Prior Service Emphasis; High – Low = 
Difference between M&A and control group when there is high (versus) low prior service emphasis. The horizontal axis of 
every graph represents the different values of Prior Service Emphasis across the data range in our sample. The dashed 
lines indicate the 90% confidence interval bands. The vertical axis of every graph represents the marginal effects of M&A 
on the corresponding dependent variables across changes in Prior Service Emphasis. Note that we only generate the plots 
for the significant (p < .05, two-sided) interaction effects. 
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Figure 4.2c 
Marginal Effects of M&A on Dependent Variables Reflecting the Investor Perspective 
Across Levels of Prior Service Emphasis 
A: Operating Margin B: Operating Expenses 
  
C: Revenue Passenger Miles  
 
 
Notes. M&A = Mergers and Acquisitions; Low (High) = 5 (95) Percentile Value of Prior Service Emphasis; High – Low = 
Difference between M&A and control group when there is high (versus) low prior service emphasis. The horizontal axis of 
every graph represents the different values of Prior Service Emphasis across the data range in our sample. The dashed 
lines indicate the 90% confidence interval bands. The vertical axis of every graph represents the marginal effects of M&A 
on the corresponding dependent variables across changes in Prior Service Emphasis. Note that we only generate the plots 
for the significant (p < .05, two-sided) interaction effects. 
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Appendix 4 
Appendix 4.A: Distribution of M&A and Control Group by Cohort 
 
Table 4.A1 - Distribution of M&A and Control Group by Cohort 
Main Effects 
  Control Group M&A Group Total 
Cohort Observations Airlines Observations Airlines Observations Airlines 
1 113 8 16 1 129 9 
2 104 10 16 1 120 11 
3 87 10 10 1 97 11 
4 101 11 10 1 111 12 
5 94 11 12 1 106 12 
6 86 10 16 1 102 11 
7 83 12 16 1 99 13 
8 77 11 16 1 93 12 
9 77 6 16 1 93 7 
10 60 4 13 1 73 5 
11 64 5 16 1 80 6 
12 52 4 16 1 68 5 
13 55 5 16 1 71 6 
14 54 4 16 1 70 5 
Total Observations 1,312 
Moderating Effect of Prior Service Emphasis 
  Control Group M&A Group Total 
Cohort Observations Airlines Observations Airlines Observations Airlines 
1 113 8 16 1 129 9 
2 104 10 16 1 120 11 
3 87 10 10 1 97 11 
4 101 10 10 1 111 11 
5 91 11 12 1 103 12 
6 83 10 16 1 99 11 
7 72 9 16 1 88 10 
8 69 8 16 1 85 9 
9 77 6 16 1 93 7 
10 60 4 13 1 73 5 
11 64 5 16 1 80 6 
12 48 3 16 1 64 4 
13 53 4 16 1 69 5 
14 54 4 16 1 70 5 
Total Observations 1,281 
 Notes. M&A = Mergers and Acquisitions. Since an airline can undergo more than 1 M&A in our 
sample, the total number of airlines will not add up to 17 as the same airline can be present in both 
the control and the M&A group in different cohorts. 
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Appendix 4.B: Detailed Estimation Results of Sensitivity Analyses 
Table 4.B1 - Detailed Estimation Results of Sensitivity Analyses 
      CONSUMERS 
      
Price 
Quality Choice 
      
Complaints Delays 
Mishandled 
Baggage 
Denied Boarding Number of Flights Number of Routes 
      Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE) 
Focal Model 
(Main Effects) 
M&A 0.051 (0.006) *** 1.517 (0.258) *** 0.117 (0.015) *** -0.103 (0.513)   0.249 (0.253)   -0.091 (0.041) ** -0.215 (0.044) *** 
Observations 1,312 1,312 1,312 1,312 1,312 1,312 1,312 
Alternative 
Exclusion 
Restrictions 
Using Only 
Prior M&A 
M&A 0.081 (0.007) *** 1.576 (0.233) *** 0.092 (0.014) *** 1.039 (0.487) ** -0.201 (0.232)   -0.447 (0.044) *** -0.259 (0.045) *** 
Observations 1,487 1,487 1,487 1,487 1,487 1,487 1,487 
Using Only 
MAPROB 
M&A 0.053 (0.006) *** 1.476 (0.265) *** 0.105 (0.015) *** 0.146 (0.526)   0.285 (0.259)   -0.101 (0.042) ** -0.200 (0.046) *** 
Observations 1,312 1,312 1,312 1,312 1,312 1,312 1,312 
Using 
Alternative 
Measures 
M&A 0.075 (0.007) *** 1.530 (0.266) *** 0.089 (0.016) *** 0.621 (0.546)   -0.609 (0.262) ** -0.342 (0.046) *** -0.395 (0.047) *** 
Observations 1,413 1,413 1,413 1,413 1,413 1,413 1,413 
Alternative M&A Date 
M&A 0.043 (0.006) *** 0.214 (0.207)   0.112 (0.014) *** -0.045 (0.497)   -0.483 (0.243) ** -0.164 (0.039) *** -0.311 (0.042) *** 
Observations 1,335 1,335 1,335 1,335 1,335 1,335 1,335 
Alternative 
Time 
Windows to 
Construct 
Cohorts
a
 
Using 1-year 
Time 
Window 
M&A 0.033 (0.009) *** 0.016 (0.328)   0.110 (0.022) *** -1.029 (0.751)   0.000 (0.331)   -0.058 (0.054)   -0.137 (0.057) ** 
Observations 722 722 722 722 722 722 722 
Using 3-year 
Time 
Window 
M&A 0.050 (0.005) *** 1.711 (0.187) *** 0.121 (0.012) *** 0.847 (0.426) ** -0.211 (0.219)   -0.181 (0.034) *** -0.240 (0.036) *** 
Observations 1,766 1,766 1,766 1,766 1,766 1,766 1,766 
Using 4-year 
Time 
Window 
M&A 0.060 (0.005) *** 2.042 (0.129) *** 0.117 (0.011) *** -0.094 (0.387)   0.025 (0.203)   -0.125 (0.030) *** -0.115 (0.031) *** 
Observations 2,085 2,085 2,085 2,085 2,085 2,085 2,085 
Using 5-year 
Time 
Window 
M&A 0.049 (0.004) *** 0.711 (0.196) *** 0.090 (0.010) *** 1.003 (0.352) *** -0.529 (0.185) *** -0.261 (0.029) *** -0.325 (0.031) *** 
Observations 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484 
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Table 4.B1 – (Continued) 
      EMPLOYEES & SENIOR MANAGERS INVESTORS 
      
Employee Salaries 
Senior Manager 
Salaries 
Employment 
Benefits 
Number of  
Employees 
Operating Margin 
Operating 
Expenses 
Revenue Passenger 
Miles 
      Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE)   Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE) 
Focal Model 
(Main Effects) 
M&A -0.272 (0.055) *** 1.450 (0.245) *** -0.412 (0.077) *** -0.216 (0.039) *** 0.113 (0.027) *** -0.157 (0.040) *** -0.316 (0.038) *** 
Observations 1,312 1,312 1,312 1,312 1,312 1,312 1,312 
Alternative 
Exclusion 
Restrictions 
Using Only 
Prior M&A 
M&A -0.396 (0.054) *** 0.274 (0.226)   -0.357 (0.072) *** -0.369 (0.039) *** 0.197 (0.026) *** -0.063 (0.038) * -0.397 (0.042) *** 
Observations 1,487 1,487 1,487 1,487 1,487 1,487 1,487 
Using Only 
MAPROB 
M&A -0.280 (0.057) *** 1.515 (0.251) *** -0.443 (0.079) *** -0.241 (0.040) *** 0.111 (0.028) *** -0.154 (0.041) *** -0.327 (0.039) *** 
Observations 1,312 1,312 1,312 1,312 1,312 1,312 1,312 
Using 
Alternative 
Measures 
M&A -0.404 (0.061) *** 0.807 (0.255) *** -0.404 (0.082) *** -0.344 (0.043) *** 0.183 (0.029) *** -0.126 (0.042) *** -0.413 (0.045) *** 
Observations 1,413 1,413 1,413 1,413 1,413 1,413 1,413 
Alternative M&A Date 
M&A -0.426 (0.052) *** 1.031 (0.240) *** -0.569 (0.072) *** -0.342 (0.036) *** 0.159 (0.026) *** -0.281 (0.038) *** -0.365 (0.035) *** 
Observations 1,335 1,335 1,335 1,335 1,335 1,335 1,335 
Alternative 
Time 
Windows to 
Construct 
Cohorts
a
 
Using 1-
year Time 
Window 
M&A -0.278 (0.078) *** 1.144 (0.334) *** -0.497 (0.107) *** -0.274 (0.054) *** 0.144 (0.041) *** -0.276 (0.055) *** -0.235 (0.049) *** 
Observations 722 722 722 722 722 722 722 
Using 3-
year Time 
Window 
M&A -0.327 (0.046) *** 1.112 (0.227) *** -0.441 (0.062) *** -0.235 (0.032) *** 0.159 (0.023) *** -0.194 (0.035) *** -0.366 (0.031) *** 
Observations 1,766 1,766 1,766 1,766 1,766 1,766 1,766 
Using 4-
year Time 
Window 
M&A -0.181 (0.041) *** 1.348 (0.213) *** -0.364 (0.056) *** -0.130 (0.028) *** 0.176 (0.022) *** -0.156 (0.033) *** -0.349 (0.027) *** 
Observations 2,085 2,085 2,085 2,085 2,085 2,085 2,085 
Using 5-
year Time 
Window 
M&A -0.513 (0.038) *** 1.408 (0.192) *** -0.658 (0.054) *** -0.328 (0.026) *** 0.220 (0.021) *** -0.254 (0.028) *** -0.407 (0.026) *** 
Observations 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484 
 
Notes. * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 (two-sided); Coeff = Coefficient; SE = Standard Error; M&A = Mergers and Acquisitions; IMR = Inverse Mills Ratio; MAPROB = M&A 
Pressures from Closest Competitors. We take the natural logarithm of Number of Flights, Number of Routes, Employee Salaries, Senior Manager Salaries, Employment Benefits, 
Number of Employees, Operating Expenses, Revenue Passenger Miles and Firm Size due to their skewed distributions. To facilitate the interpretation of parameter estimates, we 
normalize Prior Service Emphasis by its sample standard deviation and demean it with respect to its sample mean. aDue to the availability of data required to construct each cohort, 
the 2 M&As that occurred in 2013, i.e., Endeavor Air and Delta, and US Airways and American Airlines, are dropped in the sensitivity analyses that use the 3-year, 4-year and 5-
year time window, and the M&A that occurred in 2001, i.e., Trans World Airways and American Airlines, is also dropped in the sensitivity analyses that use the 4-year and 5-year 
time window. In addition, the 2 M&As that occurred in 2011, i.e., AirTran and Southwest Airlines, and ExpressJet Airlines and Atlantic Southeast Airlines, are also dropped in the 
sensitivity analysis that uses the 5-year time window. The cohort dummy variables, year-quarter dummy variables, firm dummy variables and control variables are estimated but 
results are not shown due to space constraints. 
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Appendix 4.C: Inverse Mills Ratio and Selection Model Results 
Computation of the Inverse Mills Ratio 
In the computation of the inverse Mills ratio, we follow the steps illustrated by Greene (2002, 
p. 232 – 233). First, we specify a selection model to estimate an airline’s likelihood of 
undergoing a M&A, MAict, using a probit specification, i.e., equation 1.3, to obtain its linear 
prediction, 𝑝𝑖𝑡𝛼. Second, we compute the normal density function and the cumulative normal 
distribution of 𝛼 to obtain 𝑓(𝑝𝑖𝑡𝛼) and 𝐹(𝑝𝑖𝑡𝛼) respectively. Finally, we compute the inverse 
Mills ratio for each airline in the control group and the M&A group using the following 
equations: 
IMRit =  
𝑓(𝑝𝑖𝑡𝛼) 
𝐹(𝑝𝑖𝑡𝛼)
 𝑖𝑓 MAict = 1                                         (B1.1) 
                              
IMRit =  
−𝑓(𝑝𝑖𝑡𝛼) 
1−𝐹(𝑝𝑖𝑡𝛼)
 𝑖𝑓 MAict = 0                                      (B1.2) 
 
Taking equations B1.1 and B1.2 together, we obtain the following: 
IMRit = MAict ∗ (
𝑓(𝑝𝑖𝑡𝛼)
𝐹(𝑝𝑖𝑡𝛼)
) + (1 −  MAict) ∗ (
−𝑓(𝑝𝑖𝑡𝛼) 
1−𝐹(𝑝𝑖𝑡𝛼)
)                           (B2)  
As such, we derive the inverse Mills ratio of acquiring airline 𝑖 in quarter 𝑡 using equation 
B2. 
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Table 4.C1 - Results of Selection Model 
  Main Effects 
(Moderating Effect of 
Service Emphasis) 
Alternative Exclusion Restrictions Alternative M&A 
Date 
  Using Only Prior 
M&A 
Using Only MAPROB Using Alternative 
Measures 
Variables Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE) 
Firm Size 0.079 (11.010) *** 0.793 (0.070) *** 0.079 (10.960) *** 0.788 (0.072) *** 0.843 (0.078) *** 
Leverage -0.191 (0.492)  -0.909 (0.436) ** -0.213 (0.498)  -0.926 (0.479) * -0.669 (0.514)  
Liquidity 1.018 (0.120) *** 0.726 (0.097) *** 1.011 (0.118) *** 0.722 (0.096) *** 1.061 (0.120) *** 
Competition 0.915 (0.184) *** 1.090 (0.153) *** 0.912 (0.181) *** 1.064 (0.168) *** 1.069 (0.191) *** 
Prior M&A 0.031 (0.020)  0.062 (0.018) ***    0.027 (0.025)  0.054 (0.020) *** 
MAPROB 0.675 (0.202) ***    0.772 (0.190) *** 0.557 (0.284) * 0.560 (0.200) *** 
Observations 1,312 1,487 1,312 1,413 1,335 
  Alternative Time Windows to Construct Cohortsa  
  Using 1-Year Time 
Window 
Using 3-Year Time 
Window 
Using 4-Year Time 
Window 
Using 5-Year Time 
Window 
Variables Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE)   
Firm Size 0.782 (0.097) *** 0.847 (0.071) *** 0.823 (0.063) *** 0.748 (0.056) ***    
Leverage -0.331 (0.592)   -0.955 (0.449) ** -1.040 (0.397) ** -0.711 (0.357) **    
Liquidity 0.898 (0.150) *** 1.052 (0.109) *** 0.988 (0.099) *** 0.993 (0.096) ***    
Competition 0.883 (0.233) *** 1.177 (0.161) *** 1.155 (0.139) *** 1.420 (0.131) ***    
Prior M&A 0.047 (0.026) * 0.058 (0.018) *** 0.063 (0.017) *** 0.072 (0.017) ***    
MAPROB 0.535 (0.249) ** 0.452 (0.178) ** 0.481 (0.155) *** 0.038 (0.165)      
Observations 722 1,766 2,085 2,484  
 
Notes. * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 (two-sided); Coeff = Coefficient; SE = Standard Error; M&A = Mergers and Acquisitions; 
MAPROB = M&A Pressures from Closest Competitors. aDue to the availability of data required to construct each cohort, the 2 M&As 
that occurred in 2013, i.e., Endeavor Air and Delta, and US Airways and American Airlines, are dropped in the sensitivity analyses that 
use the 3-year, 4-year and 5-year time window, and the M&A that occurred in 2001, i.e., Trans World Airways and American Airlines, 
is also dropped in the sensitivity analyses that use the 4-year and 5-year time window. In addition, the 2 M&As that occurred in 2011, 
i.e., AirTran and Southwest Airlines, and ExpressJet Airlines and Atlantic Southeast Airlines, are also dropped in the sensitivity 
analysis that uses the 5-year time window. 
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